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“Logic is a geometry of thinking”.
Space and Spatial Frameworks in Wittgenstein’s Writings
Pascal Francesco Zambito
The thesis investigates the history and functions of space concepts in Wittgenstein’s
philosophy. It is based on a Kantian account which conceives of space not as a thing, but as
an a priori framework which constitutes possibilities, not facts. The increasing abstraction
and formalisation of geometry in the 19th century enabled Wittgenstein in his Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus to extend this formal account and to devise his concept of “logical
space” as a universal and necessary manifold for all meaningful states-of-affairs. After his
return to philosophy in 1929, he holds up the idea that necessity is not an extraordinary
fact, but a feature of the logical framework which constitutes possibilities. Unlike in the
Tractatus, however, he then speaks of spaces in the plural and highlights the differences
between different “geometries” or “grammars”. I emphasise the plurality of Wittgenstein’s
later space concept by presenting the various fields in which spatial terminology is used, as
well as the similarity of these various instances by pointing out commonalities in the way in
which they are used: the emphasis on possibility instead of truth, the distinction between
“geometry” and “physics”(between logic and experience), but also the distinction between
different kinds of geometries. These similarities allow me to recognise a number of concepts
as closely connected to “space” – and thereby to one another – instead of highlighting
their differences. Against views which argue for the complete disappearance of spaces
and grammar in the late Wittgenstein’s philosophy, I suggest that these concepts are not
dismissed, but transformed after the middle period. The reasons for this transformation are
the increasing importance of time, notably the change from static spaces to more dynamic
frameworks, and the acknowledgement of empirical factors in logic: instead of an ontological
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Ich glaube einen Philosophen, einen der
selbst denken kann, könnte es
interessieren meine Noten zu lesen.
Denn wenn ich auch nur selten in’s
Schwarze getroffen habe, so würde er





This thesis suggests a perspective on Wittgenstein’s work as a whole, namely to look at his
philosophy under the aspect of space. This requires some justification since Wittgenstein is
not known as a philosopher of space nor does the concept seem to have much prominence in
his major works, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations.
Moreover, it is a somewhat un-Wittgensteinian enterprise to suggest a single perspective on a
thinker whose philosophical biography seems to be marked by significant shifts and who,
at least in his later work, argued against any kind of monoperspectivism. Let me first say
that my perspective does not amount to a claim that everything has an immediate connection
to space, nor that, although I am largely concerned with philosophical method, there is one
single method, a “spatial” one, which Wittgenstein follows in all his works. Rather, I present
a plausible reading of the early and late Wittgenstein which accounts in a coherent way for
the differences and similarities between the periods of his writing. The aim is indeed to find
a certain overarching unity, but this unity is a unity of perspective: it does not exclude shifts
in the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy – things can change under the aspect of
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space – nor a pluralist understanding of the concept of “space” itself – like the family of
game-concepts is central to his later work, his use of “space” can be important without all
its instances having one thing in common. Indeed, if its function is understood, the concept
can play its part even if the word itself does not appear at all. Understanding its role can be
useful for the clarification of problems beyond the narrow scope of Wittgenstein scholarship
with which this thesis is primarily concerned.
Why space? The motivation to read Wittgenstein under this aspect comes from a thorough
study of the manuscripts from his so-called middle period or, to be more precise, from 1929
to 1933.1 I am not the first to notice that in this period problems are strikingly often conceived
in terms of space or geometry. Commenting on a typescript by Wittgenstein from 1930,
Bertrand Russell names the two most important concepts in his thinking of that time: “He uses
the words ‘space’ and ‘grammar’ in peculiar senses” (Russell 1968, 193). Most scholars who
work on the middle period have in one way or the other taken account of this characteristic. It
is, however, typically seen as a transitory phenomenon which vanishes after the early 1930s.
Thus Joachim Schulte writes: “In my view, getting away from this mode of thinking in terms
of different spaces [. . . ] is a particularly important mark characteristic of the development
of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy”. He especially contrasts thinking in spaces with “the
motley of language-games we all know and love in the form it is presented in Philosophical
Investigations and other writings by the later Wittgenstein” (Schulte 2006, 566).
Against this view I emphasise the continuity in Wittgenstein’s thinking on which I shall
elaborate a bit before explaining why space is particularly suited to illustrate it. Schulte
uses the metaphor of a “motley” which is very popular among scholars who work on the
Investigations. It is generally meant to highlight the difference between the early and
late philosophy: while the Tractatus sought to find the “general form of the proposition”,
Wittgenstein later acknowledged “that what we call ‘proposition’, ‘language’, has not the
formal unity that I imagined, but is a family of structures more or less akin to one another”
(PI 2009, §108). The image of a motley can be illuminating in the sense that it captures this
change as long as one does not dogmatically say “Language has the form of a motley”, but
rather “What we call language is not one thing, but a motley of forms”.
It would, however, be misleading to call the later Wittgenstein’s writings themselves
a “motley of language-games”. According to the OED a “motley” is an “incongruous,
multifarious, or confused mixture or assembly”. To be sure, the style of the Investigations is
very different from conventional academic style and may make the impression of lacking
1. One can speak of middle period until 1937 when the Philosophical Investigations start to take shape, but
the early middle period can be treated separately as I shall show below.
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a coherent structure.2 But at the same time they are a very carefully arranged text which
tries to account for a number of inherently connected problems. To deny this was surely
not Schulte’s intention: after all, he edited a “critical-genetic” edition of the Investigations
which accurately presents them as the result of a long and painstaking process of writing,
selecting, revising, and rearranging philosophical remarks over the course of several years.3
But by stressing the difference between space and motley, he draws a stark contrast between
Wittgenstein’s systematic, spatial, middle period and the more motley late period. I propose
a different emphasis. The Investigations, despite their loose structure, do suggest a nexus
of problems with which they are concerned. When Wittgenstein compares his remarks to
sketches made during a journey through a “field of thought”, he says that the “same or
almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and
new sketches made” (PI 2009, 3e). Reading these sketches together with the manuscripts
from the middle period, it struck me that the problems that were accounted for in terms of
space had not disappeared, but were now put in terms of different concepts that inherited
important features of what “space” stood for in the 1930s. To be sure, this comes along with
significant shifts, which shall be discussed in this thesis, but there is also a sense in which the
problems stay the same. The preface to the Investigations was written in 1945. It states that
the thoughts expressed therein had occupied Wittgenstein “for the last sixteen years” and
does not mention any major break in this period. It even suggests a certain continuity with
the Tractatus, albeit one which involves contrast:
Four years ago, however, I had occasion to reread my first book (the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas. Then it suddenly seemed to me
that I should publish those old ideas and the new ones together: that the latter
could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background
of my older way of thinking.
If the Tractatus and the Investigations were indeed published together, there would be a kind
of link between them, namely the motto by Johann Nepomuk Nestroy: “The trouble about
progress is that it always looks much greater than it really is”. Conversely, this might suggest
that the continuity is greater than it seems, a continuity which is blurred by overemphasising
differences between the Investigations and the earlier works.
The difficulty in talking about these things is to maintain the balance between continuity
and discontinuity without overly emphasising one of them to fit a narrative. Peter Hacker has
2. And this may be said a fortiori about his unpublished manuscripts which likewise lack a hierarchical
structure, but are composed in the form of “remarks”, short paragraphs separated by blank lines.
3. It has been published in German in 2001. For the latest English version, which I shall use here, Schulte
contributed to the translation and to the introduction in which the genesis of the text is sketched (PI 2009).
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advanced an influential reading which sees only few refinements on the way from middle to
late Wittgenstein. Especially the grammatical method, which is assumed to be central in both
periods, is said to have not changed since the mid-thirties. “It is patent that the conception of
philosophy he advanced in the Investigations is, in all respects pertinent to his grammatical
investigations, perfectly consistent with that proposed in The Big Typescript” (Hacker 2012b,
17). This view has been criticised for relying too much on sources of the middle period and
for failing to recognise the changes the concept of “grammar” underwent in the late 1930s.4
To outline my claim of continuity, I shall in this introduction critically discuss two
approaches that I am sympathetic to insofar as they try to provide an account for these
changes from middle to late Wittgenstein. What I do not agree with is the exaggeration of
the differences and the tendency to make the progress “look greater than it really is”. The
first is Mauro Engelmann’s interpretation which holds, against Hacker’s view, that “[n]othing
of the ‘old grammar’ is in place in the PI” (Engelmann 2013b, 261).
In his account of Wittgenstein’s development, Engelmann is concerned with differences
and indeed draws them so sharply that he suggests speaking of “different philosophies”, not
just the traditional Wittgensteins I and II, but several philosophies after 1929. He divides
these philosophies as follows: after the Tractatus and the following period with the well-
known biographical stages (prisoner of war, primary school teacher, architect) Wittgenstein
engaged with a modification of his early work by looking for a “phenomenological language”
which was supposed to translate immediate experience into a unified notation. From 1930
this project was no longer pursued. Instead, Wittgenstein now stressed the role of “grammar”
which stands for a comprehensive system of rules governing language. This, however, was
gradually replaced by what Engelmann calls the “genetic method”, that is, a method that
tries to comprehensibly present how a certain problem has come about, often by telling a
story about how the relevant words have been learned and how certain habits have emerged.
Because of this latter feature the genetic method goes hand in hand with an “anthropological
view”, a position that tries to grasp things more objectively by treating familiar modes of
acting and speaking like an anthropologist might regard a foreign culture (cf. Engelmann
2013b, 1–4).
The general outline of this narrative is certainly plausible. There are indeed shifts in
Wittgenstein’s writing that follow the steps mentioned by Engelmann: from phenomenology
to grammar to something close to anthropology as a tool of the genetic or “therapeutic”
method. But, as Alois Pichler has pointed out in his review of Engelmann’s book, other
4. In the same paper (2012b), Hacker lists instances of grammar from the middle and late period in order to
show that nothing has changed . While this claim is largely correct for the aspects considered, the list itself is
not complete and he does not consider changes of context which may alter the meaning of a remark significantly
(cf. Engelmann 2013b; Dobler 2013; Uffelmann 2018).
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stories are possible than this somewhat teleological account which sees each new step
as replacing the previous until a final level is reached. Even though Engelmann does
acknowledge that seeds of the genetic method are already present in the Big Typescript, his
presentation follows largely a “’not yet there, but coming next’ scheme” (Pichler 2016, 7).
However, there are good reasons to consider Wittgenstein’s development “more in terms of
a continuous struggle between constantly present views and approaches and the iterative
weighting of their relation and less in terms of a linear development from one view to another”
(8). Pichler hints at the possibility of several simultaneous positions that Wittgenstein may
have found attractive at a given time. Indeed his (like David Stern’s) account stresses this
“polyphonic” nature of Wittgenstein’s style not only in the middle period, but especially in the
Investigations. While Engelmann argues that vestiges of the “old grammar” are only quoted
by the late Wittgenstein in order to be criticised, one can also regard them as voices in their
own right which strive for clear structures and systems, thereby acting as a counterbalance to
the negative and anti-systematic voices in the Investigations to which Engelmann seems to
grant final authority (cf. Pichler 2004; Stern 2017).
Here is a characteristic example from Engelmann’s book: drawing on George Edward
Moore’s report about Wittgenstein hinting at the vagueness of concepts like “proposition”
and “sense” (a step away from the Tractatus made in 1932–33), he concludes: “The lack
of sharp limits to ‘proposition’ and ‘language’ thus suggests that the idea of ‘grammar’ as
the rules of sense is idle. Tabulating those rules is useless, if one is looking for the limits of
language and the limits of sense” (Engelmann 2013b, 160).
But this is not what is said in Moore’s notes, instead they say: “although it is not sharply
bounded, the expression ‘makes sense’ is useful as ‘game’ is useful” (quoted by Engelmann
on the same page).5 This is evocative of Wittgenstein’s later remark about the concept of
“game” as a family of interrelated concepts (cf. PI, §§ 66–67), but also of him questioning the
statement that vague rules have no function at all: “’Still, it isn’t a game at all, if there is some
vagueness in the rules.’ But is it really not a game then?” (PI, §100). The point of this latter
remark seems to be that a game with vague rules is still called a game; that an enclosure with
a hole is still an enclosure; that we are misled by an ideal conception of game or enclosure
which prevents us from seeing that these words work well without being everywhere defined
with absolute rigidity. Likewise, a concept of proposition or grammar that allows vagueness
5. I cannot completely coordinate the passage from this edition (1965), in which Moore summarised his
notes into essays, with the recent edition of his notes (2016); but in February 1933, Moore reports Wittgenstein
expressing himself very similarly: “We are quite right to use the word ‘game’, so long as we don’t pretend to
have drawn a definite outline [. . . ] ‘Sense of a proposition is its use’ – & this, of course is vague”. Immediately
after this, however, Wittgenstein says something that clearly contradicts Engelmann’s reading, namely an
affirmative evocation of his “old grammar”: “When we do philosophy, we give rules of grammar wherever
there is a philosophical difficulty” (2016, 280–81).
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can still be useful to decide whether something makes sense or not. I do not agree with
Engelmann when he states that the “whole project of drawing the limits of sense, which
was the original purpose of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘grammar’ since PR, is abandoned”
(2013, 171) and replaced by describing the use of words from an anthropological perspective.
There is a certain tension between these two methods, which shall be discussed in the later
chapters of this thesis, but I shall also provide evidence that the grammatical method of
sense-constitution does not disappear completely after the mid-thirties. The strategy to prove
this continuity shall be to carve out the function of “space” and “grammar” in the middle
period and to compare it to the arguments in the late period. What motivates Engelmann’s
sharp distinction is, among other things, his assumption that the middle Wittgenstein’s
“grammar” is a comprehensive system which accounts for the totality of language. It is a
popular misunderstanding that “grammar” was supposed to be an actual book in which rules
for a totality of uses are stated. A possible source of this confusion is Wittgenstein’s analogy
of grammar as an “account book” of language which, he claims, should feature a certain
“completeness” (cf. TS213, 526r; Engelmann 2013b, 139; Uffelmann 2018, 140). However,
in the manuscripts it becomes clear that this metaphor is introduced in order to stress a
different sort of completeness, namely that grammar need not be concerned with emotional
concomitants of utterances. The feelings of a businessman play no role in an account book
which only states transactions (not rules) just like in Wittgenstein’s grammatical descriptions
the feelings of the speakers should not make a difference. In the sense in which the lack
of feelings does not constitute a gap in the account book, grammar is complete. It is not
complete in the sense of a totality of transactions or legitimate uses of a word respectively –
this would be absurd except for a limited period of time, but what would be the purpose of
such a grammar (except for historical linguistics perhaps)?
At this point it makes sense to bring in the second foil to my approach, namely James
Conant’s ideas about Wittgenstein’s method. Although known as a champion of the “resolute
reading”, which tends to emphasise similarities between Tractatus and Investigations, he
has suggested a rather strong division between middle and late Wittgenstein in terms of a
transition from one philosophical method to a plurality of methods.
His paper, too, is based on lecture notes which are a fairly reliable source of Wittgenstein’s
words.6 However, from Wittgenstein’s diary we know that these words need to be handled
with care. In 1936, he admits retrospectively that he often pretended to his students to
be certain of ideas when he was actually still in doubt about them (cf. MS183, 145).
6. He refers to Desmond Lee’s notes; these largely correspond to those by G.E. Moore who is probably the
most reliable source. Generally however, the notes by students can be problematic. Alice Ambrose’s notes, for
example, have been shown to include some significant misunderstandings (cf. Schulte 2006, 564; Nedo 2012,
321).
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Nevertheless, one statement from those notes has become very famous and is used by Conant
to support his argument: it is the bold claim that philosophy will be transformed (“as when
chemistry developed out if alchemy”) because “a method has been found” and instead of great
philosophers now “there can be skilful ones” (MN 2016, 67). This stands in obvious contrast
to another, later, remark which has also become very prominent despite its philologically
precarious status: “There is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, different therapies, as it were”. It is written on a slip of paper that was added to the
final typescript of the Philosophical Investigations and is generally considered an addendum
to §133, although there are scholars who question this attribution.7
From these two remarks Conant builds an intriguing narrative about Wittgenstein’s devel-
opment. Unlike Engelmann, he does recognise that grammar was not to be comprehensive,
but that there are indeed “grammars” and that this is a first step away from the universalism of
the Tractatus. However, there still remained the universalism of method as expressed in the
lecture note. So Conant suggests a first transition from one logic to multiple grammars and a
second transition from one method to multiple methods. Between these two transitions lies
the middle Wittgenstein, roughly from 1929 to 1937. Conant sees that space plays a role in
this development, yet he strongly believes the concept of space to be universal, as it actually
was in the Tractatus; and this prevents him from seeing that what he calls “grammars” is
connected to “spaces” in the middle period:
For the problems of philosophy no longer rest for Middle Wittgenstein on a
misunderstanding of something we can call the logic of our language, where it
is crucial to the point of the definite article here that there is just that one logical
space. (That is the point of the spatial metaphor, after all; as Kant almost says:
all parts of space must be parts of one space.)8
[. . . ] Early Wittgenstein’s conception of the logic of our language gives way
to Middle Wittgenstein’s conception of grammars, where the emphasis on the
plural now becomes essential to the conception. Starting in the middle period,
an interest prevails in mapping the contours of alternative logical terrains which
cannot be accommodated within a single space. (Conant 2011, 640)
This has, I believe, an advantage over Engelmann’s view, but overemphasises the transition
from method to methods on the basis of two rather marginal remarks. It is by no means clear
7. Among them is Engelmann who insists on the primacy of his “genetic method”. He also suggests that the
later Wittgenstein’s method can indeed be said to be one, but that it is inherently open. With this I agree, but I
would hold that it should also be open to the grammatical, spatial, methods of the middle period and not nullify
them.
8. The “almost” Kantian idea of a singular space and its reflection in Tractarian logical space shall be
addressed in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.
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what the single method was supposed to be.9 Shortly before Wittgenstein gave the lecture on
method to Moore and his other students in October 1930, he wrote in his diary that he had
not thought about philosophy for three weeks and worried about not knowing what to say (cf.
MS183, 46; 8 October 1930). Three weeks earlier he had written in a manuscript volume:
“the method of philosophy is to listen to all voices and to reconcile them all” (MS109, 159;
19 September 1930). Of course, Wittgenstein speaks of method in the singular here, but is
it really justified to make a stark distinction between method and methods if the method is
supposed to account for all voices, that is for a plurality? Perhaps the idea of reconciliation
can be read in Conant’s way, but in Wittgenstein’s practice, in his manuscripts from that
time, he clearly tries to follow the pluralist part of his programme and listen to a number
of different voices which he frames in terms of different grammatical spaces. These spaces
reflect different logical forms as opposed to the one logical form of the Tractatus. I agree with
Conant that this “open-ended, infinitely extendable conception of a family of possible forms
of grammar comes to be seen to require a correlatively open-ended, infinitely extendable
conception of a family of possible forms of philosophical method” (2011, 641). But I do
not see this methodical pluralism only develop in the late Wittgenstein. If he had said in his
1930 lecture that there must be many methods to account for all voices, it would not have
contradicted his general thinking at that time. A difference of form and grammar is not a
difference between things of the same kind which can be treated with the same method – this
is the gist of the manuscripts from 1929–32 as I will show in chapter 4.
The specific narrative Conant presents is solely based on Lee’s lecture note about a
method whose intricacies are nowhere expounded. The obscure statement that now there can
be “skilful” philosophers, is pushed too far when he argues that for the middle Wittgenstein
“no fundamental form of originality will any longer be required on the part of the philosophical
practitioner in order for him to be able to make genuine progress with philosophical problems”
because “a method has been found” which philosophers can, as it were, mechanically follow
(Conant 2011, 640). On the contrary, the invention of new forms, of new spaces, is an
important characteristic of Wittgenstein’s thinking from the early 1930s, especially in his
philosophy of mathematics as I will show. Far from being mechanical puzzle-solving, the
development of grammatical forms, which are often conceived as spaces in the middle period,
involves a considerable element of creativity.
9. Nor is it clear what the many methods of the late Wittgenstein are even though here there are plausible
suggestions. Oskari Kuusela, for example, provides a list of Wittgenstein’s methods including the method to
use rule-governed calculi and language-games as objects of comparison and the method to pursue philosophy
like “natural history” – which obviously captures Engelmann’s “anthropological” ideas. Kuusela also suggests
that there is a sense in which Wittgenstein’s later method is one, but can take various forms depending on the
philosophical problem at hand (cf. Kuusela 2008, 269–270).
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Neither Wittgenstein’s “space” nor “grammar” or “calculus”, which Engelmann seems
to regards as universal concepts, are means of reductionism. Rather, these concepts are the
expression of the post-Tractarian pluralism with regards to both forms and methods. Both
Engelmann and Conant seem to be eager to present the middle Wittgenstein as somewhat
mechanical and obsessed with fixed rules whereas the late Wittgenstein is, as it were, full of
life and humanity. Even though spaces and calculi may appear dry in contrast to the more
animate “games” and “forms of life” that inhabit the Investigations, the idea to compare
language to such systems had a very similar function as the later, more liberal, concepts;
vagueness of formal systems and the diversity of according methods were already discussed
in the early 30s. Against Engelmann, I argue that there is indeed a plurality of grammatical
spaces in the middle period, and against Conant, that these spaces correspond already to a
plurality of methods.
By focusing on space, I emphasise this continuity. Since it is such a flexible concept
in the middle period, which is used in a number of different philosophical fields, my claim
is that it is a central characteristic of Wittgenstein’s thinking and that it is not dismissed in
the late works as Engelmann and Conant suggest. The set of problems that this metaphor
is supposed to capture motivates the introduction of a “logical space” in the Tractatus, it
leads to modifications in the middle period, and it survives in the late period although it
is then no longer conceived of in terms of spaces. Hence, the spatial perspective allows
me to give a new account of the similarities and dissimilarities between the various stages
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy without marginalising the concepts of the middle period or
neglecting their later transformation.
Despite his earlier view, which regarded spaces as a transitory phenomenon in Wittgen-
stein’s development, Schulte acknowledges, in a more recent paper, a connection between
the logical space of the Tractatus and the later use of space concepts that are connected
with “grammar” (cf. 2017, 319).10 This connection has also been noticed by other scholars
(e.g. Glock 1996, 223; Hyder 2002, ch. 7; Ometiţă 2018), but the similarity has not been
spelled out yet and it has not been made clear what motivates the usage of the common term
“space” – which is itself, just like its sister concept “time”, a highly controversial term in
philosophy. Drawing on its history in Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy, I shall argue
that Wittgenstein’s logical space in the Tractatus is more than a metaphor and more than a
local phenomenon; thanks to its technical functions, it is suited to take up a central role in
the revision of his earlier work in the middle period; since functions of spaces remain vital in
the late writings, I use them as a means to illustrate the continuity of his philosophy.
10. Schulte’s example is even from the early 1940s which contradicts his earlier claim that spaces disappear
after 1933.
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Wittgenstein himself seems to have seen a kind of unity in his philosophical life. Naturally,
such an observation can only be made retrospectively and it is indeed in the writings from
his last years where we find such comments on his own work (the motto by Nestroy was
added after 1945, too). In 1951, shortly before his death, he wrote the remark whose original
version I used as an epigraph for this introduction: “I believe a philosopher, someone who
can think for himself, could be interested in reading my notes. For even though I rarely
hit the bull’s eye, he would recognise at which targets I was ceaselessly aiming” (MS175,
64v—65r). This suggests a more or less stable set of problems Wittgenstein was struggling
with, not only in his last writings, but “ceaselessly” (unablässig). In 1946, he wrote the
remarkable sentence that inspired Steve Reich to his musical composition Proverb: “How
small a thought it takes to fill a whole life!” (MS131, 180). In its context it is plausible to
interpret this remark as referring to Wittgenstein’s own philosophical life; the “small thought”
is a bit obscure (the preceding sentence is “The forces that determine how something is
represented are as great as those that insist on the truth of the representation”), but by the
end of this thesis I shall be in a position to propose an interpretation of that thought which
connects it to space and takes it as a nodal point for Wittgenstein’s whole philosophy where
many interests and problems intersect. I shall achieve this position by looking at the role of
space in writings from all stages of his work.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
In the second chapter of the thesis, I shall look at the roots of Wittgenstein’s space concept. I
shall investigate the relation between space, geometry, and a priori in general which has been
central to the work of many 19th century mathematicians and scientists and to the logical
positivists in the 20th century. Before approaching the peculiar notion of logical space, it is
helpful to consider some precursor ideas of it. Even though they may not have influenced
Wittgenstein directly (some certainly have), they still set the stage for the modal ontology of
the Tractatus.
I start with a brief sketch of Kant’s philosophy of space in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Space is here seen as a “form of intuition” which is not itself an object, but a condition
of the possibility of perception. With a Wittgensteinian phrase one could say, this form is
“the possibility of a structure”. Moreover, space and time are Kant’s prime examples of a
priori knowledge which resembles in some ways the Tractarian account of logic, although its
insights are supposed to have a different kind of truth than the apodictic certainties Kant held
to be a priori. Another parallel is Kant’s belief that Euclidean space is the form of intuition
just like Wittgenstein believed logical space reflected the form of language and reality.
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In the middle of the 19th century, non-Euclidean geometries were developed in which at
least one axiom (or postulate) turned out to be not necessarily true (the parallel postulate).
Helmholtz, drawing on Riemann, develops an account of space-like manifolds to account for
sensory experience. Generally, geometry becomes more abstract: it is no longer the study of
a three-dimensional Euclidean container in which supposedly everything physical takes place,
but an unspecified manifold of n coordinates and with variable metrics. The formalisation
of geometry led to a deflation of the concept of a priori and it enabled Wittgenstein to
fruitfully employ spatial imagery in his first philosophical book. Before he used geometrical
methods in his Tractatus, physicists such as Hertz and Boltzmann had used ideas by Kant and
Helmholtz to provide instructive representations of states of physical systems. Again the idea
of spatial locations as possibilities is central. The application of this method to physics can
be seen as a result of the increasing abstraction of geometry in the middle of the century: if
“space” is no longer the actual three-dimensional structure we live in, but an abstract manifold
of possibilities, then it can be used to represent other possibilities as well: in Hertz’s state
space particles can be located within a physical system and each possible state of the system
can be described as one momentary totality of these particle-coordinates; in Boltzmann’s
phase space statistical distributions can be modelled in space-like 6n-dimensional manifolds.
Both physicists also developed concepts of “picture” (Bild) for certain scientific frameworks
that may have influenced Wittgenstein; however, I argue that the influence of their picture
theories is rather limited, while their, roughly speaking, Kantian ideas about space are more
relevant for an understanding of both picture and space.
In chapter 3, I investigate how Wittgenstein builds on this development in his Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus. The aspects I want to highlight in my interpretation are the focus on
possibilities, the role of negation and logical operations in general, and the claim for unity
and generality. First, I shall describe the Tractarian “ontology” of objects, atomic facts, and
facts and their interdependences; the isomorphism between language and world in virtue of
the shared logical form which is to be understood in the Kantian sense as the possibility of a
structure: the possible structures of words in propositions correspond to the possible structure
of objects in facts (the picture theory). Second, I look at one important function of logical
space besides representing possibilities, namely to illustrate the function of logical constants
without them being represented as “objects” (Wittgenstein’s “fundamental thought”, TLP
4.0312). Negation can be conceived as mutually exclusive (and exhaustive) regions of a
space; conjunction and implication are relations between states in a state-space similar to
Hertz’s. Third, I investigate the claim for unity in the Tractatus and the idea that the described
language mirrors the necessary structure of the world. Again, Kantian ideas are involved in
these arguments, even in the terminology (e.g. TLP 6.13: “logic is transcendental”). The
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claim to have found the “general form of the proposition” (TLP, 4.5; 6) suggests that there is
only one kind of proposition, that it is hence possible to represent its general form, and that
this representation could be achieved by means of a universal structure such as Wittgenstein’s
logical space.
In the fourth chapter, I look at the use of space concepts in the middle period. While
keeping many of its functions, logical space loses its uniformity and disintegrates into
a plurality of grammatical spaces with sometimes incompatible context-dependent rules.
These grammars, which are repeatedly compared to geometries, still serve as frameworks
of possibilities and also inherit the crucial distinction between geometry, which is strictly
speaking senseless, and meaningful propositions within a space. What is important for
Wittgenstein at this stage is to keep these geometries apart and to show where confusion of
spaces leads to philosophical problems. He tackles a number of related fields in these years
while always referring back to the imagery of space and its basic distinctions. In mathematics,
he distinguishes number spaces and insists on the creativity that is involved in developing
new calculi, in “inventing” new spaces, rather than “discovering” places in an already given
space. Wittgenstein’s treatment of colours in the middle period is said to be a milestone
insofar as it showed the limitations of the Tractarian account and suggested the need for a
kind of phenomenological space of colours. Phenomenology in a wider sense is opposed
to physicalistic conceptions of language – generally, the space of physics is contrasted with
visual space as an example that involves vagueness and is not a “measuring space” and hence,
pace Conant, requires different philosophical methods. Finally, Wittgenstein employs space
metaphors when discussing intentionality, the mind’s relation to its objects: against causal
theories of meaning and theories about mental representation of the world, he highlights the
limitations of language and its dependence on a systematic grammatical space in which alone
thought and reality can meet.
Having carved out the functions of spaces in the middle period, I can in the fifth chapter
recognise other concepts as belonging to the same set of problems. Formal systems that
are comparable to spaces are conceived in terms of a variety of typical Wittgensteinian
concepts which supports my claim that space as a problem, not necessarily as a word, plays
an important role in his whole philosophy. The first group of these concepts can be described
as complementing the functions of space. A “form of representation” clearly has similar
functions insofar as it determines the way we look at things. The discussion of notations
in the middle period can be seen as a pluralist modification of the notation of the Tractatus
which was supposed to be the correct one. Even theories, which tend to be dismissed in
Wittgenstein scholarship, can have the grammatical function of what is elsewhere called a
space. A second group of concepts replaces space concepts as can be proven empirically –
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by looking at their occurrences in correlation with those of space – as well as conceptually
by showing how they take up functions of space. These are especially calculi and games
which gradually become more important in the form of language-games, a central tool of
the later Wittgenstein. The third group are larger frameworks which resemble the universal
logical space, but are now presented in a relativistic framework. Forms of life are indeed
larger patterns of human organisation, but none of them can claim universal validity or truth.
Like space in its deflated sense, they rather determine a way of looking at things. A similar
role is attributed to concepts like style and world-picture.
In the sixth chapter, I discuss limitations of space concepts which partly motivate their
substitution by other concepts. Unsatisfied with Engelmann’s account of the anthropological
view replacing grammar and with Conant’s emphasis on the number of methods, I propose
my own interpretation of the relation between the middle and the late Wittgenstein. This inter-
pretation is two-fold. Its first aspect is a shift from static spaces to more dynamic frameworks;
the second is the acknowledgement of the role of empirical, sometimes anthropological,
elements in the late writings. Thanks to the focus on space, however, I can still see the
continuity in these developments without regarding the new ideas as replacements of the
older ones. Instead, I argue, not unlike the polyphonic readings by Pichler and Stern, that
in the later Wittgenstein a dialectic is at work that presents arguments between different
positions none of which is given preference in a clear-cut way.
The thesis is primarily a contribution to Wittgenstein studies, especially to the debate
on continuity in his work, but beyond that I hope to open up perspectives for an application
of the gained insights. Since Wittgenstein is widely considered one of the most important
philosophers of our time, a clearer understanding of his philosophy should have ramifications
beyond the merely exegetical debate. Directions in which such applications could lead are
indicated in the conclusion.
1.3 Some Remarks on the Nachlass
Since my approach aims to provide an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a whole
and to trace its continuities and developments, it demands a closer look at the structure of the
writings themselves. The Tractatus has a unique position in this oeuvre as the only completed
and published work by Wittgenstein that we can take as his last word (at least at the time of
its publication). Nevertheless, the war-time manuscripts and letters in which he explains parts
of the book can be a great help to illuminate the very brief, dense and sometimes puzzling
remarks of the Tractatus.
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After 1929, the situation becomes more complicated: there is a series of manuscript
volumes which, in my opinion, best reflect the continuous thinking process, especially
between 1929 and 1932. Other writings of this time, which have received much attention
in the literature as they present some of Wittgenstein’s thoughts in a more accessible –
sometimes deceivingly straightforward – way, shall be less important in my thesis. Lecture
notes by students and conversations with the Vienna Circle mostly reflect arguments that
occur more comprehensively in the manuscripts while blurring or concealing their clearly
preliminary status in Wittgenstein’s development; besides, they are “second hand” sources
which do not have the authority of an original document. Texts by Wittgenstein himself
from that time, such as the paper Some Remarks on Logical Form, the typescripts on which
the publication of the Philosophical Remarks is based (TSS208, 209) and which were later
used for the compilation of further typescripts, seem likewise to be side products of the
flow of arguments in the manuscripts with only small, and only rarely significant, deviations
or differences in emphasis (the order of TS209, for example, can be significant). These
typescripts were eventually joined by Wittgenstein to one big collection, the Big Typescript
which, however, does not contain substantially new material compared to the manuscripts. It
can be instructive through the way in which it is structured. As the only text by Wittgenstein
it features a table of contents and is structured in chapters and subchapters. The order of
these chapters and the assignment of an individual remark under a certain heading can
give that remark a new gist which sometimes makes it appear more clearly as a step in an
argument (and sometimes the opposite: sometimes remarks function well in their original
context in the flow of the manuscripts and stand somewhat erratically in a chapter between
remarks that seem unrelated). The manuscript volumes and the Big Typecript have been
critically edited in the Vienna Edition. For referencing, I shall use von Wright’s codes for
the manuscripts and typescripts (cf. G. v. Wright 1969) because the Vienna Edition does
not cover the later manuscripts to which I will draw frequent connections. When translating
from the manuscripts, I shall indicate cancellations and variants only where I regard them
important for the argument made. Generally, my translation is geared to the normalised
transcription from the Bergen Nachlass Edition.11
What is interesting in the context of the Big Typescript, is how Wittgenstein used it after
1933 when he started new attempts to summarise his ideas in the form of a book, e.g. in
the network of manuscripts that has been published as Philosophical Grammar or MS116
which starts as a revision of the Big Typescript and gradually becomes more and more like
the Investigations. In the middle of the 1930s, there is also the Blue Book which is more
reliable than the lecture notes as it has been dictated by Wittgenstein himself; it contains
11. It is available online at wittgensteinonline.no and linked to the facsimiles at wittgensteinsource.org.
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in consecutive prose some ideas that are spread across various remarks in the manuscripts.
The Brown Book, dictated one year later, can be seen as the start of the project Philosophical
Investigations, but is still very much based on the material from the first ten manuscript
volumes 1929–1932. A period in Norway in 1936/37 seems to mark the start of the actual
corpus of the Investigations: again, the writings from this time are to a large extent concerned
with ideas from earlier work, from the Tractatus and the Big Typescript which he seemed to
have brought with him to Norway, but the tenor seems to have taken a new direction. From
this time, notebooks are particularly useful, pre-stages of the manuscript volumes which
exhibit Wittgenstein’s ideas, as it were, in statu nascendi. The focus on the foundations of
mathematics, which follows this phase well into the 1940s, is treated here not as a break, but
as a continuation from the lines of thought that have started in the 30s. They can be put in
terms of the “spatial” themes that I will focus on: possibility and surprise, the role of a priori
knowledge, the nature of (grammatical) rules, games and practice.
The Philosophical Investigations are rightly seen as Wittgenstein’s second masterpiece
although they have not been published by himself. I will use the latest German-English
edition by Hacker and Schulte and Schulte’s German edition which includes all pre-stages
and revisions and thereby does justice to the uncompleted status of the book. The last
writings, manuscripts which led to the publications of Remarks on Colour and On Certainty,
but also the so-called part II of the Investigations, are not a “third Wittgenstein”, but reveal
quite continuous accounts of language-game, a priori knowledge etc. which are related with
space as I understand it.

Chapter 2
Spaces in Kantian and Neo-Kantian
Philosophy
Kants Größe beruht auf der Konzeption
des Begriffs einer “Form a priori”, aber
nicht auf der Anwendung, die er ihm
gab.
Oswald Spengler
Der Untergang des Abendlandes
This chapter has two aims which are intimately intertwined with one another. The first
follows naturally from my ambition to understand Wittgenstein’s use of spatial metaphors
and concepts: to trace the origins of this imagery. As merely pointing to the usual suspects
does not seem to be satisfactory – recent scholarship rather highlights the differences between
Wittgenstein and Hertz or Boltzmann –, I go a bit further back in the history of philosophy,
notably to Kant’s notion of space and to the related concepts of a priori and a posteriori,
necessity and possibility. Of course, I am not the first to propose connections between Kant
and Wittgenstein, but my focus on the development of Kantian space-concepts sheds some
new light on this kinship and will be a constant point of reference in the chapters to come.
This touches the second aim of this chapter: to clarify or at least sketch aspects of the
sense in which “space” shall be used in the rest of the thesis. The use of spatial expressions
in the Tractatus seems to be metaphorical; indeed an important instance, the “space of
possible atomic facts” (TLP 1922, 2.0131)12 is introduced with a typical marker of imagery:
“gleichsam”, translated in both English editions with “as it were”. So one objection against
12. In the following, the quotes from the Tractatus, unless otherwise specified, are from the 1922 edition
and translation which has been authorised by Wittgenstein. Problems of this translation shall be addressed in
chapter 3.
18 Spaces in Kantian and Neo-Kantian Philosophy
a special focus on spatial expressions might be that they simply have a local illustrative
purpose like other metaphors Wittgenstein employs. However, there are two reasons that
make logical or grammatical “space” special. First, the sheer number and the argumentative
role of its occurrences distinguish it from merely local tropes or images. This claim shall
be substantiated in chapters 3 and 4 whose topic is the usage of “space” in the Tractatus
and in the middle period. Second, while other Wittgensteinian images, “ladder”, “spade”,
“fly-bottle”, have themselves histories of controversial interpretations and debates, they are
more or less straightforward metaphors which compare an abstract idea with a more concrete
physical object and receive their illustrative power from this concreteness.13 One might argue
that this “direction” is still at play in the case of space since what is illustrated with this image
is the most abstract and general idea of all, namely the possibility of “the world” conceived
as a totality of logical facts. But there remains the problem that “space” is itself a highly
abstract concept and that its tertium comparationis is not immediately obvious. To be sure,
spatial metaphors are not a Wittgensteinian peculiarity: “up” and “down”, “far” and “close”
are ubiquitous in conceptual discourse as well as in everyday language. But when “space”
and “geometry” themselves are used as analogies something different is happening. They are
themselves philosophical terms with an intricate history and controversial interpretations,
with varying functions in different philosophical approaches. Therefore the way the analogy
works depends on the respective interpretation of space and geometry on which the metaphor
is based. To understand the sense in which these unusual metaphors are employed by
Wittgenstein, it is helpful to explore how “space” and “geometry” have been used by writers
with whose ideas he was, directly or indirectly, familiar. The possible influences I consider
in this chapter have already been linked to Wittgenstein in the literature in one way or
another. Similarities between Wittgenstein and Kant have been the topic of numerous papers
and discussions; Hertz and Boltzmann have repeatedly been associated with the Tractatus
philosophy. My focus on spaces draws out another narrative which includes these thinkers,
but also considers the development of 19th century geometry in general whose intersections
with Wittgenstein’s philosophy have received less attention in the literature.14
What I want to argue is that “space” – like “picture”15 – is not merely a metaphor, but
a technical, a formal concept at the heart of Wittgenstein’s philosophy which can be better
understood against the background of Kantian philosophy and especially its later development
13. The “direction” of conceptual metaphors typically goes from concrete to abstract (cf. Kövecses 2010, 7).
14. An exception is David Hyder’s profound account of structural similarities between Neo-Kantian philoso-
phy and the Tractatus. His book The Mechanics of Meaning: Propositional Content and the Logical Space of
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (2002) is an important source for this chapter.
15. “ I have inherited this concept of a picture from two sides: first from a drawn picture, second from the
picture of a mathematician, which already is a general concept. For a mathematician talks of picturing in cases
where a painter would no longer use this expression” (WVC, 185).
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and modifications. In the first section, I shall focus on Kant who provides the terminological
and systematic background of both the Neo-Kantian and the Wittgensteinian ideas. Unlike
most comparisons to Kant (cf. Hacker 2012a; A. Moore 2013; Sullivan 2013), I do not
focus on the Transcendental Deduction, not on solipsism and the transcendental unity of
apperception, but on the first parts of The Critique of Pure Reason, on the introduction and on
the Transcendental Aesthetic where space and time are discussed as pure forms of intuition.
There is an important kinship between Kant and Wittgenstein’s uses of space which I want to
highlight and which consists in their respective treatments of necessity and possibility and
of possibility and actuality.16 But, to anticipate an obvious objection, logical space in the
Tractatus does not deal with Kantian intuition; and of course, Wittgenstein does at no point
embrace the idea of any truth that is “synthetic a priori”. On the contrary, one of his core
claims is that logical propositions, which were held to be the most general truths about the
world by his predecessors (e.g. Russell), are “true” in a different sense: for they famously
“say nothing” and are true only in virtue of their form like Kant’s analytical propositions.
While Kant would have agreed that logical propositions are empty, mathematical propositions,
synthetic a priori knowledge for Kant, are taken to be pseudo-propositions by Wittgenstein
(TLP, 6.2); and neither is “pure science” considered an a priori truth: “outside logic all is
accident” (TLP, 6.3).
These insights resemble the development of geometry after Kant. For Kant the axioms
of geometry still said “something” for they were synthetic a priori truths: they required
intuition, if only “pure” intuition. The development of geometrical conventionalism in the
course of the crumbling universality of geometry, shall be dealt with in the second section of
this chapter. Kant’s space, which is describable with Euclidean geometry, was questioned and
attacked throughout the 19th century by mathematicians, physicists and philosophers. Some
completely rejected the Kantian ideas, some tried to modify them in light of new insights in
mathematics and physics – a questionable enterprise since one aspect of Kant’s classification
of geometry as a priori was that it is immune to empirical results and that its mathematical
insights are of timeless necessity. However, the idea was precisely to shift this necessity
from the specific structure of Euclidean space, which Kant held to be the form of the outer
sense,17 to a more abstract level of necessity. The homogeneous three-dimensional space
without curvature was no longer an apodictic certainty, but there is a higher – perhaps trivial
16. The Deduction may be relevant for these issues, too, but to keep the focus on space it makes sense to stick
with the Aesthetic (after all, it is itself a kind of transcendental deduction of the concepts of space and time, cf.
A85–90, B118–122). And it was geometry which became the prime example for a priori knowledge and its lost
universality.
17. Kant scholars might object that Kant’s philosophy of space changed a lot during his lifetime and not at all
stages did he claim the apodicticity of Euclidean space (cf. Caygill 1995, 367–373). However, this became the
most influential of his positions and the one that was associated with the Kantian a priori in the 19th century.
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– necessity that any geometrical system, Euclidean or non-Euclidean, must be a manifold
of coordinated dimensions.18 The axioms, the number of dimensions, and the curvature
can vary from system to system, but once a certain geometry is in place its axioms can be
called necessary; however, they are necessary only relative to the preceding choice. Such an
understanding of geometry is first of all a mathematical notion and is less bound to physical
space which Kant was aiming to make intelligible. This abstracted notion of geometry lends
itself already more easily to metaphorical and technical applications and Helmholtz’s idea of
space-like manifolds of perception is one of them.
While we can only speculate about Wittgenstein’s direct acquaintance with this devel-
opment, his acknowledged influences, Hertz and Boltzmann, draw heavily on it and use
abstract and multi-dimensional “spaces” in order to model physical systems. This shall be
the topic of the third section. Wittgenstein’s familiarity with this abstract understanding of
“space” is likely to stem from these two thinkers; however, the structural similarities with
this tradition exist irrespective of any direct biographical influence. Besides the historical
account of philosophies of space and geometry from Kant to Wittgenstein, the aim of this
chapter is to explain how space could take up the metaphorical and yet technical functions it
features in the Tractatus and in the writings of the middle period.
2.1 Kant: Space and Form as Possibility
Wittgenstein’s relation to Kant is controversial. Parallels between their philosophical projects
have been recognised from the beginnings of Wittgenstein scholarship (cf. Stenius 1960) and
have attracted interpreters ever since. There certainly are significant similarities between
the two thinkers. Peter Hacker, who suggested very strong ties between them in the first
edition of his book Insight and Illusion (1972), describes these affinities more modestly in
the second edition:
Both philosophers shared a conception of philosophy as concerned with the
bounds of sense, even though their conception of what determines the latter
differed. Both thought that many propositions of traditional metaphysics violate
the bounds of sense, misuse concepts, and hence make nonsensical claims. More
than any other philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein were concerned with the
nature of philosophy itself and sought to curb its metaphysical pretensions by
18. Among others, Russell, in an early paper on the a priori in geometry, distinguished necessary axioms
of any geometry and Euclid’s axioms which could only be derived from experience (cf. 1895). However, he
did not go as far as the thinkers I am going to consider. For example, he held the Axiom of Free Mobility as a
priori necessary for any geometry, while Helmholtz thought of it as an empirical matter and Riemann even
considered geometries without this axiom.
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clarifying its status and circumscribing what one may rationally hope for in
philosophical investigation. Both saw philosophical and metaphysical illusions
of reason as at least a large part of the subject, and the eradication of such
illusions as a major goal of their work. And they shared a highly critical attitude
towards traditional empiricism and rationalism alike. (Hacker 1986, 207)19
Comparisons between Kant and Wittgenstein have mainly focused on their philosophical
methods and their reflections on the role of philosophy. The “critical” project of Kant to draw
a limit to pure reason seems to echo in the Tractarian project “to draw a limit to thinking
– or rather, to the expression of thoughts” (TLP, preface). There is also a striking Kantian
ring in the sub-remarks to proposition 6 of the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein describes
logic as “transcendental” (TLP, 6.13), then comments on the Kantian examples of a priori
knowledge, mathematics (in the 6.2s) and science (in the 6.3s), before turning to ethics and
aesthetics which are, again, “transcendental” (TLP, 6.421).20 An elaborate interpretation of
“Wittgenstein’s Kant” cannot be constructed out of these remarks, but a certain affinity cannot
be denied. Moreover, the general philosophical attitude, the drive to “curb metaphysical
pretensions” and to “eradicate illusions” seems to be a constant throughout Wittgenstein’s
thinking and is not restricted to the Tractatus. The Investigations are likewise concerned with
the limits of sense, although here it is investigated more closely what kinds of limits we are
talking about in philosophy (cf. PI, §§499, 500).
Despite these similarities, Kant is not mentioned in the famous list of influences that
Wittgenstein had created himself in 1931 (cf. MS154, 16r);21 and direct references to Kant
are rare in the over 20.000 pages of his Nachlass. According to Ray Monk’s biography, he
studied the Critique of Pure Reason together with Ludwig Hänsel in a prisoners of war camp
in Italy in 1919 (cf. Monk 1990, 158), but there are few traces of this reading. In any case,
19. More recently, Hacker has elaborated on these affinities, focusing especially on the question whether
Wittgenstein’s arguments can be called transcendental. In a strict sense, they are not, Hacker concludes, but he
also repeats the similarities to Kant which he had already listed in 1986 (cf. Hacker 2012a).
20. Peter Sullivan notes the Kantian background of these topics (cf. Sullivan 1996, 198). He takes these
remarks to be a step-by-step refutation of Kant’s synthetic a priori and holds that Wittgenstein here engages with
Transcendental Idealism, but in the end rejects it. Peter Hacker, in the above-mentioned paper (Hacker 2012a),
warns against calling the Tractarian argumentation “transcendental”: there may be structural similarities, but it
does not match all the implications this technical term has in Kant. While I can agree with these “anti-Kantian”
readings with regards to a direct connection of doctrines (“Wittgenstein: a transcendental idealist”), I still argue
for a structural similarity. So much is clear: Wittgenstein rejected any non-logical necessity (TLP, 6.37) and
therefore also any form of synthetic a priori knowledge; the Tractatus rejects any “a priori order of things”
(TLP, 5.634). There is no necessary form of intuition as in Kant, but there is a necessary form of the proposition.
The metaphorical transfer I am interested in is from experience to logic, which is done by means of the concept
of “space”. While the Kantian space was a framework of empirical possibilities, Wittgenstein’s space is a
framework of logical possibilities.
21. Boltzmann and Hertz, the first two influences on this list, are considered in section 2.3.
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Wittgenstein must have been familiar with Kantian thinking before 1919 through the writings
of Schopenhauer,22 probably through Russell’s treatment of Kantian ideas, and through his
studies of so-called Neo-Kantian philosophers and physicists who shall be considered in the
later sections of this chapter.
Leaving revisions aside, there are only four direct references to Kant in the Nachlass :
• In 1914, Wittgenstein writes that the theory of tautologies might throw light on Kant’s
question “how is pure mathematics possible” (MS101, 51r).
• Later in the war (MS104), he considers Kant’s problem about the right and the left
hand which cannot be made to coincide (Prolegomena, §13).23 This remark becomes
part of the final version of the Tractatus (TLP, 6.36111).
• In the writings from 1929–1932, he repeatedly compares his views on mathematics
to Kant’s claim that mathematical propositions are synthetic a priori (MS107, 183;
MS114, 10r; transferred to TSS 208, 209, 211, 212, 213).24
• In 1931, he refers somewhat vaguely to the “Kantian solution to the problem of
philosophy” which he holds to be related to his insights about the limits of language
(MS110, 61).
For my purposes, it is helpful to narrow down the focus on Kant’s terminology and
categorisation of judgements in general and on his treatment of space in particular. Questions
of ethics and religion, which were of highest importance for Kant as well as for Wittgenstein,
shall not be touched at this point. This is arguably in line with their respective philosophical
programmes which are at pains to delimit those higher spheres mainly negatively (despite
some dissimilarities in how they delimit them).25 I shall also not deal with the general
methodological similarities that have received so much attention in the literature. For
22. Schopenhauer is the third thinker mentioned in the list of influences and he commented on Kantian
philosophy extensively, especially in the appendix to The World as Will and Presentation. Wittgenstein’s
admiration for Schopenhauer, at least in his youth, is well documented and researched, e.g. Lange 1996;
Jacquette 2017. It is possible that the early Wittgenstein knew Kant largely through Schopenhauer. The order of
the 6.n propositions, related by Sullivan to Kantian topics, can also be seen as a response to the Fourfold Root
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason where Schopenhauer distinguishes between reasons in logic, mathematics,
science (causality) and human actions (motivation) which corresponds to the topics from 6.1 to 6.4.
23. Wittgenstein might have this not from a direct reading of Kant, but from his conversations with Russell
who dealt with Kant’s treatment of the asymmetry of spatial relations for example in chapter XXVII of the
Principles of Mathematics (1903).
24. I will get back to this comparison when I discuss mathematics in Wittgenstein’s middle period (section
4.2).
25. The dispute between Sullivan and Adrian Moore centres on this problem: Wittgenstein conceives of the
bounds of sense as “limits”, that is, as something non-contrastive where the other side is not known. Moore
points out that towards the end of the Tractatus this limit is recast as a “limitation”, a contrastive boundary
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now the focus shall be on technical questions concerning the synthetic a priori and space.
Wittgenstein’s explicit references to Kant, quoted above, all belong to this field as we will
see.
The “spatial” perspective reveals some lesser-known and less obvious similarities between
the two philosophers: Kant was maybe not the first, but a significant champion of the view
that space (like time) can be considered a framework of possibilities which thereby provides
a connection between mind and world. The a priori restrictions of the mind determine the
possibilities of experience which can then be confirmed or confuted by actual, empirical
input. Let me first consider the technical terms Kant introduced to categorise judgement.
These are designed to account for the quarrels between rationalists and empiricists he was
responding to: is all our knowledge created by the mind, or do we altogether depend on
experience?
Kant’s categorisation of judgements is meant to capture what is plausible in both views.
Some knowledge can apparently only be acquired after empirical reality is perceived. Whether
a lamp is on the table, is a question of experience and a true proposition stating this fact is
a form of a posteriori knowledge. However, there is also knowledge that is independent
from experience. Judgements that belong to this type are called a priori. These fall into two
further types. We can tell that a collie is a dog without looking at empirical facts first. The
truth of this statement about collies is implied by the concept itself; knowledge of its truth is
a form of analytic knowledge which is always a priori. However, not all a priori knowledge
is of this kind. Kant holds that mathematical knowledge is different. A mathematical term
like 5+7 does not entail its result 12 in the same way the concepts of collies and greyhounds
entail the concept of dogs. The result cannot be found by analysing the summands, but
requires a form of intuition (Anschauung). This intuition must, however, not be empirical
as we clearly do not depend on experience when conducting a calculation. The truth of a
mathematical judgements is, according to Kant, synthetic a priori (cf. CPR, B4). Hence he
has an example of synthetic a priori truth, the kind of truth he is interested in to achieve
his objective to give metaphysics a scientific footing. Since synthetic a priori knowledge is
possible, as is proven by the possibility of mathematics, Kant’s central question in the first
Critique as well as in Prolegomena is: how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?26
Qua a priori, a mathematical judgement cannot stem from empirical intuition which
depends on experience; and by being synthetic, its truth cannot lie in the parts of the
between facts and values. Since this pattern resembles the Kantian project to delimit reason in order to make
room for faith, he calls Wittgenstein a Transcendental Idealist. Sullivan, in turn, disagrees because ethics is
categorically different from facts and not just on the other side of a shared border. The limits of facts remain
“limits” in the sense sketched above (cf. A. Moore 2013; Sullivan 2013).
26. Wittgenstein’s mention of “the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy” (MS110, 61) might refer
to a version of this question as he was apparently familiar with the basic ideas of Kantian epistemology.
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judgement themselves. It has to derive from pure intuition. In the Transcendental Aesthetic,
as well as in Prolegomena (§10), Kant argues that time and space provide this pure intuition
by being its pure forms. We cannot perceive time or space themselves, but everything we do
perceive we perceive through these forms. Intuition stripped of any empirical content is pure
intuition, and geometry studies the pure and formal properties of space, while arithmetic
studies the pure and formal properties of time (numbers as the basis of succession).27 By
being pure forms of intuition, space and time are the conditions of possibility of empirical
intuition. This form of knowledge, which does not deal with objects, but with the a priori
possibility of a kind of knowledge, is called transcendental (CPR, B25/A11). Later in the
Critique Kant argues that in “pure science” the mind constrains what is possible, too. Its
categories determine what can be known about the physical world, they form a transcendental
scheme of possibilities which can be “filled” with actual knowledge by empirical input. One
of the laws that can be derived from transcendental insights of this kind is the Law of
Causality: as a priori, it is not itself empirical, but constitutes empirical knowledge (cf.
Caygill 1995, 108).
These Kantian ideas clearly resonate with Wittgenstein’s use of “transcendental” in
the Tractatus.28 A transcendental logic is one that does not deal with objects nor with
specific empirical propositions, but determines what can count as possible propositions
in the first place. The analogy of logical space takes up and modifies the Kantian idea
of space as a form of intuition, that is, as the structure which determines the possibilities
of empirical intuition. Tractarian form is repeatedly characterised as the “possibility of
a structure” (TLP, 2.033; 2.15). Obviously, logical structure is not the same as spatial
structure, but the analogy is that relational possibilities – be they about logical or spatial
relations – are in both cases “constrained” by form. Here we encounter what Wittgenstein
calls the limits of language: the limit of possibilities in this sense has the peculiarity that
we know only one side of this limit: that we cannot think what is impossible.29 While all
propositions proper within logical space are possible, the logical form itself is necessary and
cannot be thought or said, it can only be shown. Logical propositions, that is tautologies
and contradictions, can therefore be viewed as “part of the symbolism” (TLP, 4.4611),
27. At least in the Prolegomena this kind of parallelism seems to be implied (§10). For an account that
highlights the differences between geometry and arithmetic in Kant, see Potter 2000, ch.1.
28. It is unfortunate that the German words “transzendental” and “transzendent” are both translated as
“transcendental”. One might take the Tractarian “transcendental” in the second sense, that is, simply as
transcending the bounds of a certain sphere – which is of course correct: logic, ethics, aesthetics do indeed
transcend these bounds, but not because they are “outside” of them, but rather because they constitute them.
They are conditions of possibilities. The Tractarian world is a world of possibilities (“what is the case” is
contingent); investigating its conditions, logic and philosophy, is therefore a transcendental enterprise in the
first sense although it deviates from Kant’s use of the word in other aspects (cf. Hacker 2012a).
29. See the dispute about limits and limitations between Sullivan and Moore mentioned above.
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although they say “nothing” (TLP, 5.43). They, as it were, constitute logical possibilities
and can in this sense be compared to the Kantian forms of intuition: space and time, which
constitute empirical possibilities.30 To be sure, Wittgenstein’s problem is not epistemological
and he does not talk about intuition in the Tractatus,31 but the relation between form and
facts, between possibility and reality is strikingly similar. This connection also provides an
explanation for Wittgenstein’s early remark, that the theory of tautologies could illuminate
the Kantian question of how mathematics is possible: mathematical propositions, like logical
propositions, do not say anything about the world, do not “express a thought” (TLP, 6.21),
but constitute a framework of equations which, like logical tautologies, “show the logic of
the world” (TLP, 6.22).
The repeated references to the world, the language, general form and logical space which
are used in a universal singular, reveal a certain claim for universality in the Tractatus which
is likewise shared with Kant’s account of space (and his account of a priori knowledge
in general). A priori knowledge about space and time is held by Kant to be necessarily
and universally true (cf. Prolegomena, §12) – a transcendental certainty which derives
from the conditions of possibility of experience.32 It is above all this universal validity
of Euclidean geometry which has been associated with Kant by geometers in the 19th
century; the criticisms thereof shall be regarded in the next subsection. Wittgenstein’s logical
propositions are necessarily and timelessly true in a similar way and, like Kant’s a priori,
they are not refutable by empirical knowledge. A certain anti-Kantian twist can be seen in
Wittgenstein’s view that empirical laws (such as Newton’s mechanics) as discussed in the 6.3s
are not necessary. Another major difference between the philosophers, which has become
evident in the above, consists in their respective treatment of synthetic a priori knowledge:
for Kant necessary propositions of this kind were necessary truths, while Wittgenstein would
in large part deny their truth-aptness or at least highlight the peculiar way in which they
are “true” which is very different from empirical truths (cf. Hacker 1986, 207). Apart from
their alethic status, however, there are significant functional and formal similarities between
Kant’s a priori knowledge and Wittgenstein’s logical and grammatical propositions.
30. How they constitute these possibilities is connected with Wittgenstein’s account of objects which I discuss
in section 3.1.1. There, I also discuss how Tractarian objects are connected with space which is based on a
Neo-Kantian understanding of objects and manifolds (cf. section 2.2.1)
31. After all, he declares the propositions of logic “analytic” (TLP, 6.11), using Kantian terminology, but
explicitly distinguishing logic from synthetic knowledge a priori which requires intuition.
32. By the same token, Kant declares Newtonian mechanics as necessarily true as it is the condition of
possibility of natural science (in part III of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant claims to
“prove” Newton’s laws).
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2.2 The Formalisation of Geometry
2.2.1 Manifolds
In the middle of the 19th century, non-Euclidean geometries were developed in which at least
one axiom (or postulate) turned out to be not necessarily true, namely the parallel postulate.
What is important for the understanding of Wittgenstein’s later employment of geometrical
and spatial analogies is the increasing abstraction and formalisation of geometry, making it
solely dependent on axioms, not on intuition. Since geometry was supposed to be the science
of space, these developments naturally had serious ramifications in philosophy of space. But
beyond that, it changed the status of a priori knowledge in general as Euclidean geometry had
always been a model of absolute certainty and its method a prototype of scientific rigour and
proof (cf. Reichenbach 1958, 8; Weyl 1919, 1). All this was threatened by the conceivability
of various consistent geometries as developed by Bolyai, Lobachevsky and later geometers
(cf. Bonola 1912).33
Rather than being taken to be true of the world, pure geometry could now be
taken to be a merely convenient tool that does not express any statement about
the world. The demoting of geometry had a significant effect on what had been
taken to be a priori knowledge, given that for Kant, space and time are given in
intuition, forming the basis of geometry and arithmetic, respectively. (Stump
2015, 20)
Interestingly, these developments were embraced especially by empiricists such as Helmholtz
and, later, by logical empiricists such as Schlick or Reichenbach. This can be explained by
the following line of thought. Helmholtz argued against the Kantian view of the apriority
of space because the developments in mathematics proved that Euclidean geometry cannot
be derived from pure intuition: non-Euclidean geometries are conceivable which clearly
contradicts the Kantian doctrine that the axioms of Euclidean space are apodictic and eternally
true. Since we cannot know a priori which of the possible geometries is true, the nature
of actual space has to be determined empirically. The distinction between pure geometry
and applied geometry now becomes important. Pure geometry is a formal and mathematical
science which allows for a number of possible axiomatic systems, none of which can be
33. The historical and critical study Non-Euclidean Geometry by Roberto Bonola summarises and comments
on these developments and remained highly influential for decades (cf. Stump 2015, 33) which proves the
relevance of the topic at the time. The concrete examples of consistent geometries without the parallel axiom
are discussed in chapter 4 of that book. It was still a reference point in Wittgenstein’s time: it underlies, for
example, parts of Reichenbach’s work The Philosophy of Space and Time (1928 [engl. 1958]), especially
chapter 1. More recently Stump commented extensively on the development of Non-Euclidean geometry and
the increasing formalisation of the discipline (2015, especially ch. 2).
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said to be a priori true. Physical or applied geometry, by contrast, investigates the nature
of actual, physical space and is, at least partly, a posteriori. Helmholtz made use of both
insights: on the one hand he liberalised the notion of space in general and was thereby close
to the kind of conventionalism that can be associated with pure geometry; on the other hand
he suggested that physical space was to be constructed out of empirical, sensual data which
he thought of as themselves organised in space-like structures which he called manifolds.
This idea marks an important point in the development of the spatial concepts with
which we are concerned. The essential groundwork for this step was laid by Riemann who
developed a theory of unspecified manifolds with n coordinates and with variable metrics of
which three-dimensional Euclidean space was only a special case (cf. Riemann 2016). This
very abstract notion of manifold lends itself easily to various applications:34 Helmholtz drew
on Riemann and developed an account of space-like manifolds to account for domains of
sensory experience.
Riemann calls a system of differences in which the individual element can
be determined by n measurements, an n-fold manifold, or a manifold of n
dimensions. Thus the space that we know and in which we live is a three-fold
extended manifold, a plane a two-fold, and a line a one-fold one, as is indeed
time. The system of colours also constitutes a three-fold manifold, in that each
colour can be represented [. . . ] as the mixture of three elementary colours, of
each of which a definite quantum is to be chosen [. . . ] We could just as well
describe the domain of simple tones as a manifold of two dimensions, if we take
them to be differentiated only by pitch and volume (Helmholtz 1903, 16–17,
quoted in Hyder 2002, 26)
As Hyder observes, Helmholtz’s theory is an important prerequisite for the Tractatus concept
of logical space. Logic, he writes, “is, in a sense, a general theory of manifolds” (Hyder 2002,
24). Although it was primarily directed against Kant’s doctrine of a unique and universal
geometry, he also points to the Kantian elements of this “manifold theory of perception”.
Insofar as a priori forms of intuition constitute possible empirical intuition, Helmholtz’s
theory is “a modified form of Kantian epistemology of the sciences”. Its basic feature is that
34. One of the thinkers who took up Riemann’s ideas in a particularly prolific way was Albert Einstein who
referred to Riemann’s insight that a curved space might be boundless and yet finite (cf. Einstein 1920, §31). The
theory of manifolds in which geometries with variable curvature can be determined by differential geometry,
that is, by considering only parts of a geometry, not the whole, and establishing its metrics by means of geodetic
lines (Bonola 1906, 137 ff.), is also the underlying structure of the Space-Time conception in general relativity
whose curvature depends on the distribution of matter.
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all elements of human perception come structured in manifolds: colours, aural
tones, sensations of hardness, warmth, etc. are all supposed to be organised in
space-like manifolds. [. . . ]
It uses an expanded notion of Anschauung or intuition to characterise the field of
“possible signs” that may make up our experience. To conceive of something is
to conceive of all the possible representations that thing might bring about in us.
(Hyder 2002, 19–20)
What is important here is the peculiar notion of objects that comes with this conception.
While in traditional epistemology an object has spatial coordinates and properties, in the
manifold theory all properties are represented by means of coordinates. A blue, heavy object
at location [3,5,2] would have a more comprehensive “location” in a five-dimensional space
with three spatial dimensions proper plus one dimension for colour and one for weight: [blue,
heavy, 3,5,2] – blue and heavy could, of course, be quantified in a more exact manner, but
here we are still talking about perceptual manifolds, not measuring manifolds; so this rough
example should suffice to illustrate the idea. Anyway, the important point is that objects lose
their “independence” in this view: they only exist through their relations to other points in the
system to which they belong. Its assumed independent existence is replaced by the object’s
“address in the point-fabric” as Hyder puts it taking up a later remark from Wittgenstein’s
1929 manuscripts (MS105, 70; Hyder 2002, 26). As there is no explicit reference to this
theory in the Tractatus, Hyder presents his interpretation rather modestly as a background
for the understanding of logical space; for a holistic understanding of Wittgenstein’s space
metaphors the similarity is in fact quite profound.
Due to their central role in the Tractarian system and the lack of concrete examples,
the nature of “objects” is an important and controversial question in the interpretation of
the Tractatus. Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka propose to understand them as phenomenolog-
ical objects within a phenomenological language, which has been criticised by others as
incompatible with the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s later reflections on it (cf. Kienzler 1997;
Monk 2014). Hyder follows, again quite modestly, the phenomenological interpretation,
but has better reasons to do so than the Hintikkas: he takes phenomenology in the sense
of sensual perception that is structured in space-like manifolds. In this sense, it might be a
good working model for the Tractatus, but this notion of phenomenological objects is very
different from e.g. Russell’s “objects of acquaintance” which the Hintikkas see as a precursor
of Tractarian objects (Hintikka and Hintikka 1986, 51 ff.). In fact, the sense of objects as
defined by coordinates in a multi-dimensional space is a very abstract conception that lends
itself to many interpretations, phenomenological or physical, but there are strong indications
that logical space is meant to be more general than those special spaces. I will later show how
2.2 The Formalisation of Geometry 29
the notion of logical space is related to the picture theory in which Wittgenstein distinguishes
“spatial pictures” from “logical pictures”. The former is obviously not used in the sense of
logical space, but in a physical or geometrical sense which is less general than logical space:
Each picture is also a logical one.
(On the other hand, for example, not every picture is spatial) (TLP, 2.182).
Elsewhere, Wittgenstein uses manifolds that are space-like in the formal sense and very
similar to Helmholtz’s sensual manifolds: he speaks of colour-space, pitch-space and the like,
but also of an infinite space which surrounds the spatial objects. Again, “spatial object” is
used in a geometrical or physical,35 not in a logical sense, and the “infinite space” surrounding
it is a specific manifold which can be contrasted with other spaces:
A spatial object must lie in infinite space. (A point in space is an argument
place.)
A speck in a visual field need not be red, but it must have a colour; it has, so to
speak, a colour space round it. A tone must have a pitch, the object of the sense
of touch a hardness, etc. (TLP, 2.0131)
So these specific spaces, it seems, must not be equated with logical space in which any kind
of object can be represented. Wittgenstein considers manifold structures for different types
of objects, physical and phenomenological, but he strives for an all-embracing structure, or
rather: form, in which all possible configurations of any object can be represented. In the
Tractatus, he is mainly concerned with the logical properties of what he calls “objects”. In
light of what has been said so far, we can conceive of these logical properties, in analogy to
the sensual properties of objects in Helmholtz’s theory, as locations in a general manifold that
represents all possible relations, all possible states-of-affairs (Sachverhalte) in which an object
can occur. The object is determined by its “logical coordinates” which are introduced as an
analogy to physics in October 1914 and referred to repeatedly in the wartime manuscripts.
35. By referring to the Prototractatus (MS104, 2.0141), where Wittgenstein speaks indeed of “material points”
in infinite space, Gerd Graßhoff argues, unlike Hintikka, for a physical nature of these objects in the sense
of Hertz (1997, 116). There clearly is a similarity between Hertz’s “position of a material point in infinite
space” which is “conceivable” (denkbar; Hertz 1899, 48) and Wittgenstein’s conceivable positions in logical
space (see section 2.3 below). However, Hertz explicitly restricts his notion of conceivable to “geometrically
conceivable” whereas Wittgenstein speaks about the wider, logical, sense of conceivable. “Infinite space” is
just a three-dimensional sub-space of the multi-dimensional logical space So I think it is equally misled to
conceive of all Tractarian objects as physical objects as it is to declare them all phenomenological; that a point
is an “argument place” (PT 2.01411) highlights its dependency on a surrounding system or space, whose most
general form is logical.
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We might conceive two co-ordinates aP and bP as a proposition stating that the
material point P is to be found in the place (ab). For this statement to be possible
the co-ordinates a and b must really determine a place. For a statement to be
possible the logical co-ordinates must really determine a logical place! (NB,
29/10/1914)
If a point in space does not exist, then its co-ordinates do not exist either, and if
the co-ordinates exist then the point exists too. That is how it is in logic. (NB,
21/6/1915)
2.2.2 Geometrical and Epistemological Conventionalism
One could say that the development of various consistent geometries and the theory of
manifolds forms the basis for conventionalism. This view has been associated with authors
like Riemann, Helmholtz and Poincaré who had contributed to that development and argued
for the equivalence of different axiomatic systems. However, there is a difference – of
which these thinkers, but not all who were influenced by them, were aware – between
conventionalism in pure geometry and in physical geometry. In the former, preference of
any system can only be based on considerations of simplicity or convenience. Poincaré who
recognised the equivalence of various kinds of geometries, expressed this view very clearly:
that geometrical axioms can only be conventions and that empiricism has no role to play in
geometry (cf. Poincaré 1913, 81 ff.). However, Reichenbach (like other logical empiricists,
e.g. Schlick) misinterprets Poincaré by ascribing to him the same conventionalism when
it comes to physical space (cf. Reichenbach 1958, 49). In fact, with regards to physics,
Poincaré, just like Helmholtz, would regard empirical input as necessary. He would hold
that particularly well-confirmed empirical regularities may be “elevated” to the status of
conventions which then take up similar roles as axioms. They then constitute a space of
possibilities while they themselves are normally not questioned when operating within this
system and in this sense “necessary” (cf. Stump 2015, ch. 3: Poincaré’s Conventionalisms).
However, they are still conventions and not a priori truths in a Kantian sense, insofar as they
are hypotheses which may change over time in light of contradicting evidence.
While Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, especially his remarks on the foundations of
mathematics, has often been considered in the context of conventionalism (e.g. Dummett
1978; C. Wright 1980; Shanker 1987), his early philosophy seems to be generally opposed to
this doctrine. However, a certain proximity to conventionalist ideas can already be seen in
the Tractatus. Stump thinks a lot about the apparent contradiction in Poincaré’s view that
principles are simultaneously “certainly true” and “neither true nor false” (Stump 2015, 45).
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But this seeming contradiction is very close to Wittgenstein’s view who argued, already in
the Tractatus, that something which is certainly true, something which cannot possibly be
false, cannot be called “true” in a strict sense. A logical truth “says nothing” and thereby
is different from a normal, empirical truth which does tell us something about the world.
This does not mean that Tractarian logic is a convention; after all it is supposed to be “the
great mirror” of the world (TLP, 6.13). But the idea that something which constitutes the
possibilities of empirical knowledge, which determines the candidates for truth, is not itself a
kind of knowledge, but part of the symbolism, is a step away from Kantian necessary truth
and towards a more conventionalist account as Wittgenstein’s later philosophy might be
labelled.36
I said earlier that Wittgenstein’s view on science can be considered anti-Kantian insofar
as it does not accept general laws such as Newtonian mechanics as a priori knowledge about
the world. In fact, he is here, like Helmholtz, Hertz and Boltzmann, more Kantian than Kant,
by holding that various scientific theories are forms of representation which do not describe
the world in itself:
the fact that it can be described by Newtonian mechanics asserts nothing about
the world; but this asserts something, namely, that it can be described in that
particular way in which as a matter of fact it is described. The fact, too, that it
can be described more simply by one system of mechanics than by another says
something about the world. (TLP, 6.342)
The Tractarian view on science is Kantian insofar as it acknowledges the boundedness of our
faculty of knowledge and reason, the dependence of the world on the forms through which
we approach them. It is anti-Kantian insofar as Wittgenstein would not accept those things
for true which Kant held to be part of the a priori structure of the mind and thereby apodictic:
Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics. For this reason, it has been claimed that the
Tractarian stance on science is “conventionalist in the vein of Hertz and Boltzmann” (Glock
1996, 343). I will investigate in the next section whether this claim can be upheld and how
these physicists influenced Wittgenstein’s concepts of picture and space.
36. Yemima Ben-Menahem explores Wittgenstein’s ambivalent relationship with conventionalism. In the end,
she argues against a foundationalist understanding of philosophy which holds conventions to justify our practice.
However, she acknowledges conventionalist tendencies in Wittgenstein insofar as he does not see necessity
as reflecting substantial truths, but as a matter of logic or grammar, that is of the forms of representation (cf.
Ben-Menahem 2006, 256).
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2.3 Space in Neo-Kantian Theoretical Physics
While scholars have for a long time sought to discover connections between Wittgenstein on
the one hand and Boltzmann and especially Hertz on the other hand (Hacker 1986; Monk
1990; Graßhoff 1997), recent scholarship highlights the differences between them, focusing
on Wittgenstein’s originality and “creative appropriation” of their ideas. (Preston 2017, 121;
cf. Aguilar 2015, 61–74; Pilch 2017, 21–23). I follow Hyder in that I do not claim any
explicit and straightforward influence, but investigate a kinship between ways of thinking.
After all, this is what even the greatest sceptics about Neo-Kantian influence admit: that
Hertz and Boltzmann played a role in shaping the Wittgensteinian way of philosophising.
We should also keep in mind Wittgenstein’s list of influences in which the two physicists
are mentioned first: “Thus Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos,
Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me” (MS154, 15v).
The two key words that are associated with Hertz and Boltzmann in the context of the
Tractatus are “picture” and “space”. To be sure, neither of these ideas can be said to be a
direct precursor of the Tractarian picture theory or logical space. The reason is simple: these
terms were not elaborated to consistent theories by the physicists. Although they use the
word “picture” in prominent places – in the quasi-Kantian way mentioned above – neither of
them can be said to propose a picture theory.
Similarly Hertz’s usage of space-like manifolds and models is restricted to the rather
narrow context of his mechanics and cannot directly be applied to the logical space of the
Tractatus. The so-called “phase space” that is often ascribed to Boltzmann – and whose
foundations he has certainly laid – has striking similarities with Wittgenstein’s logical space
(cf. Janik and Toulmin 1973, 198; Glock 1996, 220), but cannot have influenced Wittgenstein
directly as Boltzmann did not elaborate the idea which has only later been taken up by other
physicists (cf. Pilch 2017, 21–22).
Given a) the mainly negative trend in the literature concerning the relation Wittgenstein-
Hertz/Boltzmann, and b) my own focus on space, my approach is to trace the continuity from
Kant via Helmholtz to these physicists to see what Wittgenstein might have found interesting
in them. I will focus on Hertz since his influence is much more visible than Boltzmann’s in
Wittgenstein’s writings; however, there are intersections in their respective views on picture
and space which motivates putting them into one section. Both Hertz and Boltzmann used
ideas by Kant and Helmholtz to provide representations of states of physical systems. Again
the idea of spatial locations as possibilities is central. The application of these possibilities to
physics can be seen as a result of the increasing abstraction of geometry in the 19th century:
if “space” is no longer the concrete three-dimensional structure we live in, but an abstract
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manifold of possibilities, then it can be used to represent other systems of possibilities as
well.
Like Helmholtz, Hertz and Boltzmann are generally considered Neo-Kantians. What
motivates this label is their acknowledgement of the Kantian insight that our knowledge is
constrained by a priori structures which determine what can be considered possible within
the framework; that we do not achieve any knowledge of “things in themselves”, but only
of things as they appear to us. In Kant, this comes with a claim for universality: Euclidean
geometry is, as much as space is concerned, the only possible a priori form of intuition.
Helmholtz, in light of the development of non-Euclidean geometries, denied this universality
and extended the idea of a priori spaces to perceptual manifolds. Hertz and Boltzmann
applied it to physical theories. In these theories, reality is not described directly and as such,
but represented in what they called “images” (Bilder), scientific models that capture only
aspects of the external world. In the preface to the Principles of Mechanics, Hertz introduces
this terminology in a manner strikingly parallel to the introduction of Wittgenstein’s picture
theory (TLP, 2.1): “We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects” (Hertz
1899, 1). This focus on representation, which is present in both Hertz and Boltzmann, is
what is seen as the specific Kantian element in their thinking (cf. Janik and Toulmin 1973,
139 ff. Preston 2017, 112). To show what distinguishes this position from e.g. Mach’s
phenomenalism, Janik and Toulmin draw particularly on the difference between the German
words Darstellung and Vorstellung, which were central terms in late 19th century Vienna. The
latter has a connotation of passivity, of empiricist “impressions” and of private phenomenal
knowledge, whereas the former is essentially public and highlights the active construction
of a system by the scientist (cf. Janik and Toulmin 1973, 140). I will later argue that the
difference between those words also entails a difference in terms of the modal status of what
is represented (section 3.2.2); at this point Janik and Toulmin’s distinction is sufficient to
see the Kantian element in the Neo-Kantians’ view on science. Their Bilder are not merely
impressions as in empiricist idealism, but actively constructed models; qua models, however,
they are also not straightforwardly realist, but only representations of aspects of reality. In his
preface, Hertz goes on to formulate three criteria or requirements which these images should
meet. First, a picture has to be logically permissible, that is, not contradicting the laws of our
thought. Second, it should be correct, that is, be in agreement with our observations, be true.
Third, it should be appropriate which is specified as satisfying the values of distinctness and
simplicity (Hertz 1899, 2). The particular image Hertz is going to suggest is meant to be
more appropriate than other permissible and correct systems of mechanics, for example the
Newtonian one.
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With these considerations in mind, we can go back to the question of conventionalism.
Preston argues that there might be some motivation to ascribe conventionalism to both Hertz
and Boltzmann. Hertz’s claims, for example, are restricted to only one aspect of reality:
the form of an image “is such that the necessary consequents of the image in thought are
always images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured” (Hertz 1899,
1). The second book of the Principles of Mechanics, however, centres on the “fundamental
law” which is supposed “to embody the entire empirical content of his system and thus”,
according to Preston, “is a poor candidate for being a convention”. And Boltzmann, he
continues, can even less be called conventionalist “since the images he has in mind, although
there are some arbitrary aspects, are genuine hypotheses” (Preston 2017, 115). Without
engaging too much in a terminological debate, we can simply state that this notion of
conventionalism is very different from both variants we encountered in the last section, and
presumably also from the way Glock had intended his statement. Even if Hertz considered
his image to be, in a sense, complete and to account for the totality of empirical content, it
is nevertheless and very explicitly considered one possible image among others. It might
be more “appropriate” than Newtonian mechanics, to which it is compared in the preface
and which it is supposed to simplify by eliminating the concept of force; but preference in
virtue of simplicity is precisely what one can call a conventional choice. Given Hertz’s three
requirements for images, one could regard the first criterion as compatible with Poincaré’s
geometrical conventionalism: here indeed all systems that are free from contradictions are
equivalent. The second criterion, the correctness of the image, can be compared to Poincaré’s
view on scientific principles in which empirical hypotheses, if they prove to be sufficiently
“correct”, may be elevated to the status of principles which then constitute a scientific image or
theory.37 If conventionalism is understood in this way, Preston’s argument against ascribing
conventionalism to Boltzmann loses its plausibility, too: the images being hypotheses does
not exclude them being conventions. Finally, Hertz’s third criterion, appropriateness, may
indeed be considered a guide in choosing one convention among those that meet the first two
criteria.
Why this discussion about pictures and conventions? Because pictures are often con-
sidered an important connection between Hertz and Wittgenstein. In contrast, I think their
respective adoption – and rejection – of elements of Kantian philosophy is more important
and this is related to their respective treatment of space as a priori form of empirical knowl-
edge. Kant’s position towards the status of our knowledge is somewhat ambivalent. On the
37. Sometimes Hertz distinguishes images from “scientific representations of images” (Hertz 1899, 2), but
mostly he uses it quasi synonymously to “system of principles” or scientific theory, especially when he compares
his image to Newtonian mechanics and early electrodynamics (e.g. 40). It is probably fair to say that the term
is not sufficiently well-defined in the preface to ascribe a picture-theory to Hertz (cf. Aguilar 2015, 57–58).
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one hand he distinguishes between thing in itself and thing as appearance, the former being
inaccessible to human knowledge, the latter being constituted by our a priori schemata. It
shares with conventionalism the idea that reality in itself cannot be known. On the other hand,
he was quite anti-conventionalist in his own theory of space and science since he only allowed
for one spatial structure and assumed necessary laws of mechanics, namely Euclidean space
and Newtonian mechanics, which are both a priori certain and not conventional.38 The
liberalised notion of space after the development of non-Euclidean geometry and the abstract
theory of manifolds enabled the Neo-Kantians to be both Kantian and conventionalist where
Kant himself was universalist; they accepted a priori structures in a weak sense of a priori
which determine what kind of knowledge the system can provide, but also the plurality of
such systems. The choice of one system of images over another may then have empirical
reasons – Helmholtz, Hertz, and Boltzmann were empiricists – but never to the extent that one
system could count as the only accurate description of reality in a metaphysically realist sense.
The emphasis on simplicity and clarity in Hertz’s third requirement, in fact demonstrates the
proximity to Poincaré’s conventionalism in which simplicity is the decisive factor for his
preference of Euclidean geometry.
The relation of Hertz’s images to Wittgenstein’s pictures is rather loose in any case.39
Remark 2.1 of the Tractatus might be intended as a conscious echo of Hertz’s preface, but the
difference is no less obvious than the similarity: for Hertz, “we make to ourselves pictures of
objects” while for Wittgenstein, “we make to ourselves pictures of facts” – and Wittgenstein
highlights the difference between objects and facts repeatedly in the Tractatus, e.g. in the
second sentence of his book (TLP, 1.1). But even granted that the use of “objects” in Hertz
is to be understood as a sort of pars pro toto for the external world – after all, he was less
concerned with logic than with physics where it is kind of natural to start with “objects” –
even then the further use of Bild is rather different from the representation of facts by means
of propositions as in Wittgenstein’s picture theory. Hertz’ images are themselves something
like theories and certainly not concerned with propositions as pictures of facts.
The reason for comparing theories to spaces and these to the various connected concepts
in Wittgenstein is the constitutive function which these frameworks have over its content,
that is, not the empirical content, but what can be said a priori about, in this case, mechanics.
It is also what Hertz stresses when he explains how he will understand the term “principles”
in his book:
38. Poincaré introduced his notion of convention precisely to distinguish this specific type of non-necessary
constitutive principle from Kantian a priori knowledge (cf. Ivanova 2015, 118).
39. Both use the German Bild, but it is perhaps no accident that in the translations different words are used.
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by this will be meant any selection from among such and similar propositions,
which satisfies the requirement that the whole of mechanics can be developed
from it by purely deductive reasoning without any further appeal to experience.
In this sense the fundamental ideas of mechanics, together with the principles
connecting them, represent the simplest image physics can produce of things
in the sensible world and the processes which occur in it. By varying the
choice of the propositions which we take as fundamental, we can give various
representations of the principles of mechanics. Hence we can thus obtain various
images of things; and these images we can test and compare with each other in
respect of permissibility, correctness, and appropriateness. (Hertz 1899, 4)
For this is what interests me in the background of all these “Kantian” notions of space.
Principles, geometrical, theoretical, grammatical, are meant to form a framework from which
corollaries can be deduced and which constitute possibilities within the framework; hence
something like a priori structures, spatial structures.40 Hertz recognised that these principles
keep their constitutive function, even if it should turn out that they must be modified in light
of contradicting experience. In fact, he deliberately designed his “image” to satisfy this
requirement:41
The correctness of the image in all cases was carefully provided for by making
the reservation that, if need be, facts derived from experience should determine
definitions or vice versa. (9)
Even though this is certainly not true in the case of Wittgenstein’s logical space (it is to
an extent in his later work), I see formal similarities in Hertz’s “image” and Wittgenstein’s
logical space, more than between their respective “picture theories”. Let me elaborate this.
The full title of Hertz’s book is The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form.
This new form, the form that distinguishes his “image” from the others considered in the
preface, is a mathematical form that is characterised above all by its systematic approach to
mechanics: his starting point are not points, but “systems of points” (29). Using the term
manifold in the sense of his teacher Helmholtz, he explains the relation of this method to
geometry.
40. An idea that comes up in Schopenhauer and in Wittgenstein is that there is, in fact, no difference between
axioms and corollary: both are equally well – or equally badly – founded. If a statement follows necessarily
from one or more axioms, then its necessity is not smaller than that of the axiom itself (cf. Schopenhauer 2008,
109). And Wittgenstein in the Tractatus: “All propositions of logic are of equal rank; there are not some which
are essentially primitive and others deduced from there. Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology”
(TLP, 6.127).
41. This is similar to Reichenbach’s later suggestion to keep the constitutive aspect of Kant’s a priori, but to
dismiss its universality (cf. Reichenbach 1965, 48).
2.3 Space in Neo-Kantian Theoretical Physics 37
A system of n points presents a 3n-manifold of motion – although this may be
reduced to any arbitrary number by the connections of the system. Hence there
arise many analogies with the geometry of space of many dimensions; and these
in part extend so far that the same propositions and notations can apply to both.
(30)
These are formal analogies, writes Hertz, emphasising the differences between pure geometry
and physics. It is indeed important to distinguish two notions of geometry in his book: the
physical space he deals with is Euclidean as he makes clear in the very first explanations of
space, time and mass (45); in this regard Hertz is a strict Kantian. However, with regards
to his method, he makes use of the abstract account of geometry as delineated in this
chapter. Why does he use the method of formal geometry which he regards as completely
detached from actual physical space? Because “it enables us to render the most general and
comprehensive statements with great simplicity and brevity” (31). Jesper Lützen who argues
that the “geometrization of mechanics” is the main innovation of the Principles of Mechanics
(2005, 159) provides an explanation why Hertz insists on the Euclidean nature of physical
space and hesitates to admit the geometrical background although his own theory of systems
of points is very close to Riemannian formal geometry:42
In modern textbooks a Riemannian manifold is presented as a formal analytical
system to which are attached geometric names such as point, distance, map, atlas,
curvature, etc. Therefore we have no problem in identifying Hertz’s geometry
of systems of points with a Riemannian manifold. However, one has to keep in
mind that in Hertz’s time the theory of Riemann’s geometry was totally entangled
with a discussion of physical space.
[. . . ] It is symptomatic that although Hertz introduced many other geometrical
terms in his geometry of systems of points, he never used the term point for his
systems of points nor the term space for what we today call configuration space.
Thus Hertz could benefit from the formalism of high-dimensional Riemannian
manifolds, without using the philosophical [sic!] problematic concept of a
high-dimensional non-Euclidean space. To Hertz, the relation between his
geometry of systems of points and the Riemannian geometries introduced by the
mathematicians was not one of equality or inclusion but one of analogy. (Lützen
2005, 155)
42. “He [Hertz] clearly accepted high-dimensional geometries with variable curvature. His own theory of
systems of points is precisely that.” (Lützen 2005, 130).
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By “analogy” he means the formal analogies mentioned above which I take to be also the
main point of comparison to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. As Lützen points out, Riemann and
Hertz’s systems “have entirely different objects, but shares [sic!] the analytic formalism”
(Lützen 2005, 156). This is also true of Wittgenstein’s system: its objects are logical objects
of an entirely different nature, but the formalism of logical space indeed resembles the highly
abstract, multi-dimensional systems of Riemann and Hertz. One can even apply Hertz’s
words to Wittgenstein that these analogies “in part extend so far that the same propositions
and notations can apply to both”. Indeed, the most obvious influence of the Principles of
Mechanics on the Tractatus is on the level of terminology. As already said, the use of Bild is
quite different from Hertz, but there are more similarities. There seems to be a connection
between Hertz’s “Lage” (position) and Wittgenstein’s “Sachlage” which both refer either
to a location or to the state of an entire system (cf. Hyder 2002, 130); moreover, that these
possible positions in infinite space are “geometrically conceivable” (Hertz 1899, 48) echoes
in Wittgenstein’s conception of logically conceivable positions in logical space; this shall
be discussed in section 3.1.2 in the next chapter. The term “coordinates” is used in both
works as coordinates in an abstract multi-dimensional manifold (49) and in Wittgenstein’s
Notebooks they mark the beginning of all space analogies (cf. Pilch 2017, 17).
The internal relation between the proposition and its reference, the method of
symbolizing is the system of co-ordinates which projects the situation into the
proposition. The proposition corresponds to the fundamental co-ordinates. (NB,
29/10/1914)
Furthermore, Wittgenstein adapts Hertz’s term “coordinates of configuration” in the Tractatus,
but for considerably different purposes. In TLP 2.0231 he uses the term “configuration”
in “configuration of objects”, establishing the important relation between simple objects
and Sachverhalte: “The configuration of objects produces states-of-affairs [Sachverhalte]”
(TLP, 2.0272). And this configuration as a changeable matter is contrasted with the stable
persistence of objects which are “indestructible” for Hertz and Wittgenstein alike (Hertz
1899, 46; TLP, 2.0271; TS213, 98r).
However, there are also considerable differences: while the respective notions of “coordi-
nates” have in common that they specify locations in a geometrical structure, Wittgenstein’s
“logical coordinates” do not concern (logical) positions of simple objects, but rather the
position of an entire Sachverhalt. (This object-fact distinction corresponds to the differing
concepts of pictures). Another difference lies in the fact that Hertz’s whole enterprise is
a theory of dynamics which shall provide a framework for describing the movement of
particles; in Wittgenstein’s space nothing moves and it is a remarkably timeless structure that
is explained here (cf. Pilch 2017, 23). More shall be said on this in section 6.1.
2.4 Summary 39
The aim of this section was to highlight the role of the formalisation of geometry in
the works of those physicists Wittgenstein is known to have absorbed. While the focus has
been on Hertz’s geometrical method, something similar can be said of Boltzmann’s whose
influential ideas in statistical physics are similarly based on the notion of multi-dimensional
abstract manifolds in which possible states of systems can be modelled. While the relation
between this “phase space” and Tractarian logical space may be “no more than a loose
analogy” (Preston 2017, 118), the formal instruments are certainly shared. With regards to
Hertz, it might well be that his focus on a perspicuous presentation by means of geometrical
methods while leaving the facts untouched has influenced Wittgenstein on a more profound
level than generally assumed. While I am sceptical of comparisons with regards to pictures
or objects, I think with regards to the methodological usage of space, there is an intriguing
similarity between these thinkers.
2.4 Summary
To sum up, what we should bear in mind when discussing logical space in the Tractatus is the
increasing abstraction and formalisation of space. For Kant, space was a pure form of intuition
and thereby a framework of possibilities for empirical intuition. With the development of
non-Euclidean geometries his claim for necessity and universality was no longer tenable;
Riemann and Helmholtz abstracted and extended the notion of geometry to unspecified,
mathematical manifolds of variable curvature and dimensionality. This enabled something
like geometrical conventionalism whose most important proponent is Poincaré who sees
the various geometries that are possible in such a manifold as on a par: each is a priori,
but precisely for this reason it is no longer necessary. However, when considering physical
space, the choice of geometry is constrained by empirical input. Necessity in this sense
amounts to something like probability, particularly well-confirmed empirical regularities may
be elevated to the status of laws. There is still an element of convention here, but it is less
free than geometrical conventionalism.
As to Hertz and Boltzmann, I agree with the current trend in the literature that a strong
influence in terms of concrete philosophical theses cannot be found; rather, they contributed
to Wittgenstein’s particular style of philosophising. However, some aspects of Hertz’ thinking
do have a strong echo in the Tractatus and beyond. His division into thinkable (conceivable)
and unthinkable shall guide Wittgenstein’s space analogies from “logical space” to “spatial
grammar” and “language-game”. More specifically, that states-of-affairs can be described as
configurations of objects resembles strongly the configuration space in Hertz, although the
particular use in the Tractatus is certainly a creative appropriation of the concept. And above
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all, the use of geometric analogies to clarify systems that need not necessarily be described
with these geometric methods is a typical characteristic of Wittgensteinian thinking as we
will see.
It shall not be missed out that two rather important influences on the Tractatus have
only been mentioned briefly so far: Frege and Russell. They are not only mentioned in
Wittgenstein’s retrospective list of influences (whose order is arguably important: Boltzmann,
Hertz and Schopenhauer come before Frege and Russell), but also in the preface of the
Tractatus. Although they commented on geometry as well, they do not take that much space
in my investigation because they both seemed to have a rather conservative view in these
matters. Stump mentions their respective arguments with Hilbert and Poincaré (cf. Stump
2015, 49). Of course, Russell was aware of the potential conventionalism of geometries – it
was the topic of his fellowship dissertation – but he apparently was still very realist about
physical space and could not anticipate the developments of general relativity. Although
Wittgenstein was closer to Frege and Russell when writing the Tractatus, his later conceptions
of space, parallel to his gradual alienation from Russell, seem to be closer to their opponents.
Chapter 3
Logical Space in the Tractatus
Stell dir Ordnung vor [. . . ] aber jetzt
stell dir bloß eine ganze universale, eine
Menschheitsordnung, mit einem Wort
eine vollkommene zivilistische Ordnung
vor: so behaupte ich, das ist der




Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften
In the last chapter, the Kantian notion of space as an a priori form of intuition has
been spelled out and special emphasis has been put on this form’s constitutive function: it
determines the possibilities of empirical knowledge, but, by being a pure form, does not say
anything about actual empirical facts in the world. In light of mathematical developments in
the 19th century the Kantian view on geometry was modified by thinkers such as Riemann,
Helmholtz and Poincaré who turned pure geometry into an abstract manifold whose dimen-
sions and axioms can be defined by convention; physical space, however, was conceived
an empirical question. Drawing on these developments, Neo-Kantians such as Hertz and
Boltzmann utilised space-like structures to model the possible distributions of particles in
physical systems.
These developments form an important basis for the understanding of Wittgenstein’s
logical space in the Tractatus as has already been indicated in the respective sections in
the last chapter; an excellent account of these historical connections can be found in David
Hyder’s study of physical and mathematical space-concepts which can serve as a background
42 Logical Space in the Tractatus
for my discussion of logical space (cf. Hyder 2002). I emphasise those aspects that are
important for my overall claim: that the concepts of space and geometry play a profound
role in Wittgenstein’s work as a whole and can thereby provide a better understanding of
continuity and discontinuity in his philosophy. This has been the topic of endless debates,
mostly centring around the question how many “Wittgensteins” there are and if and how the
later philosophy is superior to the Tractatus.43
In order to assess continuity or discontinuity with regards to space and geometry, it is
necessary to carve out the features and functions of logical space in the Tractatus which can
then be compared to occurrences of space in the middle period. In light of the similarities
that will thus become evident, it will then be possible to see which elements remain vital
in Wittgenstein’s philosophy when the notion of space stops being as central as it is in
the Tractatus and in the period 1929–32. While the connection between logical space and
grammatical space in the middle period has been recognised by a number of scholars,44 their
similarity has not been spelled out and it has not been made clear what motivates the usage
of the common term “space” – which is itself a highly controversial term in philosophy. In
Wittgenstein, it seems to be used either metaphorically or in a very specific technical sense.
Without specifying the continuity from logical to grammatical space, it is difficult to see the
further continuity from grammatical space to language-game in the later philosophy which I
shall argue for.
An account of the historical development of logical space in the war-time manuscripts
has been given by Martin Pilch. He shows how Wittgenstein’s idea evolves in a period of
intense work in the first months of the war: the notion of “logical place” goes back to an early
intuition in October 1914 about the analogy between a geometrical place and a proposition
which both refer to a possibility; shortly after this, Wittgenstein was concerned with the
relation between a proposition and its negation which turned out to be representable in a
spatial structure, too; the completeness of logical space was a requirement that had to be met
in order to make this account of negation work and to ensure that the spatial understanding
of possibility is exhaustive (Pilch 2017, 17–20).45 While this reconstruction is based on the
traces of the thinking process in the wartime manuscripts, in the final version of the Tractatus,
logical space is given important positions within the system of decimal numbers.46 It is
43. See Kienzler 2017 for a summary of various accounts that have been proposed.
44. E.g. Glock 1996, 223; Hyder 2002, ch. 7; Ometiţă 2018, 150–151; Schulte 2017, 319.
45. Pilch also provides an instructive interpretation of the various functions of logical space by means of
three representation spaces which correspond to Wittgenstein’s usage of the terms “truth-possibilities”, “truth-
conditions” and “truth-arguments”. I will draw on these illustrations in the respective part of my own account
of logical space (see section 3.2).
46. I agree with Luciano Bazzocchi’s view on the numbering system (cf. Bazzocchi 2010): remarks with
fewer decimal numbers have a higher logical weight and a series of remarks with the same number of decimals
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mentioned in a remark on the very first proposition: “The facts in logical space are the world”
(TLP, 1.13). It occurs in the first part of the picture theory (TLP, 2.11; 2.202), and in the
treatment of tautologies and contradictions (TLP, 4.463). In between, a whole one-decimal
section is dedicated to logical space, namely TLP 3.4 which is composed of lower numbered
remarks from the Prototractatus (MS104, 3.2101-3.2104).
Of course not only Hyder and Pilch, but numerous other scholars have recognised the
significance of logical space within the system of the Tractatus (e.g. Anscombe 1959; Black
1964; Glock 1996; Metschl 2001; Sullivan 2001). What distinguishes my approach is its
“holism” with regards to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. My motivation is not only a certain
curiosity about this strange concept and its role in the Tractatus. Rather, I see those features
that logical space is supposed to illustrate as central characteristics of Wittgenstein’s thinking
as a whole, at all stages; therefore I emphasis those parts of the early ideas that shall be
relevant in the modifications after 1929. Since my reading is largely compatible with the
established accounts, I hope it will not be considered Whiggish, but recognised as an attempt
to tackle the topics from a fresh angle. It is not only a particular angle to logical space, but to
the Tractatus as a whole, so that my approach is doubly holistic in seeing the Tractatus as part
of the whole oeuvre and seeing logical space as part of the whole Tractatus. In both respects,
there is a more than local significance to the usage of space. While the significance of the
space metaphor for Wittgenstein’s whole philosophy, can naturally only be assessed over the
course of my overall argument, this chapter aims to clarify the eminent role of logical space
within the Tractatus. I do this by showing its relevance for three central themes of the book:
possibility, “logical constants”, especially negation, and the claim for universality.
The focus on these three themes under the aspect of space leads to contributions to some
controversial issues. The question about the relation between Tatsache, Sachverhalt, and
Sachlage can be addressed and illuminated, albeit not finally settled, within this framework:
taking the risk of an awkward phrasing, I propose to indeed understand all three terms in
the sense of possibilities while keeping their generally “factive” nature. Another question
concerns the status of objects which, unlike the three factive structures just mentioned, are
fixed and necessary, not contingent and changing. By distinguishing different readings of
“possibility”, I aim to elucidate the apparent paradox that objects are necessary by being
possible as opposed to actual, while facts by being actual are contingent, that is, possible
as opposed to necessary. Moreover, the question whether objects have to be understood
phenomenologically or physically can be answered by pointing out the abstractness of logical
space, which does not prefer any particular interpretation.
(e.g. 2.11, 2.12, 2.13 . . . 2.19) can be read as a continuous argument which as a whole is a comment on the
respective “higher” remark (in my example: 2.1).
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Wittgenstein’s views on negation and other logical operations are intimately connected to
the differentiated notion of possibility which I elaborate in the first section. A certain kind of
possibility, namely the logical form of a picture, which corresponds to the possibility of a
certain atomic fact, cannot itself be said by means of the picture, but only shown. Based on
the spatial perspective, I advance an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s “fundamental thought”:
logical space complements the idea of logical pictures as the basis of representation; “logical
constants do not represent” because they have no “location” in logical space, but consist in
transitions from certain areas in this space to other areas.47 That such a transition is possible
shows itself in the “internal relations” of the respective propositions which are expressed in
the structure of the space: for example, a proposition and its negation cover complementary
regions in logical space and a proposition following from another proposition falls completely
within the region of the latter.
This approach also allows an interpretation of “nonsense” in the Tractatus that does not
ascribe any substantial quality to it, but still allows it to be instructive insofar as nonsense
can illuminate the logical space without being itself expressible within the space.48
The third section will investigate the Tractatus’ tendency to absolute and general claims
about propositions, logical space and the world. Some aspects of this view remain intact
during the revisions of the middle period, especially the completeness of logical space which
will still be important in Wittgenstein’s later grammatical spaces and language-games. The
universality and uniformity of logical space, however, seems to be an unfounded, or at least
confused, postulation as Wittgenstein will recognise later on.
3.1 Logical Space: A Space of Possibilities
Potentiality dominates the terminology of the Tractatus – and with it, to use a problematic
word, its ontology: what and how is a possibility? – to such an extent that a form of
“modal realism” has been ascribed to it (recently by Hacker 2017, 214). Coined by later
philosophers, notably by David Lewis, this term can be misleading, but the motivation to
use it is understandable. I suggest distinguishing three senses of possibility to clarify how
the term and related concepts are to be understood, especially with respect to its relation to
logical space. My distinction follows a method that Wittgenstein repeatedly used himself in
47. The “one logical constant” which Wittgenstein admits (TLP, 5.47), the general form of the proposition, is
itself intimately connected with the structure of logical space as I will argue in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
48. This has some similarities with Oskari Kuusela’s interpretation of the Tractatus; he approaches it under
the perspective of notation (cf. Kuusela 2019a). How space and notation are similar shall be shown in the
course of this thesis, especially in section 5.2.2.
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his discussions of various spaces in his later work, namely to ask: what is the opposite of the
concept you use?49
1. Possibility as opposed to actuality (“merely possible”)
2. Possibility as opposed to necessity (“contingent”)
3. Possibility as opposed to impossibility (“thinkable”)
The three senses do not necessarily exclude one another. Rather, they provide connected
criteria to talk about facts, thoughts or pictures, not unlike Hertz’s criteria for his scientific
pictures which I mentioned in the last chapter: first a picture has to be “logically permissible”,
i.e. possible in the sense of (3), then it can be “correct”, i.e. actual as opposed to “merely
possible” in the sense of (1); Hertz’s third criterion “appropriateness” becomes more impor-
tant in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. For the current purpose, the three-fold distinction will
suffice to illuminate a couple of issues. I start with an investigation of Wittgenstein’s ontology
where the relation of (1) and (2) is important; the more we get towards the representation of
the world in language, the focus shifts towards (2) and (3).
3.1.1 Facts and Objects
Since the completion of the Tractatus, readers have wondered what the difference between
Tatsachen and Sachverhalte might be.50 Even the two philosophers whose work Wittgenstein
called an important stimulation for his book, and to whom he sent a copy of the manuscript
shortly after completion, struggled to make sense of this distinction: “Was der Fall ist, die
Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten” – “What is the case, the fact, is the existence
of atomic facts” (TLP, 2).
I take it that every fact is the existence of a Sachverhalt in such a way that a
different fact is the existence of a different Sachverhalt. Now could we not
cancel the words “the existence” and say: “Every fact is a Sachverhalt, every
49. At all stages of his philosophy the possibility of an opposite is a requirement for the meaning of a concept
which is constituted by its place within a system – one place as opposed to others. See also section 3.2.
50. The translation of “Sachverhalt” is controversial and part of the problem: David Pears and Brian
McGuinness tried to distinguish it from “fact” by translating it as “state of affairs” instead of “atomic fact”
which was used in the first translation by Ramsey and Ogden. Since Wittgenstein commented on many other
issues and thereby influenced the translation, I take it that Ogden’s edition comes close to what Wittgenstein had
intended. Therefore, I will mostly quote from this translation, but I will take into account the modifications by
Pears and McGuinness which often seem to make more sense in English (cf. TLP 1961). One should also note,
that Ogden’s edition is bi-lingual and that therefore the translation could always be compared with the original
which is what I will do especially with regards to controversial terms such as Sachverhalt and Sachlage.
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different fact is a different Sachverhalt”? Could we perhaps also say: “Every
Sachverhalt is the existence of a fact?” You see: I get caught up in doubts over
what you want to say [. . . ] Are there also Sachverhalte that do not exist? Is any
combination of objects a Sachverhalt? (Frege to Wittgenstein 28/6/1919)
What is the difference between Tatsache and Sachverhalt? (Russell to Wittgen-
stein, 13/08/1919)51
Wittgenstein’s reply to Russell reduces the difference to a matter of correspondence to
elementary propositions and concatenated propositions respectively:
Sachverhalt is, what corresponds to an Elementarsatz if it is true. Tatsache is
what corresponds to the logical product of elementary props when this product
is true. (Wittgenstein to Russell, 19/08/1919)
Wittgenstein highlights the simplicity of Sachverhalt as opposed to facts which is the obtain-
ing of (one or more) Sachverhalte (“what corresponds to the logical product of elementary
props”). The question of potentiality is not addressed, although it seems to be suggested
by the choice of words in the book. If a Sachverhalt only corresponds to an elementary
proposition “if it is true”, what corresponds to an elementary proposition if it is not true?
Why is it always emphasised that the truth of an elementary proposition and indeed the
existence of a Sachverhalt does not matter, but only their possibility? Why is a Tatsache
“the existence” (das Bestehen) of Sachverhalte? Is a Sachverhalt only a complex, a possible
assembly of objects, while a Tatsache is the fact that things are arranged in a specific way?
For Erik Stenius, a Sachverhalt is “something that could possibly be the case, a Tatsache
something that is really the case” (Stenius 1960, 31); and Max Black considers a number of
arguments for what he calls the “P-theory”, that is, the assumption that Sachverhalte are to
be understood as possibilities as opposed to facts which are always actual. More recently,
Pilch argued for a distinction along these lines in his study of logical space:
The difference is that while Sachlagen correspond to a possibility, Tatsachen
point to reality. Tatsachen are defined as the “obtaining” (or “existence”) of
Sachverhalte (TLP 2). Logical space as presented at the beginning of the
Tractatus is a totality of Sachlagen, the obtaining or not obtaining of all the
Sachverhalte (“states of affairs”) – some of these situations obtain (or exist) in
reality and their obtaining is then called a “fact”. (Pilch 2017, 24)
51. All letters are quoted from the Innsbrucker Elektronische Ausgabe (2004). The German originals I
translated myself.
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This is also what motivated Pears and McGuinness to translate Sachverhalt as “state of affairs”
instead of “atomic fact”52 which seems to imply that Sachverhalte are always actual which
would render expressions like “möglicher Sachverhalt” very awkward: what is a possible
or even a non-existent fact?53 This latter view, that Sachverhalte are to be understood as
facts, atomic facts, is what Black calls the “F-theory” which he holds to be preferable in the
end (Black 1964, 38–45). One of his arguments is that “möglicher Sachverhalt” would be
pleonastic if it was conceived as a possibility by definition. – So it seems that the idea of
possible Sachverhalte stands in need of clarification either way.
Biographical evidence supports the F-theory: there is Wittgenstein’s approval for Ram-
sey’s translation,54 there is his above quoted letter to Russell which seems likewise to suggest
a difference of simplicity, not of modality, and which Russell used in his introduction (TLP,
xi). A note by Ramsey, which refers to his discussions with Wittgenstein in 1923, points
to the same direction and confirms that his translation of Sachverhalt as “atomic fact” was
deliberate and probably used in agreement with Wittgenstein himself:
3 words for fact atom prop (= W’s elem prop)
Atom Fact Sachverhalt p
Fact Tatsache p ·q
State of Affairs Sachlage p∨q
(Ramsey 2019, 002-29-01, 5)
This seems to suggest that all three terms are indeed factive, but distinguished by their being
atomic, concatenated or connected by other operators.55 How could Wittgenstein have failed
to convince Russell and Ramsey that Sachverhalte are facts in potentia if this was indeed
his intention? And how could he have agreed to the publication of an edition which did not
acknowledge this difference? On the other hand, McGuinness’s intuition that there is an
element of potentiality in the notion of Sachverhalt is obviously justified, too, since they can
“exist or not exist”.
By distinguishing between possibility as opposed to actuality and possibility as opposed to
necessity, this tension can be overcome. In line with ordinary usage, we can say: Sachverhalt,
Tatsache and Sachlage are all “factive”, they exist if and only if they exist. Possibility comes
52. Cf. McGuinness 2017, 86.
53. However, Wittgenstein does mention “negative facts” as the non-existence of Sachverhalte (TLP, 2.06).
And in the wartime manuscripts he struggles with precisely this point: “It is the dualism, positive and negative
facts, which gives me no peace. For such a dualism can’t exist. But how to get away with it?” (NB, 25/11/1914)
54. The absence of correction can be counted as approval as Wittgenstein did correct many other things in the
translation and gave extensive advice to the editor (cf. Wittgenstein to Ogden 23/4/1922).
55. This three-fold distinction agrees, by the way, with Pilch’s three representation spaces of logical space:
his parameter space accounts for Sachverhalte, state space for Tatsachen and propositional space for Sachlagen.
I think, he is not committed to the “P-theory”. See illustrations of these representation spaces in 3.2.
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in not by their being not actual (“A logical entity cannot be merely possible”, TLP 2.0121),
but by their being contingent. Each fact, even if it exists, could just as well not exist; it is
contingent, that is, not necessary. And this possibility is what Wittgenstein’s investigation
of logic and language is about. Logic is, in a way, not concerned with facts – this is what
concerns the natural sciences – but with the possibilities of facts: “all possibilities are its facts”
(TLP, 2.0121). Language has the capacity to present a fact even if it does not exist, hence it
does not refer to its existence, not to the fact itself, but to its “existence or non-existence”:
the possibility that things are arranged in such a way as they are actually, in fact, arranged in
the fact.
This brings in the notion of things. Initially, objects are surprisingly stripped of their
traditional role as building blocks of the universe: “The world is the totality of facts, not of
things” (TLP, 1.1). However, they are soon introduced as the constituent parts of atomic
facts56 (TLP, 2) followed by a number of comments highlighting their modal status with
regards to atomic facts. While facts are contingent, objects are necessary. Facts can obtain
or not obtain, while objects already contain all possibilities of being part of a fact. Which
facts obtain is contingent, is, in Tractarian terminology, “external” to the object; but it is an
“internal” property of an object to be capable of being part of these facts. Therefore, objects
are not actual, as facts are, but they are necessary precisely by comprising all possibilities of
actualities. The cast of a die can result in six different “facts” each of which is contingent,
but that there are these six possibilities is a necessary property, an internal property of the
object dye.57 This transition from possibility to necessity, from can to must, is particularly
obvious in remarks 2.012 and 2.0121.
In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in an atomic fact the possibility
of that atomic fact must already be prejudged in the thing. (TLP, 2.012)
It would, so to speak, appear as an accident,58 when to a thing that could exist
alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit.
If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them.
(A logical entity cannot be merely possible. Logic treats of every possibility,
and all possibilities are its facts.) (TLP, 2.0121a—c)
56. Speaking of part and whole is, of course, problematic since atomic facts are atomic: they are a combination
of objects (TLP, 2.01) which are of a different ontological category. I hope to make clear in this section that
“existence” of an object is completely different from “existence” of an atomic fact, for which Wittgenstein
prefers to use the word “Bestehen” (obtaining), and both from a concrete statement such as “Socrates existed”.
57. Sluga, in a talk in Norwich, made an interesting etymological argument by highlighting that both the
German word “der Fall sein” and the English “to be the case” go back to the falling of dice as an epitome of
contingency. The expression in TLP 1 thereby entails both facticity and contingency.
58. The words “zufällig” and “Zufall” take up the etymological implications of “der Fall”.
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Wittgenstein makes it clear that logic is concerned only with necessities, and it gets this
necessity by regarding all possibilities of contingent facts. That also the “world” is to be
understood in this sense has already been expressed implicitly in the strange addenda to
proposition 1.1: that all facts form the world (TLP, 1.11), that this determines also what is
not the case (TLP, 1.12) and that these are the facts in logical space (TLP, 1.13).
I deliberately quoted only half of proposition 2.0121 because the second half elucidates
the point from a different angle:
Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal ob-
jects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility
of its connexion with other things.
If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it
apart from the possibility of this context. (TLP, 2.0121d–e)
Here, Wittgenstein illustrates that every object necessarily brings with it all its possibilities to
occur in a specific context. While he mentions spatial and temporal objects in this remark, he
will shortly after also speak of phenomenological objects such as colours and sounds. In this
later remark the metaphor of “space” is used to illustrate a manifold of possibilities which, as
it were, surrounds the objects:
Every thing is, as it were, in a space of possible atomic facts. I can think of this
space as empty, but not of the thing without the space. (TLP, 2.013)59
In this sense, “infinite space” is the space for spatial objects, but time, too, can be called a
“space”, namely a one-dimensional manifold for temporal objects: it is its necessary context
apart from which it cannot be thought. In the same sense, there are colour space, pitch space
and so on, as manifolds for colours, sounds and other types of objects (TLP, 2.0131).
These spaces are not the logical space, but are similar to the perceptual manifolds which
were discussed in the last chapter. Wittgenstein speaks of such “Helmholtzian” manifolds
like colour-space, pitch-space, space of hardness etc., i.e. perceptual or phenomenological
manifolds, but also of a “spatial object in infinite space” by which he seems to mean physical
or geometrical space.60 These are all specific manifolds surrounding different kinds of
59. The Kantian ring (cf. CPR, A24/B38) of the second sentence has been pointed out to me by Shunichi
Takagi, and it seems to confirm the intuition that this understanding of space as an a priori structure of
possibilities takes up Kantian and Neo-Kantian traditions.
60. I understand it as a three-dimensional Euclidean coordinate system which is called “infinite”, first, because
it is infinite according to the axioms, but second, in order to avoid the awkward expression “spatial space”
which baulks at the usage of “space” as a general metaphor for manifolds of possibilities. See also the note on
Hertz’s “unendlicher Raum” below.
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objects, frameworks of possible atomic facts one of which the object must be part of: a
coloured object can be red, a sound can be a C#, an object of the sense of touch can be hard,
a spatial object can be at location (3, 5, 6) in a three-dimensional “infinite space”, a temporal
object at time t in a one-dimensional “time space”, and so on. As in Helmholtz’s manifolds,
these objects lose their independence and become the “possibilities” of existence determined
by various coordinates: this is what is meant by the remark that we cannot think of spatial
objects apart from space and of temporal objects apart from time. A temporal object, for
example, has to have a position in the one-dimensional time-manifold – it indeed is this
position, again in the sense of Hyder’s interpretation of Helmholtz’s objects as “addresses
in the point-fabric”. This is the object’s “form of dependence”: it cannot exist apart from a
space, apart from its occurrence in possible atomic facts. It is independent only insofar as it
can occur in any of these possible atomic facts (TLP, 2.0122).
Logical space, now, is the most general of these manifolds. It is clear that the spaces
listed in 2.0131 are all on a par, are different manifolds for different kinds of objects; and
neither phenomenological (contra Hintikka and Hintikka 1986), nor physical manifolds
(contra Graßhoff 1997) are preferred from a logical point of view: they are all manifolds
of possibilities with a varying number of dimensions. These spaces can be combined in
more complex Sachlagen as has already been shown in the section on Helmholtz: a blue,
hard object at a certain position in “infinite space” can be represented in a five-dimensional
manifold. Hence, a multi-dimensional all-encompassing space is thinkable which contains
all possibilities, and this most general manifold is logical space.61
But back to objects: since they and their respective spaces of possibilities are necessary,
they are the “fixed form” of the world, while their configuration, that is, their actual arrange-
ment in facts, is changing and variable (TLP, 2.0271; 2.0272). What is necessary, doesn’t
change. Taking true and false propositions as a given and possibility as a pre-condition
of truth,62 Wittgenstein claims to have proven the “existence”63 of objects. Objects and
their internal properties determine which facts can obtain and this totality of possibilities,
the “substance of the world” cannot itself be “merely possible” nor contingent. The so-
called argument for substance (TLP, 2.0211; 2.0212) anticipates the notions of picture and
proposition (which have not been introduced so far) and argues that
61. We will later encounter similar hierarchies of particular forms (space, time, colour) and the general
“logical form”, and particular pictures (spatial picture, coloured picture etc.) and the general “logical picture”.
62. “In order for a proposition to be true it must first and foremost be capable of truth, and that is all that
concerns logic.” This remark is from the same day on which Wittgenstein introduces the notion of logical place:
“for a statement to be possible the logical coordinates must really determine a logical place!” (NB, 29/10/1914).
63. Again, “existence” is not a good word (and Wittgenstein does not use it); what he says is that we have to
assume objects in order to speak about facts. Sullivan highlights that the opposition of “fixed” and “changing”
refers to modal, not temporal, variations (Sullivan 2001, 94). Hence, I prefer to call objects necessary and not
“eternal” or “sempiternal” (e.g. Hacker 1986, 20).
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(p1) we can form true or false pictures of the world, and
(p2) a proposition’s sense does not depend on another proposition’s truth, and
hence
(c) the world has substance, namely the objects and their configurational possi-
bilities.
The argument is notoriously brief and obscure, but it is clear that both “picture” and “propo-
sition” in the Tractatus refer to the potentiality of facts and this potentiality is exactly what
is guaranteed by Wittgenstein’s objects.64 For the internal properties of objects, their form,
determine the “space of possible atomic facts” and these possible atomic facts are what
pictures or elementary propositions correspond to.
The notion of propositions and their capacity to represent their sense independently of
their truth is surely at the heart of Wittgenstein’s book. His solution is implicitly prepared in
the ontological considerations in propositions 1 and 2. Before we get to the picture theory,
one more terminological issue needs to be clarified: the structure of an atomic fact is “the
way in which the objects hang together”, that is, it is a factive, contingent and external feature
of objects which can hang together in an atomic fact or not. The possibility of this structure,
however, is determined by the internal properties of the object and this is what is called form.
Thus, form is the possibility that objects are arranged in a certain way in an actual fact – it is
evident why this form is “fixed” as the possibilities do not change, only the actualities change.
The “spaces” considered in 2.0131 are manifolds of possible atomic facts; the possibility of
the structure of an atomic fact is its form. Therefore, these “spaces” are themselves kinds of
forms: “Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects” (TLP, 2.0251). They
are forms in the sense of possibilities of objects to be arranged in particular ways.
It has been said that the argument for objects is “transcendental” (cf. Hacker 2012a, 121);
the objects can indeed be seen as the condition of the possibility of atomic facts: whether an
atomic fact exists is contingent, but its possibility is guaranteed by the object’s possibility to
occur in this atomic fact, i.e. by its location in the “space of possible atomic facts” in which
the object is necessarily situated (TLP, 2.013; 20131). If we extend Kant’s epistemological
system, first to manifolds in the 19th century sense and then to logic, and if we accept
logical space as the most general manifold of possible atomic facts, we can indeed say that
Wittgenstein’s logical space, like Kant’s space, is a “form”, only not a form of intuition, but a
logical form. Both are frameworks of possible empirical facts.
64. There are very detailed analyses of this argument (cf. Cheung 2017, 133–139); for my purpose the hint
towards possibility may suffice: the necessity follows from the totality of possibilities.
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If form and structure are distinguished along the lines possible-actual and necessary-
contingent, then one is again tempted to reify form as a sort of “possible fact” with all
awkwardness this expression implies. However, the possibility that objects are arranged
in a certain way is not the same as the fact that objects are arranged in a certain way. In a
retrospective comment on the Tractatus in 1931, when he is again thinking about possibilities,
this time in the context of intentionality, Wittgenstein sees more clearly how confusing this
mode of speaking is and suggests understanding facts simply as possibilities:
The usage of the word ’fact’ and ’deed’ [Tatsache and Tat]. [. . . ] It seems
plausible to use the word ’deed’ in such a way that it corresponds only to the
true proposition. Hence, one would not speak of a deed that has not/never been
committed. But the proposition ’this was a noble deed’ must keep its sense even
if I am wrong in assuming that what I call deed has happened. And this contains
already all that is important and I can only make the stipulation to use the words
’deed’, ’fact’ (or also event) only in a proposition that completely affirms the
obtaining of this fact. (MS110, 236–37)
[And a few remarks later:] As to ’deed’ and ’fact’: it would be better to drop
the constraint in the usage of these words as they only cause confusion, and to
simply say: ’this deed has not been committed’, ’this fact does not obtain’, ’ this
event has not happened’. (MS110, 238)
Up to this point the focus of my study has been on the readings of possibility (1) and (2)
and I have argued for an understanding of the factive concepts Sachverhalt, Tatsache and
Sachlage as possible as opposed to necessary, but as actual as opposed to “merely possible”.
Objects and their internal properties, which determine their forms, are necessary as opposed
to contingent, but cannot be actual in the sense of facts: they are categorically distinct from
facts and “exist permanently”, but this is a different mode of existence to the contingent
existence of facts.65 This ontology of possibilities is the basis of the picture theory which I
now turn to.
3.1.2 Pictures and Propositions
The capability of propositions to represent facts independently of their existence is what the
Tractatus aims to make understandable. Wittgenstein’s solution is that propositions, if they
65. One could make a distinction between internal and external questions of existence similar to Carnap
(1950, 22–23); “There are objects” has no sense as a statement of internal existence (cf. TLP, 4.1272). There
are indeed some similarities between Carnap’s conceptual frameworks and Wittgenstein’s space concepts which
shall become clearer when I discuss Wittgenstein’s middle period in chapters 4 and 5.
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have sense, describe not a fact, but the possibility of a fact. This solution is illustrated with
two metaphors: possibility as a picture and possibility as a location in logical space. Both
images are intertwined in the first comment on the picture theory:
Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen (TLP, 2.1)
Das Bild stellt die Sachlage im logischen Raum, das Bestehen und Nichtbestehen
von Sachverhalten vor. (TLP, 2.11)
We make to ourselves pictures of facts.
The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and non-existence
of atomic facts.
I quote in German not in order to show any similarity to Hertz’s Bilder – which is not as close
as it seems –, but in order to highlight the language of possibility. As I also mentioned in the
last chapter, Janik and Toulmin distinguish between Darstellen and Vorstellen along historical
traditions: The first line is Hume–Mach–Vienna Circle where the concept of Vorstellungen is
central: they are conceived as pictures in the mind which can be used to build a theory of
“psycho-physics” or to construct the world logically out of sense data. In contrast, the line
Kant–Hertz/Boltzmann–Wittgenstein deals with Darstellungen: it focuses on models, Bilder,
of reality which do not claim to describe things in themselves, but only the schemes through
which we know them. Unlike Vorstellung, this is essentially a public approach to the world;
these systems, although not reaching to reality in itself, successfully capture aspects of reality.
Instead Vorstellungen are basically private “images” in one’s own mind, not accessible to
others like the scientific “pictures” devised by the Neo-Kantians. The former also point to
something outside of the system, sense-data, while the Kantian “spatial” approach determines
boundaries from inside (cf. Janik and Toulmin 1973, 139–140).
This opposition is certainly interesting and illuminating, but I would like to add a fur-
ther dimension to it which is based on my focus on possibilities: Another nuance between
Vorstellung and Darstellung, not mentioned by Janik and Toulmin, is their modal difference.
Although not capturing reality in itself, Darstellung implies the existence of what is repre-
sented; this is perhaps related to the underlying (partial, but nonetheless decided) realism of
all these, roughly speaking, Kantian approaches. Vorstellung, in contrast, has the connotation
of something that might not really exist; it is closer to imagination or presentation66 and
66. See Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung: the English title “The World as Will and
Representation” was changed to “The World as Will and Presentation” in the latest translation by R. E. Aquila
to capture this quasi theatrical meaning (2008, xiv). Schopenhauer indeed criticises the Kantian idea of things
in themselves and considers the world as Vorstellung an illusion.
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indeed emphasises the possibility rather than the actuality of what is presented. Janik and
Toulmin do not ignore the occurrences of vorstellen in the TLP, but declare them negligible
compared to the more important darstellen. However, the use of vorstellen can illuminate the
difference between the two words and the role of possibility in the Tractatus. It confirms
the “factive” nature of Sachlage which has to be supplemented with a marker of potentiality
because Wittgenstein’s logic is concerned with all possibilities. In the Prototractatus, one
can see how Wittgenstein in 2.11 first wrote “das Bild [...] stellt dar” and later replaced “dar”
with “vor” (MS104, 2.11). In a later remark commenting on what the picture has in common
with what is pictured, Wittgenstein uses almost the same phrasing, but writes “dar” instead
of “vor” and therefore has to add the adjective “möglich”. In the final version, the striking
parallelism of the two remarks highlights the difference in terminology:
Das Bild stellt die Sachlage im logischen Raum, das Bestehen und Nichtbestehen
von Sachverhalten vor. (TLP, 2.11)
The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and non-existence
of atomic facts.
Das Bild stellt eine mögliche Sachlage im logischen Raume dar. (TLP, 2.202)
The picture represents a possible state of affairs67 in logical space.
The juxtaposition of these remarks supports the claim that it is important that what the picture
represents is a possible situation since the situation could be different and the picture would
still represent the same sense, whereas the adjective “possible” is not necessary when the
situation is presented as this already implies the potential character of what is pictured.
To understand how pictures are meant to present facts, it is useful to follow the first level
of comments on remark 2.1. Pictures are models and pictures “consist” of elements which
correspond to objects in facts; “consist” has to be taken with a pinch of salt, just as atomic
facts do not “consist” of objects: rather the picture consists in the combination of its elements
in a definite way (TLP, 2.12–2.14). “That the elements of the picture are combined with one
another in a definite way”, Wittgenstein continues, “stellt vor” (!) “that the things are so
combined with one another.” Parallel to the terminology of Sachverhalte, this way of being
combined is called the structure of the picture and the possibility of this structure is called
pictorial form (TLP, 2.15). Now, a picture must have something in common with what is
pictured (TLP, 2.16). Again we must not reify this “something”: it is the possibility that the
67. It is interesting that the word Sachlage is translated differently although the context is very similar. This
has probably to do with the problem to speak of “possible facts” in 2.202, although the “facts” in 2.11 are, of
course, equally “possible” as they are “presented”, not “represented”.
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picture’s elements are arranged the same way as the objects are arranged in the fact whose
picture it is: it is its pictorial form (TLP, 2.17). According to the various kinds of forms of
objects we have encountered, there are various kinds of pictorial forms: there are spatial
pictures, coloured pictures, temporal pictures etc. (TLP, 2.171). We have seen that all kinds
of specific spaces can be represented in an all-encompassing logical space. Likewise “every
picture is also a logical picture”; logical form is what every picture must have in common
with reality (TLP, 2.18; 2.182). Every atomic fact, one could say, is in logical space, but not
every atomic fact is in “infinite space” or “colour space”. “The logical picture can depict the
world” (TLP, 2.19), because it shares with the world the same most general form, they share
the same possibilities, share the same logical space.
In the 3s, the modal status of pictures is, so to speak, “inherited” to thoughts because
thoughts are logical pictures of facts. That the word “denkbar” plays an important role in the
context of possibility and thinking may not be surprising, but the relation of Wittgenstein’s
usage of this word to Hertz’s terminology is worth noting. In Die Prinzipien der Mechanik
any position of a material point in infinite space68 is called a “denkbare Lage” (Hertz
1894, 56). In the Tractatus, a picture represents a possible Sachlage in logical space and
contains the possibility of the Sachlage which it represents (cf. TLP, 2.202; 2.203) – both its
possibility aspect and its connection to the spatial framework are emphasised. In a parallel
phrasing, Wittgenstein writes that the thought contains the possibility of the Sachlage of
which it is a thought. The remark refers, again, to Sachlagen in logical space as possibilities
and extends the Hertzian term “denkbar” from physical systems to the more general sphere
of logic: “What is thinkable is also possible” (TLP, 3.02).
To conceive of atomic facts or situations as possibilities is repeatedly illustrated with
spatial analogies: “The logical place and the geometrical place agree in that both are the
possibility of an existence” (TLP, 3.411). Due to the delimiting character of Wittgenstein’s
enterprise this kind of possibility is particularly important as an antithesis to impossibility:
We cannot think anything unlogical, for otherwise we should have to think
unlogically. (TLP, 3.03)
To present in language anything which “contradicts logic” is as impossible as in
geometry to present by its co-ordinates a figure which contradicts the laws of
space; or to give the co-ordinates of a point which does not exist. (TLP, 3.032)
68. Like Wittgenstein in TLP 2.0131, Hertz speaks of objects “im unendlichen Raume”. I take it that both
mean something like a three-dimensional Euclidean coordinate system which lends itself to geometrical or
physical application. The difference is that Hertz is interested only in this space and he uses it as a means to
model physical systems; whereas Wittgenstein speaks of “infinite space” as one of many possible manifolds,
the most general of which is logical space. Therefore, his concept of “denkbar” includes everything thinkable,
while Hertz’s “denkbar” is a shorthand for “geometrically conceivable” (Hertz 1899, 48).
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We could present spatially an atomic fact which contradicted the laws of physics,
but not one which contradicted the laws of geometry. (TLP, 3.0321)
This delimiting function of the determination of possibilities can perhaps be called the
Kantian aspect in both Hertz’s and Wittgenstein’s systems. In Kant, the forms of intuition,
space and time, determine (together with the categories) the possibilities of empirical reality
as it can be known by pure reason, thereby delimiting its sphere. In Hertz and Wittgenstein,
the possibilities are likewise determined a priori, by Hertz in the field of mechanics, by
Wittgenstein in logic. The latter’s aim is to delimit “thinking, or rather: the expression
of thought” and this limit is further specified as a limit that distinguishes language from
“nonsense” (TLP, preface).69
Now words in the preface are not always used in the sense in which they are used within
the book,70 but if “nonsense” is roughly related to what is called “sense” within the system
of the Tractatus, then it is not so difficult to understand: sense is “what a picture represents”
(TLP, 2.221) and we have already seen the remark clarifying what the picture represents: it is
a possible situation in logical space (TLP, 2.202). Hence, the sense of a picture is a location,
a possibility in logical space and here “possibility” can be read in the third sense: as opposed
to impossibility. Nonsense is what is not localisable in logical space, what cannot be pictured
by means of a logical picture, that is, by a thought. Since the thought is “the proposition with
a sense”(TLP 1961, 4),71 language, too, is thus bounded by this realm of possibilities which
is exhausted by logic.
Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is
not.
For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and
this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the
world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also.
What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we
cannot think. (TLP, 5.61)
69. It is a limit in the sense of the Moore-Sullivan dispute mentioned in chapter 2: we cannot know both sides
of the boundary.
70. It says that in the book “thoughts” are expressed although the propositions of the Tractatus are not
thoughts in the sense of “logical pictures of facts”; their truth is allegedly “unassailable” (unantastbar) while
the system says precisely that any truth is contingent and therefore “antastbar” (disputable).
71. Here, the Pears/McGuinness translation has the advantage of keeping the crucial word sense which is lost
in Ogden’s translation of “sinnvoll” as “significant”.
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Since logic speaks of all possibilities, possibility is not a property a fact could have or not.
This is what is meant with the famous expression “delimiting from within”: anything outside
of logical space we cannot even speak of. Propositions without sense are not “possible” in the
three senses of the word I have distinguished: they are impossible in the sense of (3) and can
therefore not even be assessed with regards to criterion (1), whether they are correct or not,
refer to an actual fact or not. With regards to (2) there are two special cases of propositions
that do not have sense. Since “sense” was defined as the possibility that objects can be
combined in a certain way, a place in logical space, contingency seems to be a condition for
“sense”. For objects can be combined in a certain way or not and the analogy of a “place
in logical space” was precisely used to highlight this aspect of possibility. Tautologies and
contradictions are not “possible” in this sense: for their truth is certain or impossible, but
not contingent. Hence, they do not have a “sense” in the Tractarian usage of the word, they
cannot be pictured and they do not have a specific location in logical space. However, these
special propositions are still related with that space:
Tautology leaves to reality the whole infinite logical space; contradiction fills
the whole logical space and leaves no point to reality. Neither of them, therefore,
can in any way determine reality. (TLP, 4.463)
The truth of tautology is certain, of propositions possible, of contradiction
impossible. (TLP, 4.464)
This kind of being senseless (sinnlos) is explicitly distinguished from nonsense (Unsinn)
which is completely outside of logical space; it is, to speak with a metaphor by Elisabeth
Anscombe, not even “on the map” – a metaphor with which she aims to illustrate the
connection between logical space and negation.72
3.2 Logical Constants and Logical Space
One of Wittgenstein’s main objectives is to explain how we can form true or false propositions
about the world; that this is possible is taken as a given, it is the starting point of the Tractatus.
Since it is essential for a proposition that it can be true or false (cf. Bonino 2008, 53–59),
negation must, in a way, leave the sense of the proposition untouched. Attempts to meet this
requirement pervade the pre-Tractarian notebooks. The issue of negation clearly becomes
acute after Wittgenstein has come up with both metaphors for the potentiality of propositions:
72. She illustrates the location of a Sachlage in logical space by means of an island on a map whose opposite
would be the rest of the map. Not without reason she talks about logical space in the lecture on negation (cf.
Anscombe 1959, 75).
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picture and space. It turns out that they do not account for the problem equally well. If a
picture is true it corresponds to a fact; propositions can say that something is not the case and
if this “something”, a “possible fact”, does indeed not exist, then the “negative proposition”
is true. But also this true negative proposition must be a picture and how can a picture show
what is not the case? If we consider physical pictures, drawings, paintings, one could think
of a crossed-out or inverted picture, but none of these solutions is satisfying, and in any case
the negative picture cannot show what is not the case without its positive counterpart:
If a picture represents what-is-not-the-case in the forementioned way, this only
happens through its presenting that which is not the case.
For the picture says, as it were: “This is how it is not”, and to the question “How
is it not?” just the positive proposition is the answer. (NB, 3/11/1914)
This brings us back to the problem of the sense of a picture which, we learned, is a possible
situation in logical space. Let us again follow an argumentative path in the decimal system to
better understand this point. We have seen that “the thought is the proposition with a sense”
(TLP, 4) from which it follows that propositions with sense, like thoughts (cf. TLP, 3), are
logical pictures of facts. In the sub-remarks to this main proposition (the 4.0s), Wittgenstein
is concerned with the nature of this pictoriality:
The proposition is a picture of reality.
The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is. (TLP, 4.01)
This we see from the fact that we understand the sense of the propositional sign,
without having had it explained to us. (TLP, 4.02)
A proposition has sense by describing a possible Sachlage in logical space, and it must
therefore be connected to this Sachlage. This connection is precisely that it is its logical
picture.
The proposition only asserts something, in so far as it is a picture. (TLP, 4.03)
Pictoriality has already been explained in the 2s as, first, a representation of objects by
elements in the picture and, second, as an identity of form, that is: the elements in the picture
can be arranged in the same way as the objects, for which they stand, can be arranged in
a fact. The Grundgedanke, which has received much attention in the literature, is in fact a
comment on this remark 4.03 which concerns the representation of objects in pictures:
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The possibility of propositions is based upon the principle of the representation
of objects by signs.
My fundamental thought is that the “logical constants” do not represent. That
the logic of the facts cannot be represented. (TLP, 4.0312)73
The notion of representation is hence tied to pictoriality. That the logic of facts cannot be
represented is related to the claims that the picture cannot represent its form which is after all
a logical term. Logic is concerned with possibilities, whereas the picture can indeed present a
possibility, but only, strange to say, as if it were actual because it cannot represent what is not
the case without representing the non-obtaining state of affairs. Hence, the “logical picture
can depict the world” (TLP, 2.19), where the world is understood as the totality of facts,
but it cannot represent all possible worlds. The totality of possibilities, which Wittgenstein
wants to capture in logic, cannot be represented in the picture theory. Therefore, the logical
constants, which determine all configurational possibilities of objects, do not represent, the
logic of facts is not representable.
Proposition 4.04 elaborates the idea of representation: pictoriality is a one-to-one mapping
between proposition and Sachlage and if things change in reality, its representatives in the
picture change accordingly (Wittgenstein draws an analogy to Hertz’s dynamical models).
Proposition 4.05 concerns the comparison of a picture with reality which was already
present in the 2s (“It is like a scale applied to reality”, TLP 2.1512), but is now extended
to propositions: the proposition is compared with reality. Now this comparison brings in,
again, the bipolarity of propositions; for the comparison with reality will yield a result: the
proposition is true or false. The next step in the 4.0x series expounds this with regards to
negation:
Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of the reality. (TLP,
4.06)
The proposition has a sense “independent of the facts”; ~p could by convention refer to the
Sachlage we now refer to with p. But this would not mean that ~p somehow refers wrongly
73. There is a tension between the “fundamental” word Grundgedanke and its low number which can be
interpreted in different ways: Schulte suggests that the numbering system does not actually indicate a hierarchy
since the “fundamental thought” has such a low number (Schulte 2005, 63). In contrast, Bonino argues that
the fundamental thought is in fact not to be understood as fundamental in the sense that all other propositions
can be derived from it (Bonino 2008, 125). I tend to the latter view as the remark itself is in fact implied in
other remarks and can indeed be said to be itself based on the picture theory. It does not found the rest of
the system. The formal equivalence of fact, picture, thought and proposition by means of picturing relations,
which is spelled out in the higher numbered remarks, has in a profound sense more “logical weight” than
the pronouncement of its motivations or implications. The relative prominence of the Grundgedanke in the
literature may be related with the fact that it can be shown to be a reply to Frege’s and Russell’s theories about
logical constants (e.g. Bonino 2008, 125–129) and thereby can be presented as the solution to a well-defined
problem – a welcome rarity in Wittgenstein scholarship.
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to the right fact – it is the true proposition, it means what we normally mean by p; in that
notation the absence of “~” would be used like “~” is used now (TLP, 4.061; 4.062).
That, however, the signs “p” and “~~p” can say the same thing is important, for
it shows that the sign “~” corresponds to nothing in reality.
That negation occurs in a proposition, is no characteristic of its sense (~~ p = p).
The propositions “p” and “~p” have opposite senses, but to them corresponds
one and the same reality. (TLP, 4.0621)
This last remark is obviously puzzling: how can the senses be opposed to one another, but
refer to the same reality? The same problem is expressed in the continuation of the above
quoted passage in the wartime manuscripts where Wittgenstein within a few lines seems to
straightforwardly contradict himself; however, the solution is also indicated in this passage
by moving from the picture-imagery towards space-imagery which is better suited to account
for the special role of negation with regards to sense:
It might be said: The negation refers to the very logical place which is determined
by the negated proposition. [. . . ]
The negating proposition refers to a different logical place from the negated
proposition. (NB, 3/11/1914)
We have seen how opposite pictures correspond to the same reality insofar as a negative
picture can only represent how it is not, by relating to its positive counterpart. To understand
how the senses are nevertheless opposed to one another, it is helpful to distinguish between
a “picture sense” and an “arrow sense”74 (Pilch 2017, 19) which accounts for the essential
bipolarity of propositions. The picture sense is shared by proposition and negation and is
shown, while their arrow senses are opposed to one another and said:
The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And it says, that they do so
stand (TLP, 4.022).
Note how the metaphors are crossed here: the showing aspect clearly belongs to the picture-
side and its exhibition of form without saying it; the arrow aspect, the direction, the affirma-
74. This idea takes up Wittgenstein’s metaphor: “propositions resemble arrows: they have sense” (TLP,
3.144). Wittgenstein does not actually make the distinction, his use of the word “sense” rather seems to shift
between them or include both aspects. For methodological purposes, the distinction is useful though. Note also
that the German word for sense, “Sinn”, is etymologically related to “direction” and hence implies something
arrow-like, something vectorial (cf. Grimm and Grimm 1854, Vol. 16, Sp. 1103, Sinn, I.3: “die ursprüngliche
bedeutung der wurzel war augenscheinlich die einer ortsbewegung”).
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tion and negation, are better captured in spatial imagery.75 In logical space, the idea that a
proposition and its negation are related, but distinct, can be illustrated more intuitively and
this is indeed what Wittgenstein does in the seemingly contradictory manuscript entry which
is later integrated into the final version of the Tractatus:
Every proposition must already have a sense; assertion cannot give it a sense, for
what it asserts is the sense itself. And the same holds of denial, etc. (TLP, 4.064)
One could say, the denial is already related to the logical place determined by
the proposition that is denied.
The denying proposition determines a logical place other than does the proposi-
tion denied.
The denying proposition determines a logical place, with the help of the logical
place of the proposition denied, by saying that it lies outside the latter place.
(TLP, 4.0641)
It seems to be paradoxical, but is in fact the solution. The picture sense, as it were, describes
the boundary of a proposition which it shares with its negation. Thereby the negative
proposition is related to the same logical place. It determines a different logical place by
covering everything outside this boundary, while the “positive proposition” covers only the
area inside the boundary. Negation is an operation. It consists in switching the side of the
boundary, is therefore not related to the pictorial, representing aspect of Wittgenstein’s system,
but to the spatial, formal aspect. It is important that here logical place is not conceived as a
point, but rather as an extended area in logical space.76 At one point Wittgenstein conceived
of this internal relation as a spatial boundary in a quite literal, physical sense: an object
blocking an area, so that it is clear: you cannot go there, this area is excluded from your
possibilities.
Think of the representation of negative facts by means of models. E.g.: two
railway trains must not stand on the rails in such-and-such a way. The proposition,
the picture, the model, are – in the negative sense – like a solid body restricting
the freedom of movement of others; in the positive sense, like the space bounded
by solid substance, in which there is room for a body.
75. The simile in 4.063 highlights that this “arrow” sense belongs to the proposition intrinsically. Therefore,
being true or false cannot just be represented by a point on a paper being black or white – these properties are
external to the point and one could point to it without even knowing what black is. Rather, the true and false
propositions must be different areas in logical space which are complementary to one another.
76. This is meant by Anscombe’s metaphor of the island on a map whose negation would be the rest of the
map (1959, 75). The role of space in Wittgenstein’s treatment of negation is also highlighted by Pilch who
conceives of a proposition and its negation as regions in logical space, too (2017, 19).
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This image is very clear and must lead to the solution (NB, 14/11/1914)
This imagery of space is also better than that of pictures to explain the special role of
tautologies and contradictions. For what should a picture of “It is raining or it is not raining”
look like? Indeed, the comparison between negative facts and physical bodies is set in the
context of Wittgenstein’s discussion of tautology and contradiction which was quoted above:
contradiction, as it were, blocks the whole space and leaves nothing to the proposition,
tautology leaves everything unblocked so that the proposition is true no matter what (TLP,
4.463). In Anscombe’s image, the whole map would consist of island so that any point can
be said to be “on the island”; or the whole map is ocean so that no point can be on the island.
The transfer of this idea to logic can be illustrated by means of the spatial imagery: a
proposition and its negation are two complementary regions in logical space. Crucially, in
this space there is a region representing p and a region representing ~p – but there is no point
or region representing the symbol of negation itself. Negating something just consists in
switching the side of the boundary.
What about other logical constants than negation? Pilch has shown that also other opera-
tions, such as implication, can be interpreted spatially if the functions of logical space are
conceived in different “representation spaces”. This interpretation of logical space is based
on the TF-notation which is itself designed to do away with logical constants in the sense of
logical objects. This notation makes use of the possibility to represent propositions by means







Taking only the last column of tables like this, every logical combination of the two
elementary propositions can be represented with a unique sequence of Ts and Fs. The truth-
conditions, as Wittgenstein calls them, of the disjunction of two elementary propositions p
and q are TTTF; the truth-conditions for conjunction would be TFFF; a mere affirmation
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of p: TTFF, and its negation: FFTT. The notation consists of the truth-conditions and a
declaration of the elementary propositions that are involved, e.g. (TTTF)(p, q). A scheme of
all permutations of two elementary propositions is given in TLP 5.101. With this notation
all internal relations between propositions can be expressed without the need for special
signs for negation, disjunction or implication. Logical operations simply are transitions from
certain distributions of Ts and Fs to other distributions. Negation for example turns all Fs
into Ts and vice versa. And it is clear why with this method double negation yields the same
result as affirmation.
The idea that logical constants are superfluous is discussed in more detail in proposition
5.4. After having introduced the mechanism of truth-operations applied to truth-functions
(i.e. co-ordinations of truth-value to elementary propositions), he states:
All propositions are results of truth-operations on the elementary propositions.
The truth-operation is the way in which a truth-function arises from elementary
propositions.
According to the nature of truth-operations, in the same way as out of elementary
propositions arise their truth-functions, from truth-functions arises a new one.
Every truth-operation creates from truth-functions of elementary propositions,
another truth-function of elementary propositions i.e. a proposition. The re-
sult of every truth-operation on the results of truth-operations on elementary
propositions is also the result of one truth-operation on elementary propositions.
Every proposition is the result of truth-operations on elementary propositions.
(TLP, 5.3)
Here it becomes clear that there are no such things as “logical objects” or “logical
constants” (in the sense of Frege and Russell). (TLP, 5.4)
For all those results of truth-operations on truth-functions are identical, which
are one and the same truth-function of elementary propositions. (TLP, 5.41)
This argument seems to me to be related to the spatial account of logic that has been sketched.
Many truth-operations can result in the same distribution of Ts and Fs, the same truth-
conditions, that is, in the same “area” in logical space, the same truth-function of elementary
propositions: the operations do not have a fixed location in that space, they are relations,
transitions, between regions.
What is important is the role of space in this central thought of the Tractatus. Wittgen-
stein’s idea can be represented in three representation spaces that together contain all functions
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of the abstract structure “logical space”; all mappings of elementary propositions with a truth-
value and all operations on them can be represented with this structure, as Pilch has pointed
out. In what he calls “parameter space”, the fundamental bipolarity of elementary proposi-
tions is captured. This space has as many “points” as there are elementary propositions.77
For n elementary propositions there are 2n possible conjunctions (Wittgenstein’s variable Kn,
TLP 4.27) which can be represented as states in “state space”. This space only contains the
conjunctions of elementary propositions, that is, for two elementary propositions:, there are
four possibilities of truth and falsity: p.q, ~ p.q, p. ~ q and ~ p. ~ q.78 Applying the other
truth-operations to these states leads us to the totality of combinatorial possibilities of two
elementary propositions. There are 22
n
possibilities here which corresponds to Wittgenstein’s
variable Ln (TLP, 4.42). It stands for the number of possibilities for propositions to be true or
false. Since this exhausts all propositions that can be constructed out of the given elementary
propositions, Pilch calls this space “propositional space”.79
Representation Spaces after Pilch 2017, 39
This shows that the idea of logical space in its various features and functions serves as
a means to illustrate Wittgenstein’s fundamental thought. It shows how the possibilities
of propositions as understood in the Tractatus, as the transformations of truth-functions
of elementary propositions by means of truth-operations, can be represented without the
77. The number of elementary propositions cannot be known, but Wittgenstein shows how he imagines this
space by using toy-spaces of up to three elementary propositions.
78. Note that this is what corresponds to possible facts according to Wittgenstein’s explanation to Russell:
“Tatsache is what corresponds to the logical product of elementary propositions if it is true”.
79. Sullivan is on the same track when he distinguishes two models of logical space which should not be
considered as alternative, but additional to one another. The first model is a space of as many dimensions as
there are Sachverhalte each of which can only exist or not (≈ parameter space). The second model is very
similar to Pilch’s state space, only that Sullivan tries to explain the features of propositional space within the
same framework – which is possible, but Pilch’s visualisation is more perspicuous (cf. Sullivan 2001, 96–97).
3.2 Logical Constants and Logical Space 65
need for logical constants, without reification of logical operators. These “do not represent”
because they are no locations in logical space which pictures refer to if they represent. The
spatial account of logic can illustrate the logical operations by internal structures as Pilch
demonstrates for negation and logical consequence (cf. Pilch 2017, 41–45). The metaphor
of “picture” alone could explain possibility, too, but it cannot account for negation because
the “picture sense” does only show how things can be arranged, whereas the “arrow sense”,
which is best illustrated spatially, says that they are so arranged (cf. TLP, 4.022). This
explains also the apparent paradox that the negation is related to the same logical place as the
negated proposition, but determines a different logical place: they share the same boundary in
space, but the positive proposition affirms everything inside the boundary while the negative
proposition affirms everything outside the boundary (TLP, 4.0641).
It is worth noting how important the problem of negation is in the development and
conception of this solution. This is a constant in Wittgenstein’s thinking who again and again
uses the method of asking: what would be the opposite? Is there an antithesis at all? It is a
consequence of his conceiving of sense-frameworks by means of spaces which essentially
feature this divisibility into complementary parts. This remains vital in the so-called middle
period which I will present in the next chapter, for example when discussing grammatical, or
as he sometimes calls them: geometrical, propositions in the Big Typescript: “What does it
mean when one says: ’I can’t imagine the opposite of that’ or ’What would it be like if it
were otherwise?’?” (MS213, 95r).80 A similar emphasis is made in the Blue Book where
our attention is directed to what Wittgenstein calls the metaphysical use, “namely without an
antithesis” (BB, 46); and of course the same point is made in the private language argument
and its discussions of the privacy of pain: Can I know that I am in pain if it is unthinkable
that I am in pain and don’t know it? – These statements which seem to have no alternative,
i.e. necessary statements, are always suspicious for Wittgenstein; and mostly they turn out to
be what he calls grammatical or indeed geometrical propositions (e.g. MS105, 43; BT 306r,
749r; MS119, 61–62; MS122, 69v). Remarks that simply state the structure of the space, but
do not tell us anything new, are not empirical insights. Nor are they metaphysical insights,
the recognition of a metaphysical truth, for at least the later Wittgenstein would understand
geometry and grammar in a (qualified) conventionalist sense. Grammatical propositions,
which simply describe how a conceptual space works, do not have sense according to the
criteria they themselves determine. A clock defines a space of meaningful time expressions,
but the clock itself is not a time expression and is thereby nonsense within the space of
time expressions. The Tractatus can be compared to the description of such a clock, with
the peculiarity that the clock is supposed to determine everything sayable so that it itself
80. Translation by Luckhardt and Aue (BT 2005, 78e).
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cannot be described at all: while the clock can be described with non-time-expressions,
logical space could only be described with non-logical propositions. Hence, the building and
describing of the clock itself is nonsense in a “resolute” sense, but it is nonsense due to the
clock being as it is. Does it at least show the “real time”? Is the world really as described
in the Tractatus? Wittgenstein famously described the book later as “a clock that didn’t
work” which is often quoted by standard readers to show that it is not complete nonsense
in the “resolute” sense (cf. Hacker 2017, 217). However, the clock can also be read as a
simile of a measure: of determining criteria for something which can be true or false, as
a space which constitutes sense. Whether the clock itself shows the right time one cannot
really know, because it sets the standard of what “the right time” is. Therefore, one could
indeed say its truth is “unassailable and definitive” insofar as it is a definition; but it is not
true (nor false) in the sense of a proposition within the space: it is nonsense. While I shall
argue that this grammatically conventionalist view is a characteristic of the later Wittgenstein,
in the Tractatus matters are not so clear. For there indeed seems to be only one logical space,
only one grammar, only one geometry. It is not quite clear why this must be so, but it seems
that Wittgenstein did hold this view in his first book.81 This shall be the topic of the next
subsection.
3.3 Universality and Uniformity – the Structure of the World
It has been noticed that a main motivation for the system of the Tractatus was Wittgenstein’s
rejection of a “universalist conception of logic” which he found in Frege and Russell (Ricketts
2018, 54). It is the view that logic has the same status as a science and is distinguished merely
by being the most general science; that logic encloses all the other sciences by investigating
the most general truths about the world. Although rejecting this kind of universalism,
Wittgenstein still
adheres to the idea of a single framework embracing every sentence (see 6.124).
There is just one logical space in which every sentence with sense determines
a location. Each sentence with sense is related to every other, if only by the
relation of independence (Ricketts 2018, 80)
81. Denis McManus reconstructs the argument leading to a “vertically unified” logic as opposed to Russell’s
theory of a hierarchy of logical types (cf. 2009). What is especially important here is the demand that logic
should be completely foreseeable (cf. Sullivan 2002, 58). If there were types, new kinds of propositions
could be discovered for which specific rules would apply; this question of numbers and kinds occurs in the
retrospective treatment of that issue by Wittgenstein which I present in the next section. However, I will not
give a detailed account of Wittgenstein’s rejection of type theory for there is not much in Wittgenstein’s own
text about this issue; it has been extensively discussed by others whom McManus quotes (Potter, Sullivan).
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In light of its status as the most general manifold, it is clear why logical space always occurs
in a universal singular as the logical space (TLP, 1.13; 2.11; 2.202; 3.4 ff.; 4.4623). The
completeness of logical space is a requirement for the whole system. It guarantees that
every meaningful proposition is “localizable and by this localization linked to a possible
Sachverhalt, and on the other hand it clarifies negation to be a relation between comple-
mentary regions in logical space” (Pilch 2017, 18). The mechanism of operations, negation,
disjunction etc., only works if the space is complete. Negation leaves open all other possi-
bilities, its region in logical space is really complementary to the negated proposition: each
elementary proposition divides logical space into two parts. “If all the positive statements
about a thing are made, aren’t all the negative ones already made too? And that is the whole
point.” (NB, 26/11/1914). This is again related with the avoidance of logical constants. If
we remember the TF-notation and its relation to space we can see how conjunction and
disjunction, “logical product” and “logical sum”, presuppose the complete space in a similar
way. If only two elementary propositions are given, each place, each proposition in the
propositional space of 16 propositions, contains the possibility of the other places, i.e. of the
other propositions, by allowing for variations of its distribution of Ts and Fs. Wittgenstein
highlights this completion function in a comment on section 3.4 which is dedicated to logical
space:
Although a proposition may only determine one place in logical space, the whole
logical space must already be given by it.
(Otherwise denial, the logical sum, the logical product, etc., would always
introduce new elements—in co-ordination.)
(The logical scaffolding round the picture determines the logical space. The
proposition reaches through the whole logical space) (TLP, 3.42)
The whole issue of completeness is very important also for the later Wittgenstein. As we will
see, he will not argue for the generality and uniqueness of space anymore, but he will always
insist that each conceptual space is complete.82 He argues that the mathematical space of
rational numbers has no “gaps” which had to be filled with irrational numbers (MS111, 29),
that the “vagueness” of the visual field cannot be captured in a greater space, for instance
by an “exact account of inexactitude” (cf. MS107, 172);83 in the Investigations, he asks us
to conceive of the simple language-game of the builders as a “complete primitive language”
82. Rhees warns against equating completeness with unity (1970, 51–52). He takes Wittgenstein to be
directed against completeness, not unity, when he argues against the “craving for generality” in the Blue Book
(18–19). In my view, however, generality is again different from these two notions. A space, like colour space,
can be complete without being general.
83. And this completeness is related to the grammatical fact, that “vagueness” has no opposite in visual space.
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(PI, §2); games can be games – complete games – even if not everything is determined by
the rules. And introducing new rules is then essentially inventing a new game. Treating
simple geometries as precursors of one great unifying geometry is repeatedly characterised as
“unjust” or “unfair”, mostly with the shorthand “Nicod, Russell” (MS213, 202; MS115, 81;
MS142, 19) referring to Nicod’s Foundations of Geometry & Induction and Russell’s preface
in which he describes just this method (cf. Nicod 1930). In the Investigations, Wittgenstein
elaborates his account of completeness without universality by admitting that Augustine’s
language is indeed a system – and a complete system as has been highlighted in §2 – “only
not everything that we call language is this system.”
And one has to say this in several cases where the question arises “Will that
description do or not?” The answer is: “Yes, it will, but only for this narrowly
circumscribed area, not for the whole of what you were purporting to describe.
(PI, §3)
This is a powerful criticism of his earlier view right at the start of his envisaged second book
which he had planned to publish together with the Tractatus as he remarks in the preface from
1945 and in a tentative title which is considered in a manuscript: “Philos. Untersuchungen
der Log. Phil. Abh. entgegengestellt” (MS128, 52).
Generally, the Tractatus uses a sort of generalising language: this is already evident
from its bold opening statement about “the world”; and also logical space appears to be
universal and uniform. Later commentators have ascribed a certain “logical absolutism” to
the Tractatus84 and Wittgenstein himself takes this as one of the major points of revision
on his way to his later philosophy: he does so explicitly in an argument from 1937 which
shall be treated below, and implicitly, performatively, in the development of a plurality of
grammatical spaces with their own context-dependent logics in the writings after 1929 which
are not treated as sub-spaces of an all-encompassing logical space.
Another symptom of the striving for universality in the Tractatus is the search for the
general form of the proposition which follows from the generality and completeness of
logical space (which is itself a kind of “form” as we have seen). In the remarks on the
non-existence of logical constants (5.4), there are some arguments that emphasise this unity
and shall later be recognised as problematic. From 5.453 (“there are no numbers in logic”),
Wittgenstein claims the neatness, or rather: simplicity (Einfachheit) and apriority of logic:
there are not many, but only one logical constant which he finally calls “the general form of
the proposition”.
84. As opposed to Carnap’s “relativized” view on logic as expressed in his Principle of Tolerance (Friedman
1999, 183). In fact, however, Wittgenstein made a similar move as Carnap with regards to “logical absolutism”
in his philosophy after 1929.
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It is clear that everything which can be said beforehand about the form of all
propositions at all can be said on one occasion.
For all logical operations are already contained in the elementary proposition.
For “f a”85 says the same as “(∃x). f x.x = a”.
Where there is composition, there is argument and function, and where these are,
all logical constants already are.
One could say: the one logical constant is that which all propositions, according
to their nature, have in common with one another.
That however is the general form of proposition. (TLP, 5.47)
In the sub-remarks to 5.47, this gets further sublimated as “the essence of proposition” and
equated with “the essence of the world” (TLP, 5.471; 5.4711). In 1937 when Wittgenstein
drafts the first version of PI §§89–116, he criticises these remarks in particular and comes to
realise that the assumed unity and “crystalline purity” of logic (and world) were a postulate,
and not a truth about the world (cf. MS157a, 45 ff.).
In this notebook, Wittgenstein takes up various ideas from the Tractatus and tries to find
out why he was looking for a pure and unique essence of language in the first place. The
reconstruction has five steps:
1. He was concerned not with facts, but with language – and this was correct. For
language can also describe those facts that do not exist.
2. Since he was concerned with language, he naturally asked for the essence of language.
3. He wanted to get to the essence of language once and for all, it had to be independent
of experience and a priori. For this reason there could be no kinds of language or parts
thereof – for if there was a certain number of kinds, it would already be empirical
and new kinds could possibly be discovered (MS157, 47r). Hence: „All numbers in
logic must be capable of justification. Or rather it must become plain that there are no
numbers in logic” (TLP, 5.453).
4. Hence, the answer to the question for the essence of language must be one-fold or
simple (einfach). “And so it seemed as if our answer had to be simple to the highest
85. This function-argument variable is, by the way, the closest we get to an example of an elementary
proposition. It contains everything that is said by the second expression which uses quantifier, conjunction
and identity. “A point of space is an argument place”, Wittgenstein says in the section on objects and their
dependence on the facts in which they can occur (TLP, 2.0131): I take it that an object can be understood as
the “a” in the elementary proposition “fa”; already here the metaphor of space is connected to the later ideas of
logical form and the non-existence of logical constants.
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degree. Yes, actually not even one-fold” (MS157a, 47r). Logic had to be one in
this metaphysical sense (without alternative), and also “proposition” and “thought”
had to be one, and finally there was an equivalent series: “world, thinking, language,
proposition. Thus the question for the essence of proposition (for the general form of
the proposition) was the question for the essence of the world” (MS157a, 47v–48r).
5. This claim is the “sublime” against which Wittgenstein will argue in the philosophy
chapter of the Investigations – and this claim cannot be reduced, or „scaled down“.
This preconception which is intimately connected with that of the “crystalline purity
of logic” can only be removed “by turning our whole inquiry around” (PI, §108).
In the whole Nachlass, this is the most explicit discussion of Wittgenstein’s view on the
unity of logic and the world in the Tractatus. They are presented in the notebooks MS157a
and 157b. Their importance for him is shown by the passionate tone in which they are written
(it resembles the tone from the wartime notebooks); moreover, they make up the core of
the philosophy chapter in the Investigations, the most carefully crafted piece of the entire
Nachlass. The argument has again a connection to the Kantian ideas presented in the last
chapter, although it does not correspond to the Kantian argument for the transcendental unity
of apperception. But it is connected to the Kantian notion of a priori: precisely because
logic is independent of experience it has to be one-fold in the strong sense that it strictly
speaking does not even allow for numbers. In the notebook, he quotes the first sentence of
TLP 5.453, “All numbers in logic must be capable of justification” (MS157a, 68r), which
is followed in the Tractatus by: “Or rather it must become plain that there are no numbers
in logic”. The remarkable parallel between the development of geometry after Kant and
Wittgenstein’s usage of “space” is that both Kant and Wittgenstein took one a priori form as
the only possible one, and that only later different forms, different spaces were recognised
as possible. Unlike Kant, Wittgenstein was able to do this correction himself. “The a priori
must become one form of representation. i.e. this concept must be stripped of its nimbus”
(MS157b, 3v).
3.4 Summary
In this chapter I investigated essential characteristics and functions of Wittgenstein’s usage of
space metaphors in the Tractatus. First, I showed how logical space, together with the picture
theory, illustrates the ontology of possibilities which underlies the capability of language
to express sense independently of truth. I analysed the interdependence of facts, objects,
and form as devised in the beginning of the book and provided an interpretation of pictures,
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thoughts, and propositions in light of this modal ontology. With regards to propositions the
notion of negation became central as it bundles the problem of possibility and representation:
How are the negative and the positive picture related which they surely must be? For if one
is false, the other is true and vice versa. It turns out that the spatial imagery is better suited
to meet this requirement than the metaphor of pictures. Indeed, the idea of logical space
underlies the whole mechanism of logical operations which can be conceived as transitions
in a space of possible Sachlagen. This also provides an explanation of “nonsense” in the
Tractatus: it is what is not localisable in this space and can therefore in a straightforward
sense not be spoken of. Something ineffable can be shown, by showing how the space works;
but something that is not even related to logical space is “simply nonsense”, as Wittgenstein
puts it in the preface. Finally, I explained the alleged unity of the Tractatus which manifests
itself in its craving for generality, its attempt to think of logical space as the one and only
super-structure of all possibilities.
One similarity between Kant’s (Euclidean) space and Wittgenstein’s logical space is that
both are supposed to be a priori and apodictic, i.e. the only conceivable form of reality (in
Kant’s “aesthetical” account: the empirical world as perceived through the “outer sense”; in
Wittgenstein’s logical account: the totality of facts). Wittgenstein generalises the idea of an
a priori form of knowledge from a merely “spatial space” to an all-encompassing logical
space. Logic is for him an investigation of the conditions of knowledge, it is “transcendental”
(TLP, 6.13). However, what happened to Kant’s a priori form of intuition, Euclidean space,
also happened to Wittgenstein’s logical space. He has to acknowledge that different a priori
“spaces” are conceivable and that there is an element of experience in their determination.
When Wittgenstein starts working on his later philosophy, he performs a shift from unity
to plurality, from one all-encompassing logical space to many grammatical spaces. This shift
shall be investigated in the next chapter. The features of logical space, which I discussed in
this chapter, shall, however, be important in all variations of the idea of spatial representation:
it is always a framework of possibilities which are determined by a “geometry” governing
the structure of the respective space. This geometry does not itself consist of “meaningful”
propositions in the sense defined within the respective space. Its propositions are what





[. . . ] daß alles Denken im Räumlichen
vor sich geht, daß der Denkprozeß eine
Verquickung unsagbar verwickelter
vieldimensionaler logischer Räume




We have seen that one essential feature of the Tractatus account of logic and therefore also
of the central metaphor of “logical space” was its unity or “logical absolutism” (Friedman
1999, 183): that there is one logical structure underlying all kinds of languages, a general
form of the proposition. It is clear that Wittgenstein regarded this claim for universality as
one of the “grave mistakes in what I set out in my first book”, as he puts it in the preface of
the Philological Investigations, his second book, where he addresses this point explicitly:
“We see that what we call ’proposition’, ’language’, has not the formal unity that I imagined,
but is a family of structures more or less akin to one another” (PI, §108). He is referring here,
of course, to his notion of “family resemblances” that has been introduced earlier in the book
and which is one of the most powerful passages against the unifying tendencies Wittgenstein
aims to overcome:
Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean board-games,
card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them
all? – Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they would not
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be called ‘games”’ – but look and see whether there is anything common to all.
– For if you look at them, you won’t see something that is common to all, but
similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think,
but look! [. . . ] And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large
and in the small.
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family
resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family –
build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth –
overlap and criss-cross in the same way. – And I shall say: ‘games’ form a
family. (PI, §§66–67)
In this chapter and the following, I will substantiate my claims about continuity and dis-
continuity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy which are related to this passage: I will argue in
sections 5.3.2 and 6.1.2 that it is no accident that he chose “games” as the example for family
resemblance concepts, but that game-like frameworks replace space-like structures as the
most important analogy to language use; in the present chapter I will focus on the role of
“spaces” in the so-called middle-period which roughly stretches from the completion of the
Tractatus in 1918 to the first drafts of the Investigations in 1936–7. While I will highlight the
differences between games and spaces in chapter 6, I shall first focus on their similarities,
notably their non-universal nature and the features they inherit from the Tractarian “logical
space” carved out in the last chapter.
An early trace of the idea of family resemblances can be found in a picture from the
1920s made by the Viennese photographer Moritz Nähr under Wittgenstein’s guidance. It is a
superposition of four portraits in the manner of Francis Galton’s composite photography. The
portrayed are Ludwig himself and his three sisters so that the picture shows indeed a family
resemblance in a literal sense without being a sharp picture of one particular characteristic
they all have in common. (cf. Nedo 2012, 268). To be sure, this picture is no evidence of
an elaborated philosophical concept, but it clearly belongs to the cluster of problems that
occupied Wittgenstein in the 1920s and in his first notebooks after the Tractatus: Wittgenstein
explicitly mentions Galton in philosophical contexts in 1929 and 1930 (Lecture on Ethics/
TS207, 2; MS107, 175); I will also show that in this period, he uses “space” as a family
resemblance concept which serves as a means to clarify different domains of language
through a web of similarities and differences, but without having one feature that goes
through all of them.
In this chapter, I explore how the move from logical absolutism towards a more pluralist
account of language takes place in the middle-period and how this is relates to the notion
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of space and geometry. I start by sketching the development of Wittgenstein’s idiosyncratic
notion of “grammar” which evolves in that time; comparisons to geometry pervade this
early concept of grammar and I will trace these analogies and evaluate them in light of the
role of space and geometry in the Tractatus. Following these general observations about
the importance of spatial imagery, I move on to specific applications of this geometric-
grammatical thinking in various philosophical fields. One obviously related subject is
mathematics where geometry has its proper place; another one is the grammar of colour
expressions which is of great importance in Wittgenstein’s philosophy at all stages (cf.
Rothhaupt 1996) and is often regarded as a milestone in his development from the Tractatus
to his later philosophy.86 In 1929 he is also said to have had a “phenomenological phase”
(cf. Kienzler 1997; Park 1998) in which a domain of immediate experience is contrasted
with a more mediated and hypothetical “physical language”. Finally I will consider the issue
of intentionality, that is, the connection between mind and world which Wittgenstein also
interprets in a “grammatical” way: language sets up the structure in which thinking and
reality meet; apart from that no metaphysical connection between them is possible, especially
no immediate perception of “facts” as it was envisaged in the phenomenological phase.
4.1 Grammar as Geometry
In May 1930 Russell was asked to evaluate Wittgenstein’s latest work in order to support his
application for a fellowship at the Council of Trinity College. Besides explaining his ideas in
conversations, Wittgenstein also created a typescript, a synopsis of what he had written since
1929 which later became the basis of the posthumously published Philosophical Remarks.
Russell commented on this typescript in a letter to Moore and, more formally, in a report
to the Council of Trinity College. His judgement is “a bit of a caricature” as Schulte (2006,
566) observes, but it does capture an important aspect:
[Wittgenstein] uses the words ’space’ and ’grammar’ in peculiar senses, which
are more or less connected with each other. He holds that if it is significant to say
’This is red’, it cannot be significant to say ’This is loud’. There is one ’space’
of colours and another ’space’ of sounds. These ’spaces’ are apparently given a
priori in a Kantian sense, or at least not perhaps exactly that, but something not
so very different. Mistakes of grammar result from confusing ’spaces’ [...] One
might define a space, as he uses the word, as a complete set of possibilities of a
86. Peter Hacker famously stated in the first edition of his Insight and Illusion: “Wittgenstein’s early
philosophy collapsed over the inability to solve one problem – colour exclusion” (1972, 86).
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given type. If you can say ’This is blue’, there are a number of other things you
can say significantly, namely all the other colours. (Russell 1968, 198)
There are various relations among colours which constitute the geometry of
that ’space’. All this is, in one sense, independent of experience: that is to say
we need the kind of experience through which we know what ’green’ is, but
not the kind of through which we know that a certain patch of wall is green.
Wittgenstein uses the word ’grammar’ to cover what corresponds in language to
the existence of these various ’spaces’. (200)
In fact, the idea to account for possibilities with spatial structures was not new. Logic
was compared to geometry in the Tractatus: a logical place, like a geometric place, was
the possibility of an existence; logical propositions, like geometrical propositions, did not
say anything about the world; logical space, like geometrical space, was a framework of
possibilities. Crucially, there was a difference between space as a structure and things or
propositions within space. Remember the Kantian philosophy of space which motivated
Russell’s comparison of grammar to a kind of “a priori”: geometry studies space itself as a
pure form of intuition. But what apparently struck Russell as central in the writings from
1929 and 1930 is the connection between spaces and grammar.
It is sometimes said that grammar is the “heir of logical syntax” in the Tractatus where
“heir” is meant to highlight the modification and extension of the concept (Hacker 2013b,
256). This reading seems plausible as “syntax” and “grammar” stand in a close, hyponymous
or even synonymous,87 relation in ordinary language. However, what exactly logical syntax
is is even less clear than in the case of logical space for which I have provided some reference
points in the last chapter. It tends to occur in lower numbered remarks and its function seems
to be to explain the logical possibilities of language, but the concept itself is not explained.
Let’s consider its occurrences:
• the rules of syntax guarantee that signs are used unambiguously (TLP, 3.325)
• its scope is restricted to the combinatorial possibilities of signs, it is not concerned
with their meaning or reference (Bedeutung; TLP, 3.33)
• its rules must go without saying “once we know how each individual sign signifies”
(TLP, 3.334)
87. In the Tractatus, where the earliest mention of grammar can be found, they seem to be synonymous. A
symbolism which uses its signs unambiguously is described as one “which obeys the rules of logical grammar—
of logical syntax” (TLP, 3.325). By emphasising the word “logical” Wittgenstein wants to distinguish the
logical grammar from ordinary grammar (and logical syntax from ordinary syntax).
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• its rules determine the possibilities to substitute symbols by other symbols (TLP, 3.344)
• if the rules of any sign language are known all propositions of logic are known, too
(TLP, 6.125)
Hacker acknowledges the difference to grammar which is a much richer concept and indeed
central to Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian philosophy (2013b, 256–257); I shall not dwell
too much on this interpretation of syntax as it seems to me very obscure and also leads
to confusion with Carnap’s theory of the same name. Instead, I would like to suggest
following Russell’s intuition (which is indeed not very surprising in light of the material
of the Philosophical Remarks) that there is an important connection between grammar and
space, and I aim to substantiate it by taking into account what I have said about geometry
and logical space in the previous chapters88 and also by considering material that was written
later than 1930.89 My account is not strictly chronological as the notion of grammar develops
waveringly in this time; but one can see how early ideas about what grammar is supposed
to account for, are resumed in the later more elaborate remarks on grammar and its related
concepts. Let us recall the functions of logical space from the last chapter: it is meant to
provide a framework of possibilities, and thereby of necessity; related with this, it was an
illustration of negation and other logical operations; it was meant to be complete (propositions
“reach through the whole space”) and universal (there is only one logical space, or indeed,
there can be only one, it is “not even one-fold”, “auch nicht einmal einfach”; MS157a,
47r). In this section, I focus on possibility and completeness, negation will come up in the
subsequent sections 4.3–4.5.
While “grammar” occurs only once in the Tractatus, it is very present from the start
of Wittgenstein’s writings after 1929 where he seems to outline a number of problems
that shall occupy him over the years to come. Among them is the question of the status
of phenomenology which oscillates in this year between the description of immediate
experience in a psychological, pre-logical, sense and a grammatical understanding which
88. This connection has to my knowledge not been studied in detail, although it is sometimes mentioned
casually, e.g. by Schulte who comments on a remark by Wittgenstein on William James and his notion of “a
priori”: “Among other things it shows that “grammar” is conceived as a kind of space, or as analogous to space,
and in this respect reveals itself to be a successor to logical space which figures prominently in the Tractatus”
(2017, 319).
89. Philosophical Remarks appears to be a proper work by Wittgenstein as it features a certain completeness,
a title and a motto, but biographical evidence speaks against the assumption that it was ever meant to be a book.
The posthumous publication is based on TS209 which is composed out of rearranged cuttings from TS208
which in turn was dictated from MSS105–108. In the manuscripts, there is no break between the last remark
that was dictated in TS208 and later remarks (MS108, 133). I would like to highlight that the Philosophical
Remarks are basically a snapshot of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development whose scope is contingent: he
did not decide to submit the typescript because he saw it as a completed, substantial “work”, but because he
had to provide a writing sample for a fellowship application.
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is not yet specified at this stage. However, this grammatical reading – which “wins” over
the psychological reading: in 1933 he writes “Phenomenology is Grammar” (TS213, 437) –
is already contrasted with physics in these very first remarks after Wittgenstein’s return to
philosophical writing:
Physics is distinguished from phenomenology by its aim to state laws. Phe-
nomenology only states possibilities
Then phenomenology would be the grammar of those facts on which physics
builds its theories. (MS105, 5)
The relation between phenomenology and physics shall be considered in more detail in
section 4.4, but its basic opposition can already be stated: phenomenology qua grammar is
concerned with possibilities, not with facts, with sense, not with truth (cf. MS105, 3). This
“grammatical method” Wittgenstein increasingly regards as his own method:90
My way of philosophising is still and over and over again new for me and this is
why I have to repeat myself so often. [. . . ] This method is basically the transition
from the quest for truth to the quest for sense. (MS105, 46; first sentence in
code)
We already know this distinction from the Tractatus and we have seen that it belongs to
the general question of possibility and necessity which is conceptualised in terms of spatial
metaphors. If we remember that the notion of “logical place” was introduced in order to
account for the capability of language to express a fact whether it exists or not, and that this
analogy grew into a whole structure of “logical space”, we can easily see the continuity to
the new concept of grammar. Grammar accounts for possibilities, not facts, and therefore
features the same necessity as logical space: it is a necessity that “rides on the back of
contingency” (cf. Gerrard 2017, 159) as it constitutes the totality of contingent possibilities.
Emphasising the difference of this a priori method to an empirical investigation of facts,
Wittgenstein objects to Mach’s usage of the term “thought experiment” who generalises the
word “experiment” from science to other spheres in which possibilities are explored and
clarified, for example by an artist or a businessman (cf. Mach 1976, 136).
What Mach calls a thought experiment is of course no experiment at all. It
basically is a grammatical investigation. (MS107, 284 f.)
90. The title of Rush Rhees’s publication Philosophical Grammar goes back to a remark in the manuscripts
where Wittgenstein considers it as a title for his envisaged book. It is also the title of two manuscript volumes
(MSS113; 114).
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It is not an “experiment” because it is not empirical and a posteriori. (Likewise, the
relativisation of geometry was not the result of an experiment. The necessity of Euclidean
space was not refuted empirically, but by mathematical considerations; only on the basis of
Riemann’s work could the question for physical geometry become empirical). In a way, one
already knows what one wants to find out in a thought experiment, it is only made explicit in
thinking. This is related to a view that Wittgenstein holds at all stages of his philosophical
development: there can be no surprise in logic (in 1918: TLP 6.1251; in 1930: MS108, 137;
in 1938: TS221a, 204–591).
The characterisation of Wittgenstein’s own grammatical method in terms of the figuration
of empirical possibilities remains valid in the Philosophical Investigations where it is stated
in a central passage at the beginning of the so-called “philosophy chapter”:
We feel as if we had to see right into phenomena: yet our investigation is directed
not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’
of phenomena. What that means is that we call to mind the kinds of statement
that we make about phenomena. [. . . ] Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical
one. (§90)
Besides this focus on possibility, it is the completeness of space that is taken up by the middle
Wittgenstein’s grammar. What appeared to be independent elementary propositions is now
described in terms of grammar as we will see in the section on colours. What stays the same,
however, is the idea of a logical or grammatical space which has to be complete. This again,
is most obvious in the colour example in which one colour excludes all other colours for the
same object at the same time. But the relations between propositions within a grammatical
space need not be rules of exclusion. Any sort of relation between expressions that bears
the kind of necessity that is typical for spatial propositions, i.e. that one of its possibilities
has to obtain, can be described by a grammatical proposition. In turn, the grammatical
propositions, which are true no matter what, function like a system of dimensions which
determine the possibilities of empirical actualities; they constitute the meaning of a word
for the middle Wittgenstein. The meaning of red is constituted by its place in the space of
colours, which includes its incompatibility with other colours at the same time and place as
well as its relation to other colours: pink is lighter than purple is a grammatical proposition,
not an empirical truth. (I shall say more on this in section 4.3).
This systematic character of domains of grammar (together with the above-mentioned
possibility aspect), which is related to the fragmentation of the one logical space into many
91. Here with an explicit reference to the difference between real experiments and logical inference: “if that
surprises you then you haven’t understood it. For surprise is not legitimate here as it would be for the result
of an experiment. There – I would like to say – you may succumb to the appeal of surprise – but not if your
experience is at the end of an inference”.
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grammatical spaces with their own grammatical rules, is what motivates Wittgenstein’s
frequent comparisons with space and geometry.
The meaning of a sign is the whole symbol to which the sign belongs.92 Or one
could say it is the place in grammatical space at which it stands.
In some sense one can say: A propositional sign has sense only in the system of
a language. (MS109,174 f.).
Grammar describes the system, the space, one place of which the symbol/sign
points to. (MS110,126)
Meaning, the place of a word in grammatical space (TS213, 34)
To stress that logic is a priori and independent of particular natural or human conditions he
states that “logic is a geometry of thinking” (MS108, 242) – which also shows that logic and
grammar belong together. Mathematics, qua a priori method an investigation of possibilities
of transformations, could hence also be conceived in terms of grammar:
Every mathematical investigation is quasi an investigation of space. That one
can investigate things in space is clear. But to investigate space itself!
(Geometry and grammar always correspond to one another) (MS108, 27)
This extended concept of space as a system of possibilities is the background for the various
applications Wittgenstein makes of space, geometry and grammar in the writings after 1929.
4.2 Mathematical Spaces
The very first remarks after Wittgenstein’s ten year absence from philosophy put the assumed
unity of number space into question (02/02/1929):
Is a space conceivable that contains only all rational points, but not the irrational
ones.
And this only means: Are the irrational numbers not already predetermined by
the rational ones? (MS105, 1)
92. Generally, Wittgenstein’s terminology in these writings is not always consistent due to his developing
philosophical views at that time. Here, however, he seems to deliberately pick up the sign-symbol distinction
from the Tractatus: the sign alone does not have sense, but through its possible applications it has sense and
thereby is a symbol (cf. TLP, 3.326). The space of possible applications is what Wittgenstein here calls
“grammatical space”.
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Over the following years this question shall come up again and again, crystallising more and
more clearly in the insight that different rules apply for different kinds of numbers. The order
to write down all digits of a number makes sense for normal decimals, but it does not for
irrational numbers. Likewise, a question like “does the sequence 7777 occur in π?” (which
can perhaps be answered “yes” if it does occur in the development as far as we know it – but
what if it doesn’t? Can we then answer “no”?). How can we define irrational numbers with
exactitude? Are methods like Dedekind’s cuts satisfactory or is it not equally inconceivable
to infinitely approximate a number that always eludes a final grasp? Can such a number
be called defined in the same sense as, for example, integers or even periodic decimals are
defined? When resuming these remarks in 1931, Wittgenstein’s answer to the initial question
is clearly “no” (and this answer bears an interesting hint towards the further fate of the space
concept):
Is a space conceivable that contains only all rational points, but not the irrational
ones?
And this only means: Are the irrational numbers not already predetermined by
the rational ones?
No more than the game of chess is predetermined by the game of draughts.
The irrational numbers do not fill a gap that is left open by the rational ones.
(MS111, 29)
Comparisons between mathematics and spaces or games permeate Wittgenstein’s thinking
until his death and he keeps on using these analogies when considering philosophical
problems in other fields. Scholars like Hilmy and Kuusela argue that, contrary to widespread
opinion, Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language as a calculus, which came up in the 1930s,
are not merely confused attempts to get at the essence of language, but that calculi and
language-games serve a similar purpose.93 I agree with this and would add that both also
fulfil functions that resemble those of Wittgenstein’s notion of space, that is, first, representing
possible connections or actions in a given domain and, second, distinguishing one space from
another in which other rules apply. The calculus for rational numbers is different from calculi
that work for irrational numbers. Likewise, a general expression like “all points of a straight
line” belongs to a different space than a disjunction of concrete elements of a finite set.
It is one calculus to which our account of generality belongs and another in
which there is that disjunction. When we say a cross is located between two
93. See especially note 123 in Kuusela 2008 where he mentions proponents of a widespread reading (Hacker,
Schulte, Kenny) and argues against them that, in the middle period, calculi are only used as objects of
comparison. Hilmy provides a similar argument in ch. 4 of Hilmy 1987. See also section 5.3 of this thesis.
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lines, then we do not have a disjunction ready which could take the place of this
general proposition (TS213, 313).
Other calculi might regard the differences between algebra and arithmetic.
Could one say: in arithmetic we do not need the associative law, but we work
only with specific number calculations
And algebra, even if it makes use of arithmetic notation, is a totally different
calculus and cannot be deduced from the arithmetic one. (TS213, 723)
The point is that Wittgenstein uses the word calculus in a sense very similar to space which
explains his explicit use of space metaphors when talking about mathematical frameworks. It
is the same function as in other spheres, namely to account for a possibility of moves.94 Since
in mathematics this is obviously not a preparation of empirical moves, it is a particularly
good example to show the apriority of such geometrical frameworks.
Mathematical propositions were Kant’s prime example for synthetic truths a priori and
Euclidean space was taken to be a necessary and universal form of intuition, thereby providing
a bridge between mathematics and physics. The development of non-Euclidean geometries
in the 19th century and their successful application in general relativity, destroyed this bridge
and led to new questions concerning the possibility of a priori knowledge: if a direct intuition
of space and time is not possible, is the status of constitutive principles merely conventional
or can they, in the end, be reduced to empirical laws? Wittgenstein did acknowledge the
temptation to conceive of mathematical insights in terms of a “synthetic a priori”; however,
he would not regard such an insight as true, but as the invention of a new mathematical space,
a new calculus. That the mathematician is “not a discoverer, but an inventor” (TS221, 215)
is a famous and often-quoted Wittgensteinian slogan against mathematical Platonism; it is
illustrated by the conception of various mathematical systems, calculi, or spaces. The answer
to a mathematical question is for Wittgenstein not the solution of a puzzle within a given
framework, but the imagination of new frameworks and systems. In a remark that contrasts
mathematical, grammatical, investigations with geographical expeditions (this resembles the
contrast between thought experiments and experiments), it is stressed that a mathematical
investigation is not like a search within a given space.
How strange it would be if a geographical expedition did not know whether
it had a goal, and thus also whether it has a way at all. We cannot think this,
94. That a calculus constitutes moves instead of locations is a significant difference to spaces, but here I focus
on their similarities. In chapters 5 and 6, I shall investigate the intermediate character of calculi between spaces
and games.
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it yields nonsense. But in the mathematical expedition it is precisely like that.
Hence it would perhaps be best not to make this comparison at all.
It would be like an expedition that was not sure of space itself ! (MS108, 92)
Much of this centres on the question whether mathematical propositions are analytic or
synthetic. A mathematical problem, Wittgenstein says, is not searching within a system, but
the invention of a new system or the explication of a system that exists in a different form.
The difficult mathematical problems are those for whose solution we don’t yet
possess a written system. The mathematician who is looking for a solution then
has a system [. . . ] “in his head” and endeavours to get it down on paper. Once
that’s done the rest is easy. But if he has no kind of system, either in written or
unwritten symbols, then he can’t search for a solution either, but at best can only
grope around. – Now, of course, you may find something by random groping.
But in that case you haven’t searched for it, and from a logical point of view, the
process was synthetic; whereas searching is a process of analysis. (MS105, 24)
One can only search for something within a space (MS107, 151)
One can only search for something within a system; hence there necessarily is
something that cannot be searched for (MS108, 11).
Mathematics essentially works synthetically (MS106, 285).
The development of new symbolisms can be considered the invention of a “new space” in
which different rules apply, for example Sheffer’s “discovery” that disjunction and negation
can be expressed in one symbol, the Sheffer stroke (cf. MS108, 106), or the insight that
certain fractions like 13 are periodic as decimals. This last insight is explicitly called a “new
calculus” and compared to what Kant meant when he called “5+7 = 12 not analytic, but
synthetic a priori” (MS114, 10v–11r). Later, Wittgenstein would add on this issue: “what
makes one speak of a synthetic proposition is the new form” (MS125, 79).
He seems to make a distinction that is comparable to Kuhn’s distinction between “puzzle-
solving” normal science and “revolutionary”, paradigm-changing science (Wittgenstein
stresses the conceptual, rather than empirical character of the latter). Confusingly, here he
uses “discovery” in the sense of invention which he later wants to explicitly distinguish from
“discoveries”; the purpose of space as a metaphor is clear enough, though:
The discovery of the connection of two systems was not in one space with those
two systems and if it had been in the same space, then it would not have been a
discovery (but the solution of a school exercise).
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Where there is now a connection that was unknown before, there was no gap, or
incompleteness before which has now been filled. – (At that time one could not
say “I know the issue up to this point, from here on I don’t know it anymore”)
(MS108, 19–20)
And later, in 1937, these systems are explicitly referred back to geometry with its features
of constituting possibilities which is also why these propositions appear to be necessary
(this will become important in On Certainty where mathematics also serves as an analogy to
language-games).
When we have a system of mathematical propositions, it has its own geometry
(MS121,76)
The logical certainty of proofs – I want to say – does not go further than its
geometrical certainty. (MS122, 84)
4.3 The Grammar of Colour Space
The problem of colour incompatibility is already discussed in the Tractatus where it is
mentioned as an example of logical impossibility.
For two colours, e.g., to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logically
impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure of colour. (TLP, 6.3751)
Wittgenstein compares this to the rule that a physical particle cannot be at two places at the
same time which is explained in the underlying notebook with the “structure of space and of
the particles” (NB, 18/08/1916). It may be asked what this “structure” is supposed to be, but
I am quite sure that it must mean what Wittgenstein elsewhere calls “form”.95 As seen in
chapter 3, Wittgenstein conceives of the “form” of colour and space as “spaces of possible
atomic facts” which thereby delimit, a priori, the range of combinatorial possibilities for
objects.96 When the problem returns in 1929, he indeed uses “form” instead of “structure”.
But it is then dawning on him that there is no logical contradiction in the usual sense in the
statement under question, an objection which has been pointed out to him by Frank Ramsey.
95. In most discussions, philosophical or not, these two are used interchangeably. In the terminology of the
Tractatus, it would, however, be more consistent to use “form” in this case because its relation to structure is
one of possibility–actuality and what he needs in his argument is a priori possibility.
96. The comparison between coloured objects and objects in space also shows that both “forms”, colour and
space, are similar in a way: they are both manifolds of possibilities. Since the claim of the Tractatus was that
each of these manifolds is also logical and hence there is a logical space which accounts for all possible atomic
facts, the specific rules of these manifolds such as colour-exclusion had to be “logical impossibilities”.
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That two colours cannot be at the same time at the same place has to be deter-
mined by their form and by the form of space. (MS106, 81)
No one could say that inference from ’This is red’ to ’This is not blue’ was
formally guaranteed like the syllogism. (Ramsey 1990, 48)
In light of Ramsey’s criticism, Wittgenstein comes to admit that some necessities cannot
be explained with the assumed universal logic of the Tractatus in which all elementary
propositions were supposed to be independent. The model case, which occurs most in the
manuscripts and is discussed a lot in the literature,97 is the necessity (or impossibility) that
one thing cannot be red and green all over at the same time. Given that two propositions
exclude one another, they have to be further analysed according to the Tractatus: the logical
product (conjunction) of “this object is red” and “this object is green” yields a contradiction
and therefore these two propositions cannot be elementary (cf. TLP, 6.3752). The analysis
must show that “this is red” entails “this is not green” so that the conjunction with “this is
green” is a contradiction of the form p.~p. Wittgenstein tried to provide such an analysis
in 1929 – and failed. He came to the conclusion that there must be a kind of impossibility
other than contradiction and this kind of impossibility must result from the rules that govern
the specific domain in which we are operating (cf. SRLF98). The domain of colours, like
basically all domains that include measurement in any form, demand something like a
“Principle of Single Value” (Chang 2008, 123): a rule which states that each coordinate can
only be assigned once, an object can only have one length, one weight, one colour etc. More
domain-specifically, the relations between the colours, e.g. that orange is closer to red than
to green, should also be entailed in these context-sensitive rules, because they are equally a
priori. Wittgenstein soon comes to speak of a “colour space” that serves this purpose and
introduces other phenomenological spaces such as “pitch space” and “sensational space”.99
These domain-specific logical spaces, or as he now calls them: grammatical spaces,
have an impact on Wittgenstein’s notion of negation. He still holds that a proposition and
its negation cover complementary regions in a complete grammatical space (after all, this
amounts to the “Principle of Single Value”: a proposition “this is red” excludes the whole rest
of colour space); but this only accounts for the very specific space we are working in, for a
97. To name just a few authors who cover this issue: Hacker 1972; Hintikka and Hintikka 1986; Rothhaupt
1996; Kienzler 1997; Monk 2014; Engelmann 2013b; Ometiţă 2017; Westphal 2017.
98. It is significant that Some Remarks on Logical Form, the only article Wittgenstein ever published (1929),
deals with “logical form” in the Tractarian sense, that is with a priori possibilities for which he now seems to
acknowledge some kind of empirical constraints (see also section 5.2.1).
99. This intuition is already present, but not elaborated in the Tractatus (cf. TLP, 2.0131). Later he admitted
that this remark could already have led him to the insight that a “coordinate” in such a space can only be
assigned once (cf. MS108, 53).
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particular domain of language. To say that something is not red, means that it can be orange,
green, blue etc., but it would be strange to say: “it is not red, it is heavy”.100 The proposition
still “reaches through the whole logical space” (TLP, 3.42), but this whole space is limited
to the domain of, in this case, colours and does not apply to length or any other domain (cf.
Ometiţă 2018, 148–149). Hence, negative statements are not completely independent of
their positive counterpart, but constitute a kind of “zero-point” of a dimension that is shared
with the positive proposition, as Wittgenstein shows in one of his preferred fields of interest,
“pain-space”:
’I have no stomach ache’ is comparable to ’These apples cost nothing’. For
they cost no money, but not no snow or no effort. The zero-point is a point on
one scale. And as no point of a scale can exist without the scale, nor can the
zero-point. [. . . ] I compare this state [i.e. not being in pain] to another state,
hence it must be comparable. It must lie in pain-space as well, but in another
place. – Otherwise my sentence would say that my current state had nothing to
do with a painful one; as in: the colour of this rose has nothing to do with the
conquest of Gaul by Julius Caesar. (MS108, 38)
The idea of contextual spaces is still present in the Philosophical Investigations, albeit not
explicit. They underlie, for example, the remarks on ostensive definitions in (roughly) §§28–
37 which can perhaps be summed up as follows: one already has to know in which space
one is operating in order for an ostensive definition to have sense. Similarly, orders like
“Look at the colour of the vase” or “look at the shape of the vase” might induce superficially
similar actions, but they surely have different meaning and purpose for they set up different
grammatical spaces (PI §§33–34). Consider also Wittgenstein’s comment on intentionality
much later in the Investigations: “if I say falsely that something is red, then, all the same, it
is red that it isn’t”101 (PI §429) – here I am operating in colour space or, for that purpose, in
the “space of redness” which only distinguishes between red and not red – a binary space
similar to the drawing from November 1914 (cf. chapter 3). Saying that something is not red
is not completely detached from any redness, but has something to do with it. Determining a
grammatical space, as it is primarily exemplified by means of colour space, is determining
a domain of language and the specific rules that are valid in it. It is akin to establishing a
100. A sensible use of this sentence is conceivable: but in that case we would rather be talking about spaces,
not about objects in spaces. It would basically be pointing out that someone is committing a category mistake.
101. In German it goes “daß, wenn ich fälschlich sage etwas sei rot, es doch immerhin nicht rot ist”. This
construction is a bit complicated in English, but the important point is that the emphasised “red” determines
the topic of the sentence, it determines the space or the measure that is used. Even if the sentence is false and
nothing is red in reality we are still talking about this colour; a positive statement about its absence would point
to the “zero-point” of this measure.
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measure with which we can then compare reality and even if the measured object has zero
units it has still been measured on that scale.
4.4 Phenomenological vs. Physical Spaces
Immediately after the remarks on mathematical spaces in February 1929, Wittgenstein reflects
on the nature of visual space and how it could best be represented. He considers physics and
phenomenology as possible candidates and makes a crucial distinction: physics strives for
truth, facts and laws, phenomenology for sense, possibilities and grammar. “Phenomenology
would be the grammar of the description of those facts on which physics builds its theories”
(MS105, 5). The distinction between grammatical statements about possibilities and empirical
statements about facts is a constant in Wittgenstein’s philosophy early and late. It takes up
the possibility-actuality distinction that was latent in Kant and central to the Tractatus. The
specific result of Wittgenstein’s so-called “phenomenological phase” is that phenomenology
is classified as grammar102 and stripped of any psychological vestiges that seemed to be a
necessary requirement for the description of context-specific rules in 1929 (cf. Rothhaupt
1996, 69–81; Kienzler 1997, 105). In this year, he had tried to find a “phenomenological
language” that would immediately represent sense experience and thereby reveal hidden
rules like that of colour exclusion. However, he came to acknowledge that such a language
was neither necessary nor possible.
Two problems of this envisaged phenomenological language led to its rejection: ex-
actitude and time. Both are related insofar as they both stem from the opposition of an
unfathomably rich experience and a language that seems to be too coarse, too inexact, too
static to describe it. Describing the fleeting reality seems to always falls short of the actual
experience. If I look up to a starry sky for a moment and then try to describe how many
points of light I have seen, I do not know what to say. On the one hand there supposedly
must be a definite number of points that I have seen, on the other hand there is no way how I
could access or verify this number. The problem is the result of a misunderstanding, says
Wittgenstein, namely the comparison of the memory image with an actual, physical image to
which I could go back and count. Saying that language captures reality “only” roughly seems
to suggest that an absolute exactitude is, in principle, possible – but how should this ever
be reached? Wittgenstein’s peculiar kind of verificationism, which comes up in this time,
consists in this: that the way a proposition can be verified defines a grammatical space in
102. One of the chapters of the Big Typescript (1933) is even entitled “Phenomenology is Grammar”.
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which alone the proposition has sense. The grammar of a visual experience is different from
the grammar of a painting as physical object.103
Parallel to the mathematical discourse on different spaces for discrete rational numbers
and elusive irrational numbers, Wittgenstein contrasts stable physical objects and elusive
objects in the visual field. His attempts to provide a foundation of knowledge by finding
a language that is free from any hypothetical assumptions fail because such a language
would operate in a categorically different sphere than our hypothetical physical language.
Statements of equality and exactitude have a different meaning in visual space than in
Euclidean space. And although Wittgenstein does speak of visual space as geometry, he does
not think of this non-Euclidean geometry in the sense of a curved space,104 but as geometry
in the sense of grammar, a set of rules which constitutes the meaning of expressions.
When we speak of visual space we are easily deluded by the idea that it is a sort
of raree-show box which each of us carries with oneself. That is, we use the
word “space” [Raum] similar to “room” [Raum or Zimmer in German]. But in
fact the word “visual space” only refers to a geometry, I mean to a part of the
grammar of our language (MS113,124).
The difference between physical space and visual space is that the geometry of the latter
cannot be specified by means of experiments. In physics, measurement can yield surprising
results that change our conception of space, whereas the features of visual space are “already
in plain view”, more akin to the grammar of time of which Wittgenstein says in the Investiga-
tions that it “has to be called to mind” and that it is something which, “for some reason, is
difficult to call to mind” (PI, §89). It is probably not by accident that in this central remark
of the carefully composed Philosophical Investigations, time plays a crucial role: it is a good
example for Wittgenstein’s method of distinguishing domains of sense because it illustrates
the difference between phenomenological and physical spaces. As Augustine, who is quoted
in §89, says, we generally know what time is, only when asked about its essence we do not.
Confusions arise when one domain of language, one space or one system, is transferred to
another without being aware of the change of domain.
103. In the context of counting things, one could say it has a different arithmetic: the arithmetic of visual space
is more like “1, 2, 3, 4, 5, many” (VoW 2003, 318). Wittgenstein’s wider account of geometry allows him to
understand arithmetic as a kind of geometry, just like time can be understood as a kind of space (cf. PPF, §70).
In the middle period, Wittgenstein calls arithmetic a “kind of geometry [. . . ] one could say: it is a more general
geometry”. To demonstrate that these different expressions all serve a similar purpose, is part of my project
to show the continuity from spaces to games. After the classification of arithmetic as geometry, Wittgenstein
writes: “And can I not say that, in this sense, chess is a kind of geometry as well (And indeed any other game
too)” (MS108, 116).
104. Helmholtz and later Schlick had already shown that Euclid’s axioms are not valid in intuition spaces, such
as visual space and sensual space. Wittgenstein would later say that it is non-Euclidean, but not as a result of
experiments, but by contemplating its grammar or “internal geometry”.
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In the 1930s, Wittgenstein contrasts physical and phenomenological time in a simile:
the time measured in physics is compared to a film strip running through a projector; on
this strip all pictures are ontologically on the same level and what we call “present” is just
the picture that happens to be in front of the lamp at a certain point. Time experience,
by contrast, is compared to the screen on which the picture is fluid, ever changing and
non-segmentable; strictly speaking, it does not allow for different time states past, present,
and future as there is only one lived experience consisting of memories, an extensionless,
ever moving, present and an unknown future.105 If one then asks, as Augustine does, how
we can measure time at all since the past is not anymore and the future is not yet and the
present is extensionless and fleeting, then one is applying the physical picture onto the
phenomenological one. Reminding oneself, as Augustine does, that we can and do measure
time and how we do it, is a grammatical observation, Wittgenstein says, which can help us to
understand what was wrong with the initial question (PI, §90).
By the middle of 1930, Wittgenstein had arrived at a new account of analysis which
replaced the Tractarian analysis of propositions into elementary propositions and truth-
functions with his new notion of grammatical analysis, meaning the clarification of the
specific domain in which we are operating and distinguishing which aspects in this domain
are important for the proposition in question and which ones are not. He put this insight at
the very beginning of his typescript Philosophical Remarks (TS209) which is a significantly
restructured summary of his manuscripts from 1929 and 1930.106 It is followed by the other
insight of his phenomenological phase, namely that a language that describes immediate
experience as a sort of foundation for the whole logical apparatus is neither necessary nor
possible:
A proposition is completely logically analysed if its grammar is made completely
clear: no matter what idiom it may be written or expressed in.
I do not have phenomenological or primary language as I used to call it, in my
mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary. All that is possible and
105. Cf. MS108, 33; MS111, 9; MS112, 128. Note the similarity to Bergson’s cinematic metaphors with
which he criticised Einstein’s reification of time. Wittgenstein’s method of grammatical analysis can contribute
to their famous debate by granting validity to the arguments of either side, but restricting this validity to the
respective domain.
106. Even though the Philosophical Remarks should not be treated as a completed work designed for publica-
tion, it still has some authority as it was the first text after the Tractatus (with the exception of SRLF) which
Wittgenstein prepared to be read by others; and it is a more elaborated version of the merely chronological
synopsis of his manuscripts that he had prepared earlier (TS208). The main difference between TS208 and
TS209 is that remarks are presented in a different order in the latter; therefore it has some significance that he
put a remark at its beginning which expresses a notion of “analysis” that is very different to the Tractatus.
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necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language.
[. . . ]
Each time I say that, instead of such and such a representation, you could also
use this other one, we take a further step towards the goal of grasping the essence
of what is represented. (PR, §1a– b)107
The idea that analysis consists in clarifying the grammar of a particular space survived the
extensive revisions that led to the typescripts of the Philosophical Investigations. In §46 and
the following discussion of simplicity, Wittgenstein argues that compositeness and the idea
of indivisible atoms depend on what is stipulated as a standard of simplicity, that is they
depend on the specific game that is played.
Asking “Is this object composite?” outside a particular game is like what a boy
once did when he had to say whether the verbs in certain sentences were in the
active or passive voice, and who racked his brains over the question whether the
verb “to sleep”, for example, meant something active or passive. (PI, §47)
The answer is of course: it depends. It depends on how you look at the question, in which
space or in which language game the whole discussion is set. The grammatical form of “to
sleep” is the active voice, but if we talk about activities in everyday life, no one would count
sleeping among them.
And in §72 and §88, the context dependence of exactitude is illustrated with a number of
examples that are conceptually the same as the ones in the phenomenological phase: what
can count as exact is defined by what will satisfy our demands for exactitude in a particular
situation. Some concepts, such as “game” can have an inherent inexactitude which resembles
that of visual objects (and irrational numbers in a certain sense) and in these cases it is
senseless to ask for greater exactitude (for example to demand an exact definition of the
essence of “game” or to complain about the visual field having blurred edges, or about a
memory image being diffuse). “Roughly” and “exact” have different meanings whether we
talk about being punctual for dinner or about time measurement in the laboratory (PI, §88).
Also the “relativistic” notion of analysis that is expressed in the Philosophical Remarks
recurs in the Investigations. After describing the Augustinean puzzle about time, Wittgenstein
calls his inquiry “a grammatical one”.
90. [. . . ] And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunder-
standings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, brought about,
107. In 1932 the somewhat essentialist undertone of this remark is corrected: Wittgenstein no longer speaks
of the “essence of what is represented”, but only of a goal which he wanted to achieve by means of a
phenomenological language (cf. MS114, 14).
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among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in dif-
ferent regions of our language. – Some of them can be removed by substituting
one form of expression for another; this may be called ‘analysing’ our forms of
expression, for sometimes this procedure resembles taking a thing apart.
91. But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis
of our linguistic expressions, and so a single completely analysed form of every
expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, still
unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought
to light. As if, when this is done, the expression is completely clarified and our
task accomplished.
To recognise this latter appearance as an illusion is one of the crucial differences between the
Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s writings after 1929. It is an important change in his philosophy
and yet in can be understood in terms of a continuity: the conception of language as a space of
possibilities. There is not one final analysis of this space, for example, in a phenomenological
language which records sense data in logical form;108 instead there are many spaces which
each have their own rules of analysis, including their own end of analysis, and these spaces
through their multiple connections and similarities build what we call language.
4.5 Intentionality
Intentionality is an issue in Wittgenstein’s philosophy in an indirect, but very profound sense.
It is indirect and one has to be careful not to equate Wittgenstein’s problems of mind-world
relation with Brentano’s descriptive psychology (cf. Rothhaupt 1996, 76-77). However, it is
true that this relation lies at the heart of Wittgenstein’s struggles with philosophy of meaning
(cf. Hacker 2013a). How does a thought refer to a fact? How does an order relate to its
execution, an expectation to its fulfilment, a wish to its satisfaction? What these cases have
in common is that the events that are referred to do not (yet) exist and a strict correspondence
theory fails to explain what the mind actually refers to when it is thinking, ordering, expecting
108. With this Wittgenstein anticipates parts of Sellar’s critique of the “myth of the given” which can be
summarised with the claim that non-propositional knowledge, the given, cannot serve as an ultimate foundation
of propositional knowledge of facts. Wittgenstein had already pointed out the incommensurability between
these spheres in his treatment of phenomenological language. I will investigate in section 5.4, why he would
later accept as a “given” something like the “form of life”(cf. PPF §345). With the spatial image in mind,
one can say that “forms of life”, although their status is ambiguous, are on the level of geometry and not “in
space”. For “to specify a space is not to specify a place. (to specify a space is in the end to specify a geometry)”
(MS110, 40).
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or wishing something that does not exist. “But this paradox (which indeed has the form of a
truism) can also be expressed in this way: one can think what is not the case”(PI §95).109
One solution to this – or at least a good illustration of the problem – lies in the idea of
contextual spaces: the remark §429 mentioned above says what it means for something to be
not red: it does neither refer to a “something” nor to a “nothing”, but to a point in the space
of colour, to the place which can be occupied by red – it turns out, that the Tractatus idea
that places are possibilities was already an attempt to tackle the question of intentionality.
To insist then, that “red exists because if there were no red, it could not be spoken of at all”
misses the point that this sort of existence is different from the existence of a red object;
one should rather say “the word ’red’ has meaning” (PI, §58) which amounts to declaring
it a part of the grammar of colours. The example could be compared to “the point (3,5,1)
exists” in a three-dimensional geometry – which says more about the coordinate system than
about the point and whether it is assigned a value or not (“a point in space is an argument
place”, TLP 2.0131). Before finding its way into the Investigations, this idea is elaborated in
1930 when Wittgenstein considers the relation of expectation and fulfilment as an example of
intentionality:
Expectation is not an imagination, for if I expect that a light point will appear,
then there must be a place there at which the point really will appear if it appears.
Anticipatory in the expectation as well as retrospectively in the fulfilment and
memory of the expectation, expectation and fulfilment are in the same space.
(MS108, 185)
Hence, the idea would be that what expectation has in common with reality
is that it refers to a different point in the same space (space understood very
generally). (MS108, 264)
One point where intentionality intersects with the mathematical and the phenomenological
questions discussed in the same manuscripts is generality: an expression of an expectation of
someone entering the room can be fulfilled by a number of events – but it would be nonsense
to say that all these events were somehow included in the expectation. Their “harmony” rather
lies in the fact that the same expression is used in both the expectation and in the description
of the event. These considerations have a basis in Wittgenstein’s rejection of some aspects of
109. The problem is in fact an old one: in Plato’s Theaetetus, which is repeatedly cited in Wittgenstein’s
manuscripts (and also in PI §518), Socrates leads his interlocutor into this aporia by letting him accept the
premises that 1) a person who thinks always thinks something, 2) who thinks something thinks something that
exists, 3) to think what is not is to think nothing, 4) to think nothing is not to think at all: “In that case it’s not
possible to believe what is not” (Theaetetus, 189a–b).
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set theory, especially concerning infinite sets: when one refers to “all elements” of an infinite
set, this should not be understood as a disjunction of its elements, i.e. as a disjunction of
an infinite number of discrete elements. Instead this kind of generality is to be understood
as a rule which has nothing to do with the number of individual elements that fall under
its general concept. An interval of a line does not consist of an infinite number of points,
but rather constitutes a new space which does not deal with the mathematical problems of
continuity and infinity or infinite divisibility. “Generality is not in measuring space” (MS111,
37). “The line is between 5 and 10 cm long” is only considered a question of yes or no, not a
question of the exact length of the line.
These considerations are important, because they combine the idea of context-dependent
exactitude and the idea of a relative space of agreement (as opposed to a supposed identity of
expectation and fulfilment in an absolute space). The expectation that the postman brings
the mail can be met by any event that can be described as the postman bringing the mail
and is independent from a concrete person whom I may have thought of when uttering the
expectation or not.110 It is a general expectation like the description of an interval or a space
whose possibilities in this case are not the distinct instances or points, but are reduced to a
question of yes or no, in or out. In trying to grasp the instances of a general description or
an infinite set, there would always be an instance that I had not foreseen. To prescind from
this infinity of possibilities and instead consider only two possible states, yes or no, is not
a logical indeterminacy, but rather a different kind of logic, a different kind of grammar, a
different kind of geometry. Wittgenstein sketches structurally similar arguments in numerous
occasions, for example:
I want to say, there seems to be a relation between a point and the edge [of a
surrounding area] which is independent of their distance. – It is, as it were, as if
I used a geometry in which there is no distance, but an inside and an outside. In
this sense, indeed, the pictures and are equal. (MS109, 113).
[. . . ] the indeterminacy of generality is not a logical indeterminacy. As if we had
not only freedom within logical space, but also freedom to extend and change
this space.
Hence not only free mobility, but an indeterminacy of geometry. (MS111, 186)
110. Tim Crane criticised Wittgenstein’s grammatical account of intentionality with an argument which
basically says that ’Mr Smith brings the mail’ can meet the expectation of the postman bringing the mail
although I did not think of Mr Smith when uttering the expectation, but of Mr Jones who normally brings the
mail to my house. Hence, Crane suggests distinguishing between the object of expectation and how the subject
thinks of this object. Since these can be different things, Wittgenstein’s account of intentionality is declared
incomplete and hence insufficient (cf. Crane 2010).
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Wittgenstein repeatedly compares his approach to the intentionality problem with a step that
has been made by the theory of relativity.111 The analogy comes up when he talks about a
certain preparation that is made in expecting something, a preparation that sets the stage for
the expected event to happen (or not). The question “how can I now in my expectation refer
to an event that is not yet there?” is related to the question “how can I now that an event is
taking place know that this is what I expected?”; and both are variants of “how can I think
something that is not the case?”.
How can I know that this is what I expected if not through the fact that it fulfils
my expectation now, corresponds to my expectation now.
A move is required which is similar to that of relativity theory. (MS108, 270)
The preparation is, as it were, itself the language and cannot go beyond itself (in
this not being able to go beyond itself lies the similarity of my observations and
that of relativity theory) (MS108, 272)
What resembles Brentano’s intentionality, “the mind’s direction on its object”’, is what
Wittgenstein calls the relation or the harmony between thought and world. However for
him there is no real agreement, the “harmony" lies only in using the same expression in the
description of the thought and in the description of the event that corresponds to this thought.
The correspondence consists in being describable by the same expression:
The relation, the connection between thought and reality is reflected in language
by them having the same expression. Language cannot represent this relation in
any other way.
Here we have a kind of theory of relativity of language (and this analogy is not
arbitrary) (MS109, 85)
Later in the same manuscript he expresses the same idea in the context of a discussion of
Frege’s symbol for assertion: what “I think p” and “⊢ p” have in common is only the sign
“p”, not a third entity to which both refer. “The line of thought that is needed here is again
the typical move of the theory of relativity – when I say: that’s just how language works”. It
is again the idea that language, a system of signs, cannot go beyond itself: if I ask something
and get a reply (i.e. signs) then this is perfectly fine, and I wouldn’t say “but, this is only a
reply” (MS109, 199).
What these analogies to the theory of relativity hint to is the need to specify a space of
measurement in order to make agreement possible in the first place. Like Einstein highlighted
111. For a study on Einstein’s influence on Wittgenstein, see Kusch 2011.
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the need for definitions in order to give any sense to the concept of simultaneity (cf. Einstein
1920, 19), so Wittgenstein stresses the role of the grammatical space which first of all
constitutes the meaning of the terms therein. Like Einstein undermined the idea of an
absolute time in relation to which events could be called simultaneous, Wittgenstein rejects
the idea of an absolute harmony between thought and reality in a supposed metaphysical
realm. “The intention sets a standard according to which the fact can now be evaluated”
(MS109, 263). The constitutive function of the stipulation of a measure is not unlike the
constitutive function of Kant’s a priori intuitions, only without the claim for apodictic
truth.112 Evidence that Wittgenstein conceived his analogies to relativity in that way can
be found in the contexts of the literal references, for example in 1937. Before reminding
himself that “Einstein has taught the world that the method of time-measurement belongs to
our grammar of time expressions” he reasons about the agreement of experiences:
But what is the ’same’ experience here? How do we measure /compare/ two
such experiences /on which scale do we compare them to one another/: after all,
this is required to say ’this and this is the same experience’! (MS119, 116)
Let me give one more example, this time from the early 1940s when Wittgenstein worked
on the foundations of mathematics and rule-following. Again he transfers questions from
physics such as the stipulation of a measure – with its background assumptions such as
rigidity or constancy – to mental phenomena such as the recognition of a colour. When I see
a flower and say “it is red” can I be wrong in this judgement?
No. The certainty with which I call the colour “red” is the rigidity of my measure,
is the rigidity that I take for granted. It is not to be doubted in my description.
For this characterises what we call describing.
Following the rule is at the basis of our language game. It characterises what we
call describing.
This is the similarity of my investigation with relativity theory: that it is, so to
speak, an investigation of the clocks with which we measure the phenomena.
(MS164, 82)
In all these cases Wittgenstein’s account of intentionality, of the relation between mind and
world, centres on the constitutive function of the space that is set up a priori and which first
112. Michael Friedman has elaborated these historical lines from Kant via the formalisation of geometry to
special and general relativity (especially 1999 and 2001). His idea of a “relativized a priori” which goes back to
Reichenbach’s distinction of the apodictic and the constitutive aspect of Kant’s a priori forms (Reichenbach
1965, 48), captures an important function of Wittgenstein’s grammatical spaces: it constitutes the meaning of
certain expressions (and actions) without being universally or necessarily true.
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of all determines the candidates for empirical truth. “The grammatical rules first determine
the meaning (they constitute it) and therefore they are not responsible to any meaning and
insofar they are arbitrary” (MS114, 109).
4.6 Summary
Wittgenstein once considered a line from King Lear as a motto for the Philosophical Inves-
tigations: “I will teach you differences” (Drury 2018, 135) – a certain preoccupation with
differences is clearly visible in the period from 1929 to 1937, namely differences between
grammatical spaces. It is a move away from an equalising “logical absolutism” to a rela-
tivised account. However, I also pointed out what motivates the usage of “space” in different
fields: there is a certain continuity in all this diversity. A space is always a framework for the
possible candidates for truth. Grammatical or geometrical propositions are therefore not true,
but constitutive for the sense of the propositions that can be true. In this they resemble the
logical propositions of the Tractatus, but, while these had a unique status as applying to the
logical space, now a plurality of spaces is considered for which different propositions can
count as “grammatical”. One criterion for a grammatical proposition is for example that it is
not possible in the sense of contingent in the Tractatus: it is not localisable as a region on the
map which would exclude other regions; rather these propositions are valid in the whole of
the space (however, without necessarily being formal tautologies). Therefore, grammatical
propositions do not have a negation in space like descriptive propositions do. The negation
of a grammatical proposition would not be false, a possibility among others which happens
to be not the case, but nonsensical insofar as it cannot be described as a possibility “on the
map”. Hence, two functions of Tractarian space, possibility and negation, are still preserved
in the notion of grammatical spaces; like logical space they also have to be complete as we
have seen in the case of colours where one colour excludes all the other colours at a certain
point at a certain time, and in the case of complete number spaces in mathematics. The
flexibility of Wittgenstein’s usage of space shows itself in that he considers not only finite
and discrete, but also infinite and continuous grammatical spaces. In the latter, the claim
for completeness is served by conceiving of grammatical propositions as rules which do not
“contain” infinitely many applications, but allow for an infinite possibility, and in the end
reduce the space of possibilities to two alternatives: in or out. More on this shall be said in
section 6.1.3 when rule-following is considered. The purpose of this chapter was to give
an idea of the importance of space concepts in the middle period and of its continuity with
logical space.
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The frequent use of space metaphors in this time does, despite all similarities, not allow
for a straightforward identification of something essentially spatial that is common to all
applications:
Our notation, or mode of expression, shows which similarities – and differences
– we want to highlight in particular. So sometimes one calls everything a space
that has a similar structure as space, and one always wants to stress this analogy.
And then again one only wants to shun this analogy because it leads to confusion
and one wants to stress the differences between “spaces” [. . . ] (MS108, 135)
This is something spaces have in common with the family-resemblance concept of games
which I will consider, among other things, in the next chapter. For the disintegration of
logical space into many grammatical spaces is paralleled by a disintegration of the concept
of space into a number of related concepts which serve similar functions. These shall be
investigated in the following.

Chapter 5
More Disintegration: Forms and
Functions
“Also was sind Richtbilder?” [. . . ]
“Ewige Wahrheiten, die weder ewig noch
wahr sind, sondern für eine Zeit gelten,
damit sie sich nach etwas richten kann.”
Robert Musil
Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften
In this chapter I shall investigate concepts that take up functions of “grammatical spaces“,
especially that of providing a framework of seemingly necessary propositions which con-
stitute possibilities in a specific domain. I shall not focus on the differences between them.
Scholars have tended to categorise these concepts in taxonomies in which each is in its place
and the differences are emphasised (cf. Baker and Hacker 2009, 273–277; Glock 1996,
135–139). However, while Wittgenstein is indeed a philosopher of differences, he rarely
points out these differences. He does not explicitly distinguish between different kinds of
a priori framework.113 Instead, his preoccupation with differences can be specified: First,
there are differences between things on the same level which belong to the same space,
the same system, and which are determined through their relations to other parts of the
system. Second, there are differences between spaces, that is, categorical differences as they
have been dealt with in the last chapter. And third, there is the difference between those
two differences, i.e. the difference between empirical propositions on the same level and
113. In fact, since sense depends on a sense-constituting framework, and since Wittgenstein rejects any meta-
frameworks, it is extremely difficult to talk about them in meaningful words. Therefore, I take it that his various
concepts for these frameworks are not to be taken as a sophisticated typology of different frameworks, but as
partly metaphorical tools to express various shades of a shared functional role.
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grammatical propositions which are not locations in a space, but belong to its geometry.
Roughly, the first are empirical differences, the second are grammatical differences, the third
is the difference between grammar and experience. Drury’s memory of Wittgenstein quoting
King Lear has the following context:
Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different
are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look
the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a
quotation from King Lear: “I’ll teach you differences”. (Drury 2018, 135)
I take it that e.g. mathematical propositions and grammatical propositions, in Hacker’s
narrow sense,114 and “hinge” propositions like “This is my hand” do not look so similar
that one has to point out the differences between them in order to avoid confusion. Rather,
Wittgenstein in this case wants to highlight the similarity between them, their similar role in
practice, which allows for the analogies he frequently draws. These analogies do not stress
the differences between different kinds of necessity, but between necessity and contingency,
between grammar and experience; thereby he aligns propositions that look different, but have
similar roles in their respective usage.115 In this way he even assimilates certain empirical
propositions to mathematics (cf. OC, §448), thereby emphasising that they function like
non-empirical certainties: he stresses that their necessity derives from their being constitutive
of a game. In other places, the same comparison is meant to suggest that even mathematical
propositions are not metaphysical truths, but depend on their application – just like the
so-called hinge propositions have their extraordinary role due to the fact that they are never
questioned in our everyday practice, not because they cannot be questioned.116 In my
view, this mutual illumination is one of the main motivations for Wittgenstein’s intertwining
of mathematical and philosophical questions in his writings (more on the ambivalence of
constitutive frameworks between a priori and experience in section 6.2).
In the following, I investigate concepts that are similar to “spaces” in the sense elaborated
so far. By showing the proximity between them, I also make a claim for the continuity of
114. By “grammatical proposition” Hacker seems to mean only rules for the use of language such as “black is
darker than white” (cf. Hacker 2012b, 9–10).
115. Without putting too much weight on Drury’s recollection, one can still note that Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s
accounts are not mutually exclusive – rather they have different objects: Hegel is interested in things which look
different and Wittgenstein in those which look similar. So it is not impossible that Wittgenstein is in fact quite
Hegelian – in this crude sense – with regards to things which look different. My claim is that this is the case
with the various and at first sight very diverse topics in his writings which he nevertheless treats in a similar
way.
116. Especially in the manuscripts that underly the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics but also in
those that underly On Certainty, here again with a reference to relativity theory and its verificationism (cf.
§301–307; cf. also section 4.5)
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this kind of spatial thinking in Wittgenstein’s work. While the word “space” itself becomes
less frequent after the middle period, other concepts, notably language-game, take up its
functions and remain important throughout the late and latest writings. An important feature
that binds together the various concepts I am considering here is their systematicity which is
often neglected because the later Wittgenstein seems to be a rather unsystematic philosopher,
especially in contrast to his early work. While in his middle period he indeed rejects a
universal system, which would integrate the whole of language, he still adheres to ordered
representations, a kind of local systematicity which I shall present in the first section.
In the second section, I shall look at a variety of concepts for constitutive frameworks that
complement the notion of grammatical spaces. This is not a completely new development in
the middle period: already in the Tractatus some functions of logical space were accounted
for by other concepts. The most important one is logical form which a priori determines the
configurational possibilities of objects. Beyond that, “syntax”, which later is assimilated to
geometry (cf. MS107, 213), and “sense” belong to the Tractarian language of possibility. In
the middle period, this plurality of concepts grows further. With the acceptance of a variety
of spaces, forms of representation come into focus which are not sub-forms of the one logical
form as assumed in the Tractatus. Similarly, Wittgenstein ceases to speak of the one notation
which infallibly captures reality (its truth being “unassailable and definitive”), but considers
the possibility to introduce notations for particular purposes. A rather surprising candidate
for these spatial functions are hypotheses, which may become less surprising if we think
about Poincaré’s conventionalism about geometry and hypotheses which can be elevated to
quasi-axioms. Contrary to most readings, I try to provide a place for a positive account of
theory in Wittgenstein’s philosophy which is derived from Hertz’s notion of “image”; as I
have shown in chapter 3, it is in fact closer to Wittgenstein’s space concept than to his picture
theory.
While these concepts are important and certainly belong to the orbit of grammatical
space, they have a rather supplementary function. To conceive of a constitutive framework
as a form of representation, a notation or a theory, may be more appropriate in certain
contexts and prevent misunderstandings which “space” brings with it. However, there are
other concepts which seem to replace space concepts; for this claim I shall give empirical –
their occurrences increase while those of “space” decrease – as well as conceptual reasons.
These frameworks are especially calculi, clearly an intermediate concept, and games or more
specifically language-games which are central in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy.
Language-games are, however, embedded in larger frameworks which influence our way
of looking at the world as a whole. To these belong the notorious forms of life. It is debatable
whether the term is as important in Wittgenstein‘s philosophy as is sometimes suggested,
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but they surely have some grounding function for what societies and individuals consider
meaningful and „possible“ (possible locations if one wants to use this now a bit obsolete
metaphor). Other frameworks of a comparably large scope both on the individual and on the
cultural level are the concepts of “world picture” and “style”.
5.1 Systematicity and Grammatical Propositions
While the belief in a universal system such as the Tractatus was shattered, there is still
systematicity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy after 1930 insofar as the various perspectives
and forms of representations he now suggests are themselves systematic; though none of
them can claim universality. It may seem as if this systematicity disappeared in the later
Wittgenstein as the frameworks become more and more liberal, less rigid in how they
determine possibilities. But the features that make them systematic largely stay in their place.
In the middle period, these are often presented in a very apodictic manner which makes them
appear in stark contrast to the rather questioning tone of the Investigations. The position of
the Big Typescript corpus is: Only as a possibility in a system does a word have meaning and
a proposition sense; only in contrast to other possibilities can the one possibility which is
represented become a significant sign:
All I can do in language is to say something: say the one thing. (Say the one
thing in the space of what I could have said) (MS110, 1)
The grammar describes the system, the space, in which the symbol (sign) points
to one position. (MS110, 126)
Importantly, these statements are expressions of Wittgenstein’s method; he does not make
a thesis about signs which could be disproven if one discovered a sign without system.
He rather suggests understanding those signs, Satzzeichen, which seem to be unsystem-
atic insofar as they are not constituted by their place in a framework of alternatives, as a
different kind of proposition, namely as “grammatical propositions”. To prevent another
misunderstanding: it is important to see that these differences are not “big differences” in
the sense of a metaphysical gap nor “small differences” between things that are in principle
similar (cf. TS213, 643r); instead, they are differences in grammatical role. “The essence of
metaphysics”, Wittgenstein writes, is “that the difference between factual (sachlichen) and
conceptual investigations is not clear to it” (MS134, 153).
Statements that do not have an opposite are suspicious for Wittgenstein, especially if
they are treated as a form of metaphysical truth which appears to be necessarily true because
no alternative is imaginable. Rather he would consider those statements grammatical; they
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belong to the geometry of our grammatical space, not to locations within them. Again the
section headings of the Big Typescript can be quite instructive: “A proposition is a sign within
a system of signs. It is a combination of signs among several possible ones and in contrast
to the other possible ones”. Each proposition of a language has sense only in opposition to
other configurations of words in the same language. Under that heading Wittgenstein writes:
If a proposition was not one possible combination among others, it would not
have any function.
That is, if a proposition was not the result of a decision, it would have nothing to
say. [. . . ]
→ as opposed to ↑ is a different sign than → as opposed to −→ . (TS213, 93)
While the differences between the two arrows in each pair are differences within a space, the
difference between the pairs is one between different spaces, between “direction space” and
“length space”. The next sub-chapter then speaks of the third difference I mentioned. It is
titled “Being able to imagine ‘what it would be like’ as a criterion for a proposition to have
sense” and it highlights the point that in the sense in which I cannot imagine the opposite
of a seemingly necessary statement, I can also not imagine “how it can be like this”. Here
we speak of the difference between ordinary propositions, which can always be imagined,
just as well as their opposites, and grammatical propositions which seem to express a logical
necessity or impossibility (TS213, 95–97;117 cf. also PI §251).
The idea that propositions within a space always have an opposite, whereas grammatical,
geometrical propositions do not, is a constant in Wittgenstein’s thinking.118 We have seen in
chapter 3 how this was part of his motivation to employ the metaphor of space in the first
place: any meaningful proposition should have a negation, a complementary region in logical
space. In the middle period, the same idea is applied to the more flexible grammatical spaces.
The issue comes up in the context of time and the flux and indeterminacy of experience
which was responsible for the abandonment of phenomenological language.
[. . . ] in stating our puzzles about the fleeting nature of all phenomena, we are
using the words “flux” and “vagueness” wrongly, in a typical metaphysical
way, namely without an antithesis: whereas in their correct and everyday use
117. The next sub-chapter is titled accordingly: “’Logical possibility and impossibility’. – The picture of
‘being able to’ applied ultraphysically” (TS213, 98).
118. See also Jacquette (2010) where the connection of the proposition’s bipolarity to completeness and to
the different kinds of “existence” is made which we have encountered in chapter 3. By looking at §50 of the
Investigations, Jacquette points out that the role of the prototype metre in the game of measuring is indeed
beyond existence and non-existence insofar the “Ur-Meter” first of all constitutes what a metre is.
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vagueness is opposed to clearness, flux to stability, inaccuracy to accuracy, and
problem to solution. (BB, 46)119
This passage is related to a group of remarks that is worth tracing in the Nachlass. Its last
version has become famous as a programmatic statement of the Investigations: “What we do
is to bring the words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (PI, §116). Being
considered one of the central remarks of the so-called philosophy chapter, it has received some
attention in the literature and its genesis has been tracked back to the manuscripts from 1931
(cf. Stern 1991; Baker 2004). Gordon Baker points out that the opposition of metaphysical
and everyday is crucial here. He shows, that “everyday” is not necessarily tied to so-called
“ordinary language”, but should be understood as the antithesis to metaphysical: it could
perhaps simply be substituted with un-metaphysical. He distinguishes four characteristics for
the use of “metaphysical” in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass all of which can be put in words that
are based on my conception of space (cf. Baker 2004, 97–100):120
i) the implication of
necessity
Necessity in my interpretation lies in the geometry of a space, in
the framework that constitutes possibility, whereas facts are to be
found within the space and are merely contingent.
ii) the use without an-
tithesis
The geometrical or grammatical propositions are precisely those
that do not have an antithesis while every region in space has a com-
plementary region to it as described already in the pre-Tractatus
notebooks. Colour exclusion can again serve as an example: that
red and green cannot be at the same place at the same time is
a grammatical proposition and the opposite is inconceivable in
colour space.
iii) the treatment of
philosophical prob-
lems as if they were
scientific
If this statement (“that red and green. . . .”) is uttered in the form
of a scientific discovery it is a form of metaphysical nonsense.
Uttered as a grammatical proposition it does not do much harm,
but does not say anything positive either; it is just a description of
the form of representation.
119. This refers to Wittgenstein’s famous view that philosophical problems are not solved, but dissolved.
They are not problems for which there are solutions, like engineering problems, but problems that arise out
of misunderstandings about the way our language works. One has to re-think the question instead of looking
for an answer that doesn’t exist. It is telling that Wittgenstein here considers the solution as the problem’s
antithesis, not its complement, a kind of non-problem, not the filling of a gap.
120. This is surprising since Baker is in fact known for his opposition to the “grammatical” reading of
Wittgenstein which highlights the systematicity; instead he supports a “therapeutic” reading which puts more
emphasis on the variety of methods which are to be applied locally. The disagreement is largely a matter of
emphasis with regards to the middle period (cf. Engelmann 2013b, 290).
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iv) the attempt to get
at the essence of a
thing or a concept.
These geometrical, grammatical statements do not tell us any-
thing about the essence of colours, as little as the statement that
everything is in flux tells us anything about the nature of time
– other spaces with other grammars are conceivable in which
colours might be superimposed or time might be conceived as
a spatialised ordering (think of the film projector or notions of a
four-dimensional “block universe”).
Among these especially iii) and iv) are important because they distinguish Wittgenstein’s
method to highlight aspects of grammar, of the geometry of our grammatical space, from
what he dismisses as “metaphysics”. What distinguishes them is the awareness of the form
of representation, of the geometry which allows for certain possibilities and excludes others.
Wittgenstein’s aim is to demystify the a priori necessity which seems to be expressed in those
statements, but which actually is only a proposition about the geometry of the grammatical
space we are operating in: “A proposition a priori arises when a proposition about the
kind of representation is clothed in the form of a statement about the represented objects”
(MS157b, 3v). Baker tracks remark §116 back to the Big Typescript where it is set in a
context that puts emphasis on possibilities (2004, 101). Its manuscript source stems from
1931. Therein Wittgenstein scrutinises the idea that “all is in flux”, that the fleeting reality
cannot be captured in language. As later in the Blue Book (see quote above) he points out that
“fleeting” normally is used in opposition to “stable” and that, in this sense, there is nothing
metaphysical about it:
That all is in flux seems to prevent us from expressing the truth, for it is as
though we can’t get hold of it, since it slips away from us.
But it doesn’t prevent us from expressing something. – We know what it means
to want to get hold of something fleeting in a description. That happens, say,
when we forget the one while we want to describe the other. But that’s not what
we are dealing with here. And that’s how the word "fleeting" is to be applied.
We lead words back from their metaphysical use to their correct use in language.
The man who said that one couldn’t step twice into the same river said something
false. One can step twice into the same river. (MS110, 33 f.)
and in the Zwischenfassung, the intermediate version of the Investigations from 1937:
(The man who said that one couldn’t step twice into the same river said something
false; one can step twice into the same river. – And an object sometimes ceases
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to exist if I cease to see it, and sometimes not. – And we do know sometimes
what colour someone else sees, and sometimes not.) (TS220, §111)
Baker comments instructively:
Here the expressions ‘sometimes’ and ‘sometimes not’ evidently function as
modal terms, understood as contradicting necessities expressed by using ‘never’
and ‘always’. This parenthetical remark is evidently meant to give some exam-
ples of the (dis)solution of philosophical difficulties by bringing words back
from their metaphysical to their everyday use (alltägliche Verwendung), and the
crucial move is to refrain from affirming apparent necessities and impossibilities
by acknowledging a wider range of possibilities. (Baker 2004, 102)
I agree with this reading. The important point is that the “wider range of possibilities” is not
concerned with hidden possibilities in the same space, but with the possibility of different
spaces, of looking at things differently. Another occasion where one could answer with
‘sometimes’ or ‘it depends’ is the example from the Investigations where “a boy racked his
brains over the question whether the verb ‘to sleep’, for example, meant something active
or passive” which is itself an example to illustrate the context-dependence of simplicity (PI,
§47).
To conclude this discussion, Wittgenstein does not dismiss systems altogether after the
Tractatus, but replaces the one comprehensive order with a more local systematicity of
constitutive frameworks in which something has sense in virtue of being part of a system of
possibilities. Unlike Baker and Hacker (before they split over the grammar/therapy-issue),
I do not believe that the propositional systems (Satzsysteme), which Wittgenstein studied
in 1929 and 1930, were largely abandoned (Baker and Hacker 2009, 44).121 Instead, the
systematicity of these systems, which coincide with the space concepts of that period, is
reflected in a number of related concepts which I shall now turn to.
5.2 Concepts Complementary to Space
5.2.1 Logical Form and Forms of Representation
The plurality of systems that comes up in the middle period and is later emphasised in the
Investigations is directed against logical universalism which was implied in the Tractatus by
121. Baker and Hackler do admit that some aspects of this view are permanent, but those listed by them are, I
believe, the wrong ones: the autonomy of grammar, for example, is not a permanent feature of Wittgenstein’s
thinking as both Engelmann and Kuusela have shown: it neglects the instrumental use of language as e.g.
acknowledged in PI §492.
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the general form of the proposition and the unifying account of words whose sole purpose it
is to represent objects.122 Moreover, it is meant to highlight that this multiplicity of forms is
not fixed, given once for all, but changes. An important concept to express this multiplicity of
systems is what Wittgenstein calls “form of representation” or “form of expression”. These
are much more casual and flexible concepts than the very technical “logical form”, but they
are still forms. They are forms in the sense in which Wittgenstein introduces the word in the
Tractatus, that is, as something that is intimately connected to the idea of logical space: form
is the possibility of structure (cf. chapter 3).123
In 1929, Wittgenstein published a paper that is often discussed as a central piece of his
middle period because it has the form of a conventional academic publication: it is a paper
that was supposed to be given at a conference and published in the proceedings. Far from
being a key text to the middle Wittgenstein, it merely sums up some of the developments
from 1929. Especially the arguments on colour exclusion and statements of degree are
discussed; I shall not repeat them here (cf. section 4.3). Anyway, Wittgenstein did not give
that paper because in the time from April, when he supposedly wrote it, to July, when he
spoke at the conference, he had moved on to different topics, mainly generality and infinity
in mathematics as can be reconstructed from the manuscripts from that time.124 While the
paper itself contains little that is not in the manuscripts, I want to emphasise one feature about
it, namely its title. Although it is, like most of Wittgenstein’s titles, very general, “Some
Remarks on Logical Form” is significant because logical form is precisely the feature of
the Tractarian system that shall undergo the most profound changes. The idea is still about
possibility of structures, but through its treatment of colour exclusion the paper shows that
not all impossibilities are excluded by logical form alone. And that hence the investigation
must be “in a certain sense a posteriori” (SRLF, 163). For the first time, the idea is articulated
that logic might not be completely detached from experience, if only “in a certain sense”;
– Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is indeed marked by the tension expressed in this vague
formulation: on the one hand the temptation to think that logic is empirical, on the other
hand the conviction that this would abolish logic and cannot be the solution; the role of
122. And it is important that in his notebooks from Norway in 1937, where much of the Investigations’
“philosophy chapter” is sketched, Wittgenstein reconstructs and dismantles the idea that there could not be
any kinds in logic. For if there were kinds, new kinds could empirically be discovered; the claim for apriority
implies a certain unity. “All numbers in logic must be capable of justification” (TLP, 5.453; cf. MS157, 47r; see
also section 3.3).
123. Of course, there are also more deflationary instances of “Form” in Wittgenstein’s writings and sometimes
it simply means “shape”, but there is a significant number of remarks in which it has the technical meaning that
is connected to “space”.
124. Martin Pilch has approximately dated the MS-volumes 105–107 using all dates that are available and
assuming a steady writing pace for the undated passages. That Wittgenstein spoke about mathematics instead
of presenting his paper is proven by a letter to Russell (July 1929).
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logical propositions is still different from empirical ones (cf. section 6.2). While in 1929 he
suggests engaging in phenomenological analysis, he increasingly understands propositions
that are not “logical” in a straightforward sense, but still closer to logic than to experience,
as grammatical.125 In the manuscripts 1929–1932 in which the notions of grammar and
space are most important, there are some significant occurrences of “form” in the sense
that interests me: as a descendent of “logical form”, but stripped of its Tractarian claim for
universality.
In the context of the discussions of a presentist account of time (film strip and projector),
Wittgenstein notes that what he is studying is actually “the possibility of movement. Hence
the logical form of movement” (MS108, 27). And the idea of a phenomenological language,
of an immediate description of sense data, which may lead to presentism or solipsism (“only
my present experience is real”), is characterised in these remarks as “only one form of
description, not the only possible or the only correct one as one might think” (MS108, 45; cf.
also MS110, 287). It is possible, he writes, to describe the logical form of a certain domain of
language by making conventions; these could be different, but changing them would change
the whole way words are used (cf. MS108, 98). These conventions are like norms, stipulated
by us and then misleadingly considered as something which is given a priori – “It is a given
form of representation” (MS110, 245).
The more the focus of Wittgenstein’s attention shifts towards the use of language, the
more pressing becomes the question of the role of grammar between experience and logic.
The above sketched typology of differences is nicely captured in the following remark in
which the second type, that is, differences between grammars, is expressed in terms of a
difference of “forms”. The third type, the difference between empirical and grammatical
differences is hinted at in the last paragraph:
All one actually needs to know in philosophy is that each difference in the use
of a word is a logical difference, and that we are hence dealing with different
forms (whose grammatical relationship is at most indicated by the same word)
That is, one must not pass over a difference of forms – as one may well pass
over a difference of chairs when it is very small.
In a certain sense there are for us – namely in grammar – no small differences.
And indeed the word “difference” means something completely different than
when we are dealing with the difference between two things (MS111, 56–57).
In the notebooks leading to the Investigations, Wittgenstein noted that the a priori should
become one form of representation, not the form (cf. MS157b, 3v), the one form which so
125. “Phenomenology is Grammar” (TS213, 437).
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greatly impressed him in the Tractatus.126 In the final version, this view finds its way into
the discussion of the ability to read: a naturalistic interpretation of reading which seems
to be a priori necessary is here characterised as “a form of representation which is very
appealing to us” (PI, §158). However, it is also one example of how “our forms of expression,
which send us in pursuit of chimeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing
extraordinary is involved.” (§94). And in the manuscript that links the corpus of the Big
Typescript with the Investigations:
The “great”, difficult, problems of philosophy are what they are not due to an
unheard of, subtle, and mysterious state of affairs which we should examine, but
due to the crossing of a large amount of misleading forms of expression at this
place. (MS116, 217–218)127
It is an essential part of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to criticise these misleading forms and
– as he also said about creativity in mathematics – invent new ones.128 “The philosophical
problem appears to be unsolvable. Until one sees that there is a disease of the form of
representation” (MS115, 110). And in the philosophy chapter, Wittgenstein describes (part
of) his grammatical method as the substitution of one form of expression with another (cf.
§90). All these uses of form share with “space” their role as a framework which determines a
certain perspective on an issue and on what is considered possible. If this perspective causes
confusion, the space must be clarified or new spaces be invented.
5.2.2 Notation, Symbolism (Mythology)
It has been pointed out that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein is introducing a notation. Recently
Kuusela advanced a compelling interpretation pointing out the many phrasings that sound
like the introduction of notational concepts („I will call...“) and thereby solving the so-called
paradox of the Tractatus, namely that its own propositions are nonsense. By interpreting
them as introductory, Kuusela succeeds in giving an account of how they can have a function
despite being nonsensical129 (cf. Kuusela 2019a). What he does not address specifically is
126. On the picture theory and the idea that there must be a logical form, which accounts for all possibilities
world and language have in common, he comments retrospectively: “Thus, a certain generalisation intrudes
itself upon me, a certain form of representation, a certain aspect” (MS116, 123).
127. In the Investigations, the tension between meaning as use and understanding “at a stroke”, which I shall
discuss in the next chapter, is characterised as such a crossing (cf. §191).
128. With regards to mathematics as inventing “new forms of representation”, see MS119, 95. On different
“forms of questions” in mathematics, see also MS112, 130.
129. This is the notorious problem of the resolute reading. It claims to take seriously the remark that the
propositions of the Tractatus are nonsense and refuses to distinguish different kinds of nonsense; but if this is
true, why should exactly these nonsensical propositions help us to get to the right point of view?
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the role of notations in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, but he does mention one remark about
his discussions with Ramsey in 1929. Wittgenstein complained about his friend’s neglect of
the importance of a specific form and highlights his own preoccupation with notations:
R[amsey] does not comprehend the value I place on a particular notation any
more than the value I place on a particular word because he does not see that
in it an entire way of looking at the object is expressed; the angle from which
I now regard the matter. The notation is the last expression of a philosophical
view (MS105, 10).
I think it is significant that Wittgenstein insists on the importance of notations in that period
in which he is also obsessed with spaces and calculi. (especially in MS106 and MS113, cf.
section 5.3.1). In 1930, in the remark already quoted in chapter 4, Wittgenstein reflects on
his own frequent and various usage of “space” in his own writings. „Our notation or mode
of expression“, he writes, constitutes the way we look at things which is expressed in this
space-terminology. The remark implies that the “spatial” mode of expression is a notation, or
rather: many notations. For he also admits that he uses “spaces” in various ways: sometimes
he wants to highlight an analogy with physical or geometrical space, sometimes he wants
to point out differences in a more metaphorical sense between different spaces (cf. MS108,
135).
What the concept of “notation” implies is that constitutive frameworks can be constructed.
However, even though there are those expressions in the Tractatus in which this constructivist
aspect is visible, as Kuusela has shown, this aspect is easily overlooked due to the universality
of the Tractarian system. It makes it seem as though the right notation had simply been dis-
covered, the logical space simply been described: the truth of these thoughts is “unassailable
and definitive”. In 1932, by contrast, Wittgenstein is more aware of the possibility to invent
spaces (like the mathematician, cf. section 4.2) and to construct new notations „I offer the
confused person a rule and he accepts it. One could also say: I offer him a notation“ (MS113,
27r).
The description of a new, for example a more perspicuous, notation (for per-
spicuity is central for us) is of the same kind as the description of one of those
languages which children invent or learn from one another in which, e.g. each
vowel of normal words is doubled and between each part of the doubling a “b”
is inserted. Here we have come quite close to the concept of game [. . . ]
What seems to lead us astray here is the double meaning of the word “descrip-
tion”: when one sometimes speaks about the description of a real house or tree
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etc., and sometimes about the description of a form (Gestalt), construction etc.,
of a notation, of a game. (MS113, 28v)
In the last paragraph, the distinction between experience and grammar is framed as the
problem of the ambiguity of “description”. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s repeated claim to be
purely descriptive can be puzzling due to this double meaning. It is connected to the different
kinds of difference which I distinguished above: while the description of houses, trees and so
on belongs to the sphere of experience, the description of notations and games belongs to
that of grammar. The former corresponds to the differences between trees and houses, the
latter to those between different grammatical spaces. The “double meaning” of “description”
corresponds to the ambiguity of “difference”, that is, to the difference between empirical
differences and grammatical differences.
Even though the constructivist element (more on this in section 6.2) is quite visible in the
context of notations, there is still the temptation, which Wittgenstein had succumbed to in
the Tractatus, to give a “mythology of the particular notation or symbolism” one is using
(MS108, 104). What does mythology mean here? It means to conceive of the second type
of “description”, of a description of grammar, as if it were a de re description of the first
type, to hypostatise the notation as an underlying structure of reality instead of seeing it as
a formal aspect of the way we describe things. To work against this kind of mythology, to
work “against the myth-building tendencies in our mind” (MS158, 28r) is a central aspect of
Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy: “One could say philosophy purges our thinking
from a (wrong /misleading/) mythology” (MS109, 210–211).130 Until shortly before his
death, he conceived of the constitutive structures that frame our approach towards things
as mythologies; in his latest writings he will explicitly emphasise the fact that empirical
propositions, too, can have the role of such “mythological” statements, but also that the
mythology can change (cf. OC, §95; 97).
5.2.3 Hypotheses, Theory, Image
Other concepts in the orbit of “spaces” are the more scientific concepts of hypotheses and
theories. Of course, hypotheses are the paradigmatic example of sentences that may be true
or false. But Wittgenstein acknowledges the possibility to turn them into postulates which
will be upheld no matter what:
130. In this remark, Wittgenstein also makes a reference to Paul Ernst’s epilogue to Grimm’s Tales (1910)
which seems to have influenced his use of the word “mythology”. It is another example of creative appropriation.
For Ernst, mythology is indeed connected to misunderstanding “the logic of our language”, but has rather
positive connotations as a source of poetic expression. Wittgenstein instead criticises similar misunderstandings
and mythologies in the would-be scientific conceptions of his contemporary philosophers.
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One can compare a part of a hypothesis to the movement of a part of a gear,
a movement which one can stipulate without predetermining the envisaged
movement. However, one must then set up the rest of the gear in such a way that












Once I have made the decision that a certain part of a hy-
pothesis is not to be altered whatever the experience may
be that I want to describe, then I have stipulated a manner
of representation and that part of the hypothesis is now a
postulate. A postulate must be such that it cannot be refuted
by any conceivable experience, even if it may be troublesome to hold on to the
postulate. (MS108, 109)131
Later, he uses the same analogy to show the same relation between an empirical hypothesis
to an a priori postulate and frames it in terms of the already mentioned “form of expression”:
How does the assumption of a fact (Sachverhalt) turn into an assumption of a
form of expression? Picture of the differential gear. (MS116, 233)
This view is basically similar to Poincaré’s idea of hypotheses which may be elevated to
conventions and then form a quasi a priori system of accepted beliefs.132 A number of these
postulates may be turned into a theory which, of course, has a larger scope. Hertz’s images,
for example, are theories to account for the totality of mechanics. They can be more or
less correct and are insofar revisable, but it is also clear that within such a system it makes
no sense to question the principles themselves. As he makes clear in the beginning, Hertz
holds that his principles are a priori in a Kantian sense (Hertz 1899, 1) and that the title of
his book is motivated by the aprioric status of his “principles” (they are, however, testable
for their permissibility, correctness and appropriateness, but this is a different testing than
testing a hypothesis within a theory). Wittgenstein’s general opposition towards theories
in philosophy133 is in one sense directed against the universal claims they might suggest
(cf. Kuusela 2008); in another sense a theory is a scientific doctrine, something that can
131. The schematised image is taken from the Vienna Edition, vol. 2, p. 230.
132. This is the reason why Carnap justified himself in the famous plagiarism affair by referring to Poincaré:
Wittgenstein had accused him of having stolen the notion of hypotheses which can never be completely
verified, but only “stand the test” and then eventually be turned into conventions. This idea indeed occurs in
Wittgenstein’s remarks from 1929/30 and in Carnap’s paper Die Physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache
der Wissenschaft (1931). Wittgenstein claimed that Poincaré could not have known his idea because he did not
have Wittgenstein’s account of propositions and grammar. But it is understandable that Carnap saw them as
reasonably similar (cf. Wittgenstein’s letter to Schlick 8/8/1932).
133. Wittgenstein’s rejection of theories is much discussed in the literature, see for example Kuusela 2008;
Hacker 2012b; Engelmann 2011; Uffelmann 2018 etc. All accept this rejection. Some scholars (Kuusela,
Engelmann), however, believe that other scholars (Hacker, Glock) implicitly impute a theory to Wittgenstein by
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empirically be refuted and hence not what Wittgenstein was interested in (cf. PI, §109; cf.
Hacker 2012b). The philosophy of the Tractatus was a theory in the first sense: Wittgenstein
compares his former assumption that all propositions must be pictures to Freud’s theory that
all dreams are wish-fullfilments (cf. MS157a, 55r–55v). It was not a theory in the second
sense: already the Tractatus was concerned with “what precedes every experience” (TLP,
5.552; see also Kuusela 2019a).
An interesting crossed-out remark from the manuscript of the Investigations contains
an addendum to §3 which insists that Augustine‘s system of language is only valid for a
narrowly circumscribed region. In the cancelled sentence, Wittgenstein asks the reader to
compare this with the „theories of macroeconomists“ (TS227, §3). First, it is interesting that
Wittgenstein brings up the notion of theories in this context which can be explained by means
of the conceptual proximity of linguistic systems and theories which I have pointed out (both
are spaces, games etc.). Second, it is interesting that he chooses such a questionable „science“
as macroeconomics in which we are probably less tempted to say they are „true“, but rather
appropriate in their domain.134 This might also be one of the ways in which Piero Sraffa
influenced Wittgenstein‘s thinking beyond the famous legend of the Neapolitan gesture.135
The remark, although crossed out, indicates that it is not completely absurd to conceive of
theories in terms of spaces or games. I repeat that Wittgenstein rejects theories insofar as
they are concerned with scientific discoveries as opposed to conceptual clarifications; he also
rejects them as frameworks that claim universality.
However, a theory as a non-universal framework, constructed in order to clarify a specific
situation, would in principle not be in conflict with his philosophy. Like a word only
acquires meaning within a space (or a language-game, as we will see), he argues that
“something is an experiment only in the space of a theory” (MS117, 97). Remember also
Wittgenstein’s positive references to relativity theory throughout all of his writings from
absolutising his method of philosophy: that one should look at language under the aspect of rules, grammar or
language-games is itself a theory, they claim, and should therefore not be taken as Wittgenstein’s dogmatic
position. I shall not dwell too much on this dispute. I argue that “meaning is use” stands in some continuity to
“meaning: the place of a word in grammatical space” and acknowledge that Wittgenstein said about this method
that it works for “a large class of cases [. . . ] – though not for all” (PI, §43).
134. And it is perhaps today as relevant as it was at the time when we think about the consequences economists
derive from simplified modells up to this day.
135. Michael Nedo told me in private conversation that Sraffa – somewhat tongue-in-cheek – did not remember
that incident, but that he had heard the story so often by other people that it must be true. Engelmann gives a
more comprehensive proposal of what Sraffa’s influence consists in, namely in making Wittgenstein aware of
the importance of use as opposed to an autonomous grammar. While I agree that Sraffa must have pointed out
the plurality of frameworks one has to take into account and that these are constituted by empirical findings and
not completely autonomous, I do not agree with Engelmann’s framing which presents Sraffa as convincing
Wittgenstein to drop grammar completely and to adopt the “anthropological view” (cf. Engelmann 2013a).
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1930–50.136 Elsewhere, he uses theory and language-game quasi synonymously when he
compares “the position of a picture in a theory, in a language-game” to the location of
a mathematical expression in an equation: the expression alone does not tell us anything
without its environment (cf. MS120, 50v). And in 1945, after the completion of the preface of
the Investigations, he rejects “philosophical theory” in terms of his distinction of describing
and explaining. While a theory tries to explain things, philosophy ought only to describe.
He continues that what makes the task of describing so difficult is that we see reality, as it
were, through a net which makes us confuse features of reality with features of the net. What
is very subtle about this remark is that it seems to simply confirm the anti-theoretical gist
Wittgenstein is famous for, but then goes on as follows: “a completely unordered description
is of no value for us. But to see the relevant structure is difficult because it is hidden by the
grammatical net” (MS130, 217–19).137 This is somewhat puzzling and seems to indicate
Wittgenstein’s shifting terminology. He certainly rejects a “philosophical theory” as he
reinforces in the preceding remark, but he also rejects the idea that reality can be described
without any “net”, without any “order”. While this remark sounds as if there was a reality
that can be described independently (cf. also PI §103),138 I can only make sense of it if it
means: we have to provide a different net, a different order, which is “relevant” insofar as it
solves a particular confusion that has been prompted by the misleading grammatical net of
our ordinary and established language. In this sense, it could even be a philosophical act to
suggest a new theory, only not in any universalist sense:
We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order
for a particular purpose, one out of many possible orders, not the order. For this
purpose we shall again and again emphasize distinctions which our ordinary
forms of language easily make us overlook. (PI, §132a)
Nor in the sense of a theory which captures reality better than our ordinary language. Rather,
these new theories should only be put forward to clarify shortcomings or confusions in the
existing ones.
This may make it appear as if we saw it as our task to reform language.
136. Einstein, too, initially insisted that his theory was not epistemologically necessary but a more promising
and satisfying way to look at things (cf. Einstein’s letter to Schlick from 6th September 1917: quoted in
Hentschel 1986, 481).
137. The word “relevant” is marked as questionable with a wiggly underline and for “the relevant order” there
is a textual variant “one relevant order”. Both modifications clearly aim to prevent any essentialist and absolutist
connotations about the relevant order.
138. In an earlier version of §103, he seems to consider that the analogy of the glasses through which we
see everything can be misleading as it suggests that we could also see without any glasses (cf. MS157b, 3).
Strangely, Wittgenstein also says that the glasses in his simile could not be exchanged either. Maybe he has in
mind the great power a certain ideal can have over our minds.
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Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our termi-
nology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, may well be possible.
But these are not the cases we are dealing with. The confusions which occupy
us arise when language is, as it were, idling, not when it is doing work. (PI,
§132a–b)
The proposal of a theory in a positive sense would be, again, very similar to Hertz’s images
which were supposed to make disappear certain questions that cannot be answered in a theory
that suggests contradictory or confusing connections.139 Philosophy would then consist not in
describing reality as it “really” is, without any net, but in suggesting different nets in order to
solve problems that arise out of the existing one which is wrongly taken as the correct one. If
the suggested theory does not solve the problem, Wittgenstein is happy to drop it and suggest
another one, an offer which has frequently been quoted in order to illustrate Wittgenstein’s
non-dogmatism (cf. LFM, 22; Engelmann 2011, 87). In 1946, when discussing psychology
and psychological theories like that of William James, Wittgenstein seems to use “theory”
in the more positive sense I want to highlight, giving further evidence of the connection
between theory and notation:
The theory says really: ‘it could be like this . . . ‘. And the purpose of the theory
is that it illustrates a concept.
But it can illustrate it better or worse; more or less to the point. The theory is, so
to speak, a notation for a psychological phenomenon. (MS132, 48)
Even though he rarely calls frameworks in this positive sense “theories”, I think it would be
possible in the qualified sense sketched in the preceding paragraphs. Such a theory would not
claim to have discovered anything true by means of which something can now be explained,
but it is, like a new notation, rather the description of a new way of looking at things: “the
real merit of Copernicus or Darwin was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fruitful
new aspect” (MS112,117). The word “theory” he seems to reserve for the negative cases in
which the wrong framework, which is taken to be universally valid, hinders us to see that
things could be different (and would be less confusing). Wittgenstein repeatedly points out
139. Indeed Wittgenstein also considered using a line from Hertz’s preface to the Principles of Mechanics as a
motto (cf. Baker and Hacker 2005, II, 30). I quote it with a bit more context, although Wittgenstein wanted
to use only the last sentence “Our confused wish finds expression in a confused question as to the nature of
force and electricity. But the answer which we want is not really an answer to this question. It is not by finding
out more and fresh relations and connections that it can be answered; but by removing the contradictions
between those already known, and thus perhaps by reducing their number. When these painful contradictions
are removed, the question as to the nature of force will not have been answered; but our minds, no longer vexed,
will cease to ask illegitimate questions” (Hertz 1899, 7–8).
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how deeply rooted in our minds some misleading forms of expression are140 and attributes
the need for such forms to “the power of theory” (MS131, 96).
The positive account of “theory” may also shed some light on Wittgenstein’s famous
criticism of Ramsey as a “bourgeois thinker”. Following the earlier remark on Ramsey not
seeing the importance of notation, one can interpret Wittgenstein’s problem with Ramsey’s
attitude as follows: In chapter 4, I compared Wittgenstein’s ideas about creativity in inventing
spaces with Kuhn’s revolutionary science which introduces a new paradigm. Paradigm
may be a wider concept than theory, but it captures the positive aspects of theories I am
highlighting. Thus, “bourgeois” can be read as opposed to “revolutionary” in the Kuhnian
sense: as a sort of puzzle-solving activity which may involve a considerable degree of
skill, but is still distinguished from the creativity that is required for paradigm change.
Ramsey would in this sense be bourgeois because he prefers to work within an unquestioned
framework, not thinking about its notation or form. Whether this criticism is fair, I do not
want to judge, but it seems very likely to me that these remarks are connected with the idea
of constitutive frameworks rather than with political attitudes.141 There are some indications
supporting this view. The political imagery – Ramsey was only concerned with a “given
community”, with “the improvement of this state” while the “possibility of other states”
unsettled him – is meant to distinguish the two philosophical styles: for Wittgenstein, “the
philosopher is not a member of a community of ideas (Denkgemeinde)”, but instead engages
in revolutionary thinking by offering different ways of looking at things (cf. MS112, 70v and
72r).
5.3 Frameworks Replacing Spaces
I shall now turn to concepts which are more frequent than those discussed so far. They are
used heavily in certain periods of Wittgenstein’s writing and it is striking that they emerge
when the literal occurrences of “space” decrease. This is an indication that, unlike the
discussed concepts, which complement the space idea, the concepts of calculi and games
rather substitute spatial frameworks. Even though they take up many functions that the
former were supposed to fulfil calculi and games differ from spaces in a substantial way:
140. “The forces that determine how something is represented are as great as those that insist on the truth of
what is represented” (MS131, 180).
141. For such a view see Gakis 2018, 245. However, this accusation would be strange: although Wittgenstein
had some connections to socialist movements in Cambridge and beyond, Ramsey was no less active in these
circles and probably even more committed. And Wittgenstein himself had obviously the most bourgeois
background one can imagine.
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while the latter are static frameworks, the former are more dynamic. This is at first a marginal
difference, but becomes increasingly important as I shall show in section 6.1.
A rough idea of the relation between space, calculus, and game can be attained by con-
sidering the frequencies of the terms in the manuscript volumes from 1929 to 1932. The
significance of such a quantitative comparison is of course limited, especially as the table
does not account for related terms such as “Geometrie” or adjectives such as “räumlich”
and “geometrisch”. Moreover, there are “jumps” between the manuscripts, for example
when the remarks from MS106 are continued on the verso pages of MS105 which had
been left free when Wittgenstein started writing manuscripts in February 1929. Hence, an
occurrence of “game” in MS105 can in fact be later than an occurrence of “space” from
MS106. What is more informative are the year dates and the ratio between the three frequen-
cies in each volume. Over the course of the four years a general tendency becomes evident.142
MS-Volume pages year “Raum” “Kalkül” “Spiel”
105 134 1929 30 1 1
106 298 1929 46 1 3
107 300 1929-30 45 3 7
108 300 1929-30 59 8 10
109 300 1930-31 14 3 19
110 300 1930-31 34 19 18
111 200 1931 16 71 33
112 270 1931 15 43 72
113 270 1931-32 32 93 42
114 60 (290) 1932 (33) 9 (16) 7 (43) 5 (71)
While I argued against a direct connection between logical space and Boltzmann’s phase-
space, in light of these numbers one may speak of a “space-phase” after 1929 in which
“space” is Wittgenstein’s preferred concept to account for the grammatical insights he wants
to highlight. The occurrences of “space” decrease slightly after their peak in 1930 which goes
along with a significant increase in occurrences of “game” – clearly an indicator of transition
in Wittgenstein’s thinking in light of the further use of these concepts: “space” disappears
almost completely after 1933, whereas it is obvious how important “game” is in the later
philosophy of the Investigations and On Certainty. What is particularly interesting, though,
142. The data in this table is taken from wittfind, a web-application developed by the universities of Munich
and Bergen in order to make Wittgenstein’s Nachlass digitally searchable. (wittfind.cis.lmu.de, access date
13/11/2018). Only parts of MS114 belong to the continuous stream of remarks which stops in June 1932. In
1933 Wittgenstein starts a re-working of the Big Typescript in the second part of that volume (numbers in
brackets).
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is the striking cluster of “calculus” in 1931–32, a concept which occurs only occasionally
in later manuscripts, mostly in reflections on mathematics (e.g. MS117)143. To better
understand these numbers it is necessary to look at the function of the words in their contexts
as I have done with “space” in the last chapter.
5.3.1 Calculi
We have seen that grammar was conceived in terms of geometry. In the calculus-phase,
Wittgenstein considers grammar a “pure calculus” (MS113, 62r; 128r). While the meaning of
a word was defined as its “place in grammatical space” and similarly the sense of propositions
was accounted for in spatial terms, now the “proposition has its content as an element of
a calculus” (MS111, 183; cf. MS114, 43r); and: “what role the proposition plays in the
calculus, that is its sense” (MS113, 42r).
Analogies to space were used in the context of intentionality in order to account for the
idea that thought and world, expectation and fulfilment, are both phenomena of language.
Agreement between thought and reality relies on agreement in grammar, that is, on their
being located in the same grammatical space. In 1931, Wittgenstein writes instead: “When
the words ’agreement with reality’ are used, they are not used as a metalogical expression,
but as part of a calculus, as part of ordinary language” (MS113, 49v). Generally, the word
calculus is often invoked to stress the impossibility of metalogic, by which Wittgenstein
understands the description of logic, of a geometry, a calculus, in a kind of neutral and
maximally general language which is independent, as it were, outside, of the individual
calculi. However, the description of the geometry of a space is already part of another space,
a new calculus, not a meta-calculus.
The invention of new calculi follows the same pattern as the invention of new spaces; to
calculi, too, Wittgenstein’s association to the Kantian synthetic a priori applies which he
exemplifies with the discovery – better: invention – of the space of periodicity, that is, a
space that allows for the possibility of numbers with periodic decimals, and an according
notation: 0.33333 . . .= 0.3̇
143. Susan Edwards-McKie argues for two strands of interest in the later Wittgenstein, one focusing on
calculi and mathematics, one focusing on games and practices (in private conversation). While this has
some plausibility, particularly in light of the separation of mathematical remarks during the genesis of the
Investigations (cf. Baker and Hacker 2009, 3–19 ; cf. also Edwards-McKie 2015), I here argue for the similarity
of these two strands. First, I do not want to split Wittgenstein’s personality further into a mathematical and a
practical Wittgenstein, as the existing fragmentation along chronological lines already causes enough trouble
(cf. Kienzler 2017); second, I think there is enough textual evidence to stress the connection between calculi
and games and between mathematics and the more anthropological remarks.
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And the discovery of periodicity is in reality the construction of a new sign and
a new calculus (MS114, 10r).
He who discovers periodicity, invents a new calculus. The question is, how is
a calculus with periodic division distinguished from one which does not know
periodicity? [. . . ]
In the next remark, he exemplifies these distinctions between calculi, which are used similarly
to distinctions between spaces, with the juxtaposition of a finite and an infinite space (treated
here as individual signs, belonging to different calculi) which we have encountered in the
last chapter:
[. . . ] I could, by the way, say that the sign “1, 1+1, 1+1+1, and so on” is
distinguished from the sign “1, 1+1, 1+1+1” by its application. That they belong
to different calculi. (MS111, 52)
That the periodic division can be continued infinitely is not a fact, but more akin to an aspect
of geometry, something which determines the possibilities in space like rules of a calculus
determine the possibilities of applications: “When we say: ’the possibility of producing
decimal positions in the division of 1:3 is infinite’, we do not state a fact of nature, but we
give a rule of a calculus” (MS113, 98r). Again, distinctions between calculi are something
else than differences within a calculus:
One might perhaps say: but ’integer’ is opposed to ’rational number’, ’real
number’ etc. But this difference is a difference of the rules (of the rules of the
game which are valid for them) – not of a position on the chess board – not
a difference for which one could use different coordinated words in the same
calculus. (MS111, 123–124)
Two mathematical entities one of which I can compare with every rational
number in my calculus, but not the other, – are not numbers in the same sense of
the word (MS113, 134r; cf. again MS105,1)
The notion of impossibility, which was one function of logical space and is in the background
of all variants of grammatical spaces – they exclude possibilities from the realm of colours,
physical time, visual space etc. –, is likewise accounted for by calculi in this period:
When one asks: does it have sense to say ’there will never be this and that’? –
well, what evidence exists for this; and what follows from it? – for if there is no
evidence for it – not that we have not yet been able to get them – but that it has
not been arranged for by the calculus, then this determines the character of the
propositions (MS113, 44r).
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The proximity of these ideas to the usage of “geometry” and “space” as systems of grammati-
cal rules as delineated in the last section is expressed in the following remarks. They highlight
the somewhat inflexible rule-governedness of calculi which shall become problematic later:
What applies to the word “language” must also apply to the expression “system
of rules”. Hence also to the word “calculus”. (MS110, 200)
I look at language and grammar under the aspect of calculus / as a calculus /
under the form of the calculus, i.e. of the operations / the operating according to
fixed rules / i.e. as a process according to fixed rules. (MS111, 67)
The focus on fixed rules shall return in a central remark of the Investigations. It has led many
scholars to dismiss calculi and language games as tempting, but misleading concepts.
F. P. Ramsey once emphasised in conversation with me that logic was a ‘norma-
tive science’. I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but it was doubtless
closely related to what only dawned on me later: namely, that in philosophy we
often compare the use of words with games or calculi which have fixed rules,
but cannot say that someone who is using language must be playing such a game.
[. . . ]
All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater
clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning and thinking. For it will
then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone
utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according
to definite rules. (§81)
However, the temptation is in any case a significant one for Wittgenstein as much of his
philosophy is concerned with these kinds of framework. Second, they are not dismissed,
but still regarded as useful objects of comparison. And it is hard to neglect that making
comparisons is at the heart of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and that it is precisely these objects
of comparison which characterise his way of clarifying problems. Third, the remark is
qualified as for calculi and games “with fixed rules”. The idea that there are frameworks
which are more flexible and do not feature a metaphysical necessity is one reason for the
preference of games in the later period and for Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with questions
of necessity (games with fixed rules are in this sense more like calculi, but they allow for
moves which are not rule-governed, and games are conceivable that have very flexible rules
or no discernable regularity at all).
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To conclude this section, the whole idea to compare language to calculi is based on the
earlier comparison to spaces and geometries; it can be seen as a transition to “language-
games” which is a concept close to calculus anyway. “This is clear: that the question ‘what
is a calculus’ is of the same kind as ‘what is a game’ or as ‘what is a rule”’ (MS111, 75).
Calculi are not only etymologically related to games,144 and not only connected to them in
Wittgenstein’s reflections on mathematical formalism,145 but also structurally similar in their
role as frameworks of possibilities which allow for certain moves and exclude others.
5.3.2 Games
Although the centrality of games is obvious in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy there have
been warnings against exaggerating their importance. Pichler argues that the method of
language-games proper was developed in the Brown Book and was changed on the way to
the Investigations, notably in MS142. The Brown Book is obviously more didactic, aiming to
teach something by means of language-games, whereas the Investigations are more open:
just presenting the language-games like a play might be performed without a particular
didactic aim, simply juxtaposing different views (cf. Pichler 2004). Similarly Kuusela argues
against an overblown importance of games because in his view, they are simply objects of
comparison (again PI §81 supporting this) and only one of various methods for treating
philosophical confusions (cf. Kuusela 2008, 172–176). But it is certainly Wittgenstein’s
method to use these objects of comparisons. One could also compare language to other
things, but as a matter of fact, games are a very useful tool (as is space) to highlight the kinds
of difference Wittgenstein cares about. Moreover, his point is that language need not conform
to a calculus or game with “fixed rules”, but towards the end of this section I am going to
investigate Wittgenstein’s idea to speak of language-games whose rule are not fixed, but
flexible and changeable over time. That the concept of games is more flexible and allows for
loose and “incomplete” rules motivates their preference over calculi in the Investigations.146
While the connection between calculus and game is easy to see, that between game and
space is less clear. Wittgenstein’s chess analogies can help to illuminate this connection. Max
Black noticed the possibility to compare Tractarian logical space to the rules of chess which
constitute a space of possible positions (cf. 1964, 55). This intuition is very close to my
reading of Wittgenstein’s space concept, although it neglects the difference between static
locations and dynamic moves that shall be central in the next chapter. Wittgenstein himself
144. In Latin, “Calculi” means little pebbles or stones which were used in ancient Rome to calculate, but also
as tiles in games. (cf. Schütt 2004, 353).
145. Cf. the sub-chapter in the Big Typescript “Mathematics compared to a game” (TS213, 530 ff.).
146. See also Baker and Hacker 2005, I, 51.
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made similar comparisons in the middle period where the “space” idea changes. In this time,
the concept of “geometry” is extended to all kinds of domains, even to arithmetic, and in this
sense he raises the question whether the “game of chess, too, (or any other game) is not a
kind of geometry?” (MS108, 117).147 And in his conversations with Waismann and Schlick,
Wittgenstein argues that it is “the totality of the rules of a game that yields the logical position
of a pawn” (WVC, 104).148 These analogies highlight the similarity between space and game
as it has already been indicated in the last chapter where the incommensurability (and yet
completeness) between number spaces was compared to the difference between chess and
draughts (cf. MS111, 29). The similarity is that in both cases a range of possibilities, not
facts, is constituted. A geometrical object is constituted by the axioms, a word is determined
by “its place in grammatical space”, a piece of chess by its role in a game. “Geometrical
laws constitute the cube like the rules of chess constitute the king” (MS112, 112). Outside
of a space or a game a word does not have sense. In 1931, when thinking about indexicals
and the impossibility to define them ostensively (“this is here” is empty without context),
Wittgenstein states a typical result for his thinking in that time: “this shows that the space is
missing in which this statement is to be made in order to have sense” (MS109, 246). Later,
in the Investigations, this emphasis on context-dependence recurs in the terminology of
games; to give just one example with similarly “empty” words which lack a clear conceptual
framework to be used in:
These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind
the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now?
The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing.) (§96)149
Another feature space and game have in common, at least since the disintegration of logical
space, is their plurality. In the first paragraphs of the Investigations, Wittgenstein quotes
Augustine as an example of how language has often been viewed – mainly as naming objects
– and imagines a language-game in which two people build a house using such a language
in which words are simply coordinated with objects. We are asked to conceive of this as a
“complete primitive language” (§2) and to observe that what is described by Augustine is
indeed a “system of communication”:
147. In the following remark, he writes something that is related to my idea about a shift from static possibility
as exemplified by pictures and spaces to the question of application and interpretation: “The thought is picture
and interpretation at the same time. The picture is static, but it is applied in a dynamic context”.
148. In this context, Wittgenstein also speaks of the differences of geometrical and physical possibility when
he states that the word “can” in “The bishop can move only diagonally” is grammatical.
149. In the language-game of §8, the word “this” does indeed have a function, but it is not the function of a
name in the sense of a “rigid designator”. It is radically context dependent. Wittgenstein is here countering the
idea that “this” is the archetype of naming, establishing a direct connection between a word and an object. But
it does so only in a space and could refer to any location within that space, to any move in a game (cf. §38).
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only not everything that we call language is this system.150 And one has to say
this in several cases where the question arises “Will that description do or not?”
The answer is: “Yes, it will, but only for this narrowly circumscribed area, not
for the whole of what you were purporting to describe.”
It is as if someone were to say, “Playing a game consists in moving objects about
on a surface according to certain rules . . .” – and we replied: You seem to be
thinking of board-games, but they are not all the games there are. You can rectify
your explanation by expressly restricting it to those games. (§3)
If one regards the Investigations as the most finished work by Wittgenstein after the Tractatus,
this remark can be seen as the result of the struggles (“over the last 16 years”: 1929–1945)
to overcome the universalism of logical space. The system of the Tractatus, although being
much more elaborate than the primitive language-games considered here, does not achieve
what it aimed for, namely to provide a universal account of language; it can be rectified by
restricting its domain.151
At this point, it is in order to give a brief overview over the first part of the Investigations
which on the one hand marks a deviation from the middle Wittgenstein because it follows a
different, a polyphonic, strategy instead of the more straightforward attempts to find fixable
insights which last up to the Brown Book (cf. Pichler 2004); on the other hand it shows nicely
how the whole idea of spatial thinking is still present and how it is connected with games.
Since I do not have the space here to reconstruct the Investigations in detail (as has been
done by Baker and Hacker in their analytical commentary), I highlight selected passages that
touch the issue of spaces and games.
The first mention of games is set in the context of language learning and not related to
my concern, except for Wittgenstein’s statement that he shall “also call the whole, consisting
of language and the activities into which it is woven, a ‘language-game”’ (§7). However,
considering different kinds of word (cf. §17) already comes closer to the idea of grammatical
spaces with different rules as exemplified in the middle period, especially if we consider
the examples that are given (colours, numbers, physical objects etc.) and the emphasis in
the surrounding remarks on their multiple possibilities of classification depending on how
they will be used.152 Obviously, the term “kinds of word” differs in scope from, is narrower
150. Cf. in 1931: “Augustine describes indeed a calculus, only not everything we call language is this calculus”
(MS111, 18).
151. This is by the way another comparison with relativity theory and its conception of space. Even in General
Relativity, Euclidean Geometry has not disappeared, but become a special case of the variable structure of
space, useful in small dimensions.
152. Remark §12 of the Investigations comes straight from the peak of the space-phase in 1930, where its aim
was to show that words may seem superficially similar, but function very differently in different systems or
spaces (cf. MS107, 231–232).
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than, the frameworks we have encountered so far, but like dimensions of a space, they are
manifolds of possibilities. Wittgenstein distinguishes in the example of someone buying
“five red apples” (§1) and in the (extended) language-game of the “builders” (§8) different
kinds of word which challenge the initial assumption that all words denote objects. In these
games, there are number-words, colour-words, words for kinds of fruit, words for the shapes
of physical bodies, and two kinds of indexical (“this”, “there”). Each of these kinds is a
system, or a space, insofar as one location in this space can only be addressed as opposed to
the other locations in that space which would also be possible: I want apples as opposed to
other kinds of fruit, red ones as opposed to yellow or green ones, and five as opposed to any
other number. Likewise it belongs to the geometry of this space/game that the apples must
have a colour and that there must be a certain number of apples (even zero or “no apples”
would be in “apple-space” as we have seen in section 4.3).
The fact that various of these kinds of words can be used in one language-game already
shows that the scope of such a range is narrower than that of games. Here we re-encounter the
relation of the Tractarian logical space and its sub-spaces, although on a smaller scale, and of
course with the difference that there is not one logical form common to all the sub-forms:
their only principle of unity is that they are jointly used in a certain activity. The kinds of
words may be considered as dimensions of the larger space called “the-builders-game”: the
dimension of shape has four locations, that of number perhaps 26,153 the indexicals point to
any location in either “shape” space (“this”) or the physical playing field (“there”). The first
important thing to note is that there are differences in the way these words are used, but the
second is that there is no a priori determinable and fixed set of kinds of word which could be
given independently of a purpose. How words are grouped together depends essentially on
the aim of classification (cf. §17).
Again, there is a chess analogy to be made about these multiple ways of categorisation:
one could, for example group chess pieces into black and white, but also into pawns and
other pieces and within the latter, knight and bishop might belong to one group and rooks to
another (minor and major pieces). But one could just as well group rook and bishop together
and single out the knights if one wants to distinguish the straight movement of the former
against the more flexible of the latter; the relative value of the pieces may also change over
the course of a game and thereby also the groupings. A similar argument is used with regards
to simplicity: a chess board can be naturally divided into 64 black and white squares and in
this case the squares would be the simple objects which make up its structure and constitute
the possibilities (possible locations for chess pieces). But Wittgenstein suggests different
153. Its symbols are the letters of the alphabet. There is no indication of what happens if higher numbers are
required, the dimension might as well be infinite.
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ways to divide the board, for example, we could take “black and white and the schema of
squares” as simples out of which the whole is composed (§47). Likewise, monochrome
patches would be considered “simple” in most games that deal with colours, but if we talk
about flags, the French Tricolor and the Union Jack do not need to be analysed into their
constituents, but are treated as units (cf. §64). What a simple object is, a possible location in
grammatical space, depends on the purpose of categorisation.
The problem of relative simplicity is connected to the problem of objects and names:
The starting point of these considerations is that what is ordinarily called a simple “thing”
(referred to by a name) can be destroyed (e.g. the sword that is called “Nothung”). However,
sentences using the name still have sense when the thing is destroyed, or even if it never
existed: “Nothung has a sharp blade” (§39). Therefore, it seems, “normal names” cannot
be real names; what the real name refers to, the real object, must be that which cannot be
destroyed. Notoriously, Wittgenstein does not give a definite account of his position, but a
reply along the spatial lines we have highlighted could be reconstructed like this: a word is a
possibility in a space; the “object” it talks about is the special kind of existence for which
destruction is not even possible, like a geometrical point. This would be not too far from
the Tractarian account of objects (“Anyway, the thing about progress is that it always seems
greater than it really is”). In this sense the argument is not directed against his former view.
But it is in another sense, i.e. the following.
Like the objects of the Tractatus, the “things” discussed in the Investigations are supposed
to be simple. However, they are no longer supposed to be absolutely simple as the simple
“points” of an absolute logical space were. Instead they are only simple relative to a given
space in which the standard of simplicity is such that their “constituents” cannot even be
mentioned. In the “space of swords”, Nothung can indeed be considered a simple, but its
only purpose is to distinguish swords from other swords. In most cases, these spaces are, of
course, more complex and have further dimensions so that we speak also of blade and handle
of a sword, or of its colour and shape, and in this sense it is composite. However, simplicity
and compositeness are always context relative:
If I tell someone without any further explanation, “What I see before me now
is composite”, he will legitimately ask, “What do you mean by ‘composite’?
For there are all sorts of things it may mean!” – The question “Is what you
see composite?” makes good sense if it is already established what kind of
compositeness – that is, which particular use of this word – is in question.154
(§47)
154. In this last sentence, the word “use” is quite close to my reading of “space”. This shows once again the
contrast to an account such as Engelmann’s which highlights the difference between the spatial grammar of the
middle period and grammar as use in the late period. Both have the function of providing a context and both are
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The danger Wittgenstein saw in his former account – propositions being pictures of facts
in logical space – was the reification of possibilities. Speaking of a “substance”, which is
indestructible and remains fixed while the configurations of the objects change, admittedly
seems to imply that objects are, well, substantial or even substantival. The argument in the
§§50s of the Investigations is basically a specification, an extension of the Tractatus idea
that these objects are not to be confused with physical objects, but belong to the geometry of
logical space. The difference is that now the idea of a universal logical space is rejected and
that therefore what counts as a simple object depends on the respective space it is used in.
In the space – the game – of measuring length, the prototype metre is (or used to be) part
of a geometry with all its features we have elaborated so far: it constitutes the possibility of
other things to be measured in metres, but it cannot be measured in metres itself; for it is
inconceivable that it turns out that it is not one metre long. This would only be possible if the
standard of a metre had changed. If the metre is defined as the length of a path travelled by
light in a vacuum in a certain time, it is possible to say that the physical platinum bar in Paris
is not exactly one metre long. But this possibility rests on the change of standard, in which
case the prototype metre would have lost its role.155
In an analogous sense colours are “indestructible”. Like the prototype metre is neither one
metre long nor not one metre long, the colour “red” does neither exist nor not exist. However,
this special status of being beyond ordinary existence, of being “timeless” or “indestructible”
(§58) could better be expressed as red being part of a language-game which is, in fact, played.
“Red exists” would then be another way to say that “red has meaning” or “red has a role in
this game”. This latter statement is a statement about the use of the word “red”, not about
the metaphysical nature of red. Hence, the argument is directed against the reification of
grammar as a special sort of existence, which the space-metaphor is perhaps prone to, and
suggests an understanding of meaning as moves in a language-game. This shall become
more relevant when we speak about rule-following (in 6.1.3).
The plurality, that there is not just one way in which words or propositions function, is
clearly a criticism of the undifferentiated position in the Tractatus. There were “forms of
objects”, such as space, time and colour (cf. TLP, 2.0251), but these were all unified in the
considered pluralistic concepts. Engelmann sees that use and grammar are similar, but assumes that grammar
has completely changed its meaning and has nothing to do with the “old grammar” of the Big Typescript.
155. This accounts also for Kripke’s argument that the bar can be measured in inches (for which he assumes a
different standard) and if it is 39.37 inches long then why should it not be one metre long? (cf. Kripke 1980,
54). The point is that if the proposition that the bar is 39.37 inches long is an expression of a definition, of the
translation rule from metres to inches, then the expression is no more informative than saying that the metre bar
is 100 cm long. If, however, it is an empirical observation that the bar is 39.37 inches long and one wants to
say that therefore it is 1 m long, then one takes the standard for what is 1 m long to be dependent on the inch
standard and defines it as 39.37 inches. In this case the metre bar in Paris would again have lost its role as the
standard of measuring in metres.
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most general logical form. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein repeatedly rejects views which
strive for a single and general form of words (cf. §1) and sentences:
There are countless kinds; countless different kinds of use of all the things we
call “signs”, “words”, “sentences”. And this diversity is not something fixed,
given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may
say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can
get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)
The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking
of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
[. . . ] [long list of examples of different language-games]
It is interesting to compare the diversity of the tools of language and of the
ways they are used, the diversity of kinds of word and sentence, with what
logicians have said about the structure of language. (This includes the author of
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.) (§23)
This plea for plurality is followed by the considerations of naming. The discussion of
ostensive definitions centres around the question in which space a certain definition is made.
After reaffirming that a proposition is always a possibility in contrast to other possibilities
in the same space (cf. §20), the diversity of spaces turns out to be a problem. For the bare
expression “this” or the pointing of a finger is empty if one does not know the space in
which “this” is supposed to highlight one location among others. It is acknowledged, that
“one can ostensively define a person’s name, the name of a colour, the name of a material,
a number-word, the name of a point of the compass, and so on” (§28) – but in many cases,
even those enumerated here, the object in question would be defined by the same gesture. To
take again an example from the middle period, let us consider the example of the unknown
word “tove” in the Blue Book:
Let us then explain the word “tove” by pointing to a pencil and saying“ this is
tove” [. . . ] The definition then can be interpreted to mean: – “ This is a pencil”,“
This is round”,“ This is wood”,“ This is one”,“ This is hard”, etc.. etc. (BB, 2)
In the example in the Investigations, the envisaged space is the space of natural numbers and
the place in it which shall be defined is the number “two” – by pointing to two nuts. The
word “number” would help preventing misunderstandings insofar as it “shows what place in
language, in grammar, we assign to the word” (PI, §29). The place of “two” is not a variety
of nuts among others or their size or colour or whatever quality the nuts might have (we
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see that there are “countless” language-games in this sense), but a place in number space
and as such distinguished from other numbers: these nuts are “two” as opposed to “one”,
“three”, “four” etc. Familiarity with number space, with the concept of number and counting,
is a requirement to understand this kind of definition. Wittgenstein also asks wherein the
knowledge of a space consists and anticipates ideas about the crucial role of the use of
language – but even besides these complications, the argument is a good example for the
presence of spatial thinking in his later philosophy. He repeatedly highlights the importance
of the “preparation of a place” (e.g. §31) so that the ostensive definition can have sense:156
the preparation of a place where the object belongs. And in the same remarks the terminology
fluctuates between spatial metaphors and game-terminology: an ostensive definition can be
understood if one knows the “place” of the word, or “what role it is supposed to play” (§30);
one must “already master a language-game” (§33). Again chess pieces in chess space serve
as an analogy (§31).
One central aspect of many of the following remarks is the attempt to undermine the
generalising tendency of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. In passages that I have already
mentioned in the previous, he points out: That the simplicity of objects is not stable, but
depends on the contextual framework which is now crucially tied to linguistic practice and
use (beyond the already mentioned remarks see also §§59–64). That the concept of “game”
is a family of games whose members need not have one thing in common – it is intrinsically
an open concept and cannot therefore be fixed as a disjunction of “all” games (§§66–67).
That even the seemingly meta-logical word “rule” allows for many different interpretations
which can likewise be exemplified with the loose and indeterminate rules of games which
nevertheless and undoubtedly count as games; rules needn’t be fixed but can also be made
up, and even altered, “as we go along” (cf. §§82–84). That proper names can be understood
in many different ways, and different (Russellian) descriptions will do depending on the
context (cf. §87). That the meaning of “exactitude” may vary from one language-game to
another (cf. §88). As does the meaning of “analysis” (cf. §§90–92). That hence there is no
“final analysis” of language, no “single completely resolved form of every expression” (§91).
That Wittgenstein’s “grammatical” investigation is indeed concerned with the possibilities
of phenomena (again §90), but not with the “a priori order of the world: that is the order
of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought” (§97).157 That, unlike
156. A “preparation” in the same sense in which the definition of simultaneity was a preparation of measuring
two events in special relativity. Or like the expectation was the preparation of the place in grammatical space
for the expected event (cf. section 4.5).
157. I take it that the emphasis on possibilities qualifies the expression “a priori order of the world” and
illuminates the relation between Tractatus and Investigations in this point: while there was “no order of things
a priori” (TLP, 5.634) in the sense of substantial truths, there was still an a priori order of possibilities, which
is implied by the expressions of logical form and logical space. Now the Investigations reject even this form of
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Nicod’s simple geometries, Wittgenstein’s simple language-games are not “preparatory
studies for a future regularization of language – as it were first approximations” –, but objects
of comparison, used like a measuring rod, not as a “preconceived idea to which reality must
correspond”. That the particular order, the particular system or space or game, is established
“with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order” (§§130–132).
That the “crystalline purity” of logic, which I take to suggest a system of static elements
(crystalline molecules don’t move) is not the only possible way to look at things, but one
form of representation (§§107–108; cf. MS157b, 3v: “The a priori must become one form of
representation”).158
5.4 Larger Frameworks
5.4.1 Forms of Life
The word language-game, it is said in the Investigations, is used “in order to emphasize
that the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (§23). Hence
forms of life obviously have a larger scope than language-games. To be sure, from the few
remarks that occur in different manuscripts, it is not possible to extract a developed concept.
(The other concepts can be very diverse too, but there is at least a larger textual basis in the
manuscripts to see something like a prototypical use). Nevertheless, the usage of the concept
in those remarks does fall into my range of interest with regards to spatial frameworks. I
suggest seeing forms of life as descendants of earlier „forms“: of the Kantian forms of
intuition, Tractarian logical form, late Wittgenstein’s forms of expression and representation.
In this row, however, they take up a peculiar place.
One indication of them belonging to the group of concepts I am interested in, is that
they are not to be questioned. They resemble the constitutive frameworks we have hitherto
encountered by not being candidates for truth and falsity, but instead determining those
candidates. After having discussed the irreducible nature of following rules, Wittgenstein
calls the shared practices of rule-following, e.g. in mathematics, the “scaffolding from which
a unique order a priori – there are instead many orders of possibilities, but they are only a priori insofar as we
are committed to accept them as frameworks: within the framework some things that belong to its geometry can
then indeed be said to be independent of experience, but no metaphysical truth is expressed in this utterance. It
is a description of forms of expression – and this is obviously not Kant’s use of the term anymore, although
there is a relation.
158. Etymological arguments are not generally Wittgenstein’s style, but his emphasis on “Vorurteil” in §108
reveals a striking ambivalence in this context: the crystalline purity is a priori insofar as it is prior to any
judgment (“vor dem Urteil”), but it also captures the negative connotations of the word “prejudice” insofar as it
needn’t be true.
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our language operates”159 (PI, §240). The conventionalist tone of this remark is immediately
countered:
So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”
– What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that
human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.
(§241)
What is at the basis of our practices is not that people happen to agree on the truth of certain
facts (agreement in opinions), but on the question over what can be true or false. This
agreement is embodied in the way of acting and in the practices of human beings which
Wittgenstein here calls forms of life. The appearance of empirical contingency, which this
concept certainly has and of which more shall be said in the next chapter, is at least weakened
by the word “form” which, in light of Wittgenstein’s previous use of formal concepts, gives it
a kind of logical connotation. The same reminder is in place when looking at another mention
of forms of life that can also be explained with their constitutive function: “What has to be
accepted – the given – are forms of life” (PPF, §345). Instead of trying to find an ultimate
foundation of knowledge in sense-data (the “given” for phenomenologists), Wittgenstein
points out that all that has to be accepted is the framework which first of all enables any
sort of meaningful discourse or action. In this remark, the plural is important: otherwise
it might suggest an unquestioning acceptance of the one framework or form of life one is
placed in. However, the plural is a reminder of the possibility of different frameworks which
may not yet exist, but which become conceivable once the current framework is sufficiently
clarified. In order to change the status quo, one first needs to accept it. One can indeed
imagine other forms of life which Wittgenstein explicitly mentions in combination with
imagining languages: “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” (PI, §19).160
Anyway, the remark is not made in the context of politics and tradition, but in the context
of mathematics in which the term “given” also has its place.161 Mathematics as a science
depends indeed on the shared practice of mathematicians and, perhaps even stronger, on
159. Note that also in the Tractatus “spatial” concepts were described with the image of “scaffolding” (cf. TLP,
3.42; 4.023; 6.124). A scaffolding is something stable and necessary from which more dynamic and optional
movements can be performed. Juliet Floyd also hints at the contrast to Hilbert’s metaphor of “Fachwerk” which
is integrated into the building, whereas scaffolding can be removed and rebuilt in new ways while the building
stays the same (private conversation, cf. Floyd 2018, 78). Thus the logically conventionalist element of “spaces”
would be accounted for with this imagery, too.
160. Wittgenstein mentions languages that consist only of orders or questions (§19). One could also think
of something like Jorge Luis Borges’ story Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius where a people is sketched that has a
language tailored to radical philosophical idealism. Imagining these languages can also help us get clearer
about our own form of life.
161. I owe this observation to Felix Mühlhölzer.
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ordinary people who engage in mathematical activities. At the same time “real mathematics”
in Wittgenstein’s sense consists not in just acting in accordance with inherited rules, but in
developing one’s own rules. In doing so, one is at the same time acting within a form of life –
the cultural practice of mathematics – as well as changing its rules.
5.4.2 Style and Picture
The notion of “style” can be understood in two senses both of which are present in Wittgen-
stein’s writings as Sabine Plaud (2011) has pointed out. First, it is used in the sense of the
style of an individual, the aesthetical appearance of an artefact which recognisably links
it to a specific person. The relevance of style in this sense can be seen in Wittgenstein’s
emphasis on his style of writing which is reflected in the endless revisions of his remarks as
well as in explicit comments on style. While these often bemoan his shortcomings against
an apparently very high stylistic standard, some are more reflective and indicate something
super-individual about style: “Style is the expression of a general human necessity” (MS183,
23). “To write the right style is to place the carriage exactly straight on the rails” (MS117,
225). It is striking that stylistic matters seem to be closely related to the notion of grammar as
delineated in the preceding chapters. When discussing grammatical differences, Wittgenstein
describes his attitude as a special sensitivity towards stylistic matters:
In a certain sense for us – that is in grammar – there are no “small differences”.
Anyway, the word “difference” means something completely different here than
when we speak of differences between things.
A philosopher feels changes in the style of a derivation which a contemporary
mathematician passes over calmly with a blank face. (TS213, 643r)162
In the Investigations, such a change of style – not in mathematics, but in philosophical
language – is characterised as a “grammatical movement”, as a new way to conceive of, in
this case, sensations. In fact, Wittgenstein suggests that comparing this move to a style is
preferable to the expression “discovering a grammatical movement”, presumably because it
sounds too realist (cf. section 6.2.2): “Above all, you have found a new conception. As if
you had invented a new way of painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song” (PI
§401).
The collective rather than individual account of style, which shines through these remarks,
hints towards the second sense of “style” which Plaud characterises as “a framework or
162. Note the new context of this remark after its transferral from MS111 where this connection to styles was
missing (quoted in section 5.2.1).
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as an a priori pattern of thought” (2011, 77). She shows this second sense to be rooted in
the German tradition, in art history and cultural history in general. Oswald Spengler, for
example, understood style in this second sense which may well be one of the ways in which
he influenced Wittgenstein – his name is on the list of influences with Hertz, Boltzmann,
Russell, etc. (see chapter 2). My claim is that this sense is connected to Wittgenstein’s
usage of “spatial” concepts which, like “style”, can be conceived as frameworks that a priori
constitute possibilities of thought and expression. For Spengler, a style is connected to his
notion of culture which according to his historiography in The Decline of the West rise and
fall and follow each other according to certain repeating patterns. The style of a culture
determines the way in which it expresses and organises religious, intellectual, social or
economic matters; hence it is not something individual, but a collective framework (cf. Plaud
2011, 86–89).163
Spengler understands the style of a culture very similar to what he calls a culture’s
“world picture” (Weltbild) or also Weltanschauung. An interesting echo of this is found in
Wittgenstein’s mention of Spengler in the pre-stage of the Investigations when he describes
the method of “perspicuous presentation” as central to his own style and considers: “Perhaps
a kind of the ‘Weltanschauung’. Spengler” (TS220, 80).164
In her article, Plaud elaborates her intuition that world picture and style belong together
for both Spengler and Wittgenstein, and I agree: both concepts belong to the orbit of a priori
frameworks, spaces etc. However, picture plays a very versatile role in this whole conceptual
field. We have already seen that Hertz’s concept of Bild belongs to it. Like Hertz suggested a
new Bild in his Principles, Wittgenstein suggested a new Bild in his Tractatus, a picture of
which he later said that it “held us captive” (PI, §115). As it stands, this use of Bild is a bit
obscure. Is it a simile, an analogy? Or is it a framework of possibilities, a space? In the latter
case, being held captive by it would amount to hypostatising a form of representation to an a
priori necessity of reality. “One thinks that one is tracing nature over and over again, and
one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it” (§114).
163. A strong influence on Wittgenstein can be seen in his pessimistic sketches from 1930 which have
been published by his editors as the preface of the Philosophical Remarks. In these remarks, Wittgenstein
follows Spengler’s tenor and terminology by speaking of his time as “civilisation” and Unkultur, words which
characterise their time as the late stage of a culture in decline (cf. MS109, 204–5).
164. In the final version, this takes the form of a question: “Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?” (§122). Wittgenstein
is here not objectively considering or diagnosing faulty frameworks, but conceives of his own world picture as
one out of several possible ones. This question is perhaps another reason not to dogmatically take Wittgenstein’s
own method as the way to do philosophy, but as a suggestion that proves fruitful and seems appropriate to
him. Kuusela also rightly points out that this “method of perspicuous presentation” may be one method, but
perspicuity is achievable in various ways and therefore there is no contradiction to the remark that there are in
fact “methods, different therapies, as it were ” (PI, §133; cf. Kuusela 2008, 269).
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A Weltbild, a world picture, can hold us captive, too, but has a larger scope than analogies
that determine the representation of rather specific situations. Instead, world picture seems
to be connected to forms of life, frameworks that determine the way we look at the world
as a whole. Indeed, Wittgenstein uses the word like this in On Certainty where it is almost
interchangeable with style and form of life (also the “spatial” terminology of “scaffolding”
reappears).
The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the
starting-point of belief for me. (OC, §209)
Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps
it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the
scaffolding of our thoughts. (Every human being has parents.) (OC, §211)
What is interesting about these large framework in the last writings is that Wittgenstein
speaks of them as forming a system of undoubted propositions. Importantly they feature
again some kind of systematicity or even totality, although it is clear that it is not a totality in
the Tractatus sense. The frameworks again constitute what cannot be doubted within it and
they again show the systematicity we have marked as a criterion of spatial frameworks in the
wider sense:
When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single propo-
sition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the
whole.) (OC, §141)
It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which conse-
quences and premises give one another mutual support. (OC, §142)
Our Knowledge builds a great system. And only in this system has the particular
the value which we attribute to it. (OC, §410)
These kinds of framework are again characterised as a kind of mythology which was already
a typical expression for the frameworks of notations and symbolisms. Wittgenstein here
alludes to the ambivalences of frameworks that I shall discuss in the next chapter. On the
one hand, the frameworks are unquestioned certainties which are beyond true and false, but
determine the candidates for truth. On the other hand, they are themselves “inherited” and
learned “practically” which implies that they themselves could be different: only their role
gives them the seemingly necessary, “geometrical” status.
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But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness:
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited
background against which I distinguish between true and false.
The propositions describing this world-picture165 might be part of a kind of
mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be
learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules (OC, §§94–95).
It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since
one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical propositions
into a norm of description.
Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances
in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that takes place when there
is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He
has got hold of a definite world-picture – not of course one that he invented: he
learned it as a child. I say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the
matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned.
(OC, §67)
The last remark indicates that Wittgenstein also assumes some influence of world-pictures
on the sciences. This opens up some interesting connections between Wittgensteinian
thinking and his contemporaries, especially Ludwik Fleck’s theory of styles of thinking. Via
Fleck the idea that scientific practice is constituted by the framework of possibilities in which
it is pursued influenced Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigms which may have some more
similarities with Wittgenstein’s grammar than generally assumed. In the last chapter, I will
also indicate ways in which the idea of constitutive frameworks is at work in the debate on
the “relativized a priori” in science. This debate, too, originates in the abstraction of space
and geometry and led to the assumption of local a priori principles in science (cf. Stump
2015).166
5.5 Summary
I have investigated a number of concepts in order to show that spatial thinking and, related
to it, grammatical thinking is not given up completely after the middle period, but that its
165. The translation is not consistent: in both cases (“picture of the world”, “world-picture”) the German is
Weltbild.
166. I give a more detailed account of this relation in my forthcoming paper Beyond “logical absolutism”.
Wittgenstein and the relativized a priori.
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functions had been shared with a number of concepts before the Big Typescript some of
which survive until the very last writings. The variety of usages for the space concept, which
I discussed in chapter 4, is expressed here through the fact that all these related concepts are
pluralist concepts. Wittgenstein did not strive for just one notation (the phenomenological
language was really just a short project he was very sceptical about from the start), but his
use of notation is compatible with the pluralist and creative account of space, form, theory
etc. which I discussed. Likewise, he did not strive for a “comprehensive grammar” which
would account for all kinds of language use; grammar has always been differentiated which
shows itself in the pluralist concepts that are related to it.
The investigation of these concepts has led to two problems which have implicitly already
been mentioned: first, the problem of the static nature of space; second, the problem that logic
is supposed to be independent of all experience, but that sometimes empirical propositions
function like logical ones. And that the only justification for their logical status is: their
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Nicht unfruchtbar wäre es, die
Geschichte der neueren Philosophie
unter dem Aspekt zu behandeln, wie sie
mit dem Antagonismus von Statik und
Dynamik im System sich abfand
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik
The disintegration into several concepts reflects an increasing dissatisfaction with the
conception of language as organised in space-like a priori structures. I have argued, however,
that instead of simply being dismissed, many of the functions of spaces are taken up by other
concepts as has been shown in the last chapter. In the following, I shall look closer at this
transformation from spatial frameworks into more dynamic and flexible frameworks, but also
how they lose their strictly a priori status and become intertwined with experience.167
I shall first look at the role of space’s sister concept time which becomes increasingly
important in the 1930s. The word-frequencies and contexts discussed in section 5.3.1 suggest
that calculi and games replace spaces and this raises the question why they do so and
how they are preferable. As has been shown, they are not something completely new, but
share important features with spaces. However, they differ in being more dynamic than the
static spaces of possible locations. After briefly sketching the literal occurrences of time
in Wittgenstein’s writings – mainly investigations of time in terms of spatial concepts – I
shall reverse these priorities in the second section and look at the transformations of spatial
167. A priori is here understood in a minimal sense as independent of experience – without the Kantian
apodicticity.
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frameworks under a temporal perspective. The contrast between a space of static possibilities
and dynamic games shall be central.
In the second part of this chapter, I look at another consequence of this temporalisation.
By becoming temporal, spaces have also become historical. By having become changeable,
constitutive frameworks now appear as historical facts which can themselves be studied like
empirical objects and events. The important tension between their function as logical, a
priori, and constitutive frames on the one hand and their own empirical nature and (implied)
fallibility on the other hand shall be studied by means of two contrasting juxtapositions:
the first distinction is one between a prescriptive understanding of rules and a descriptive
approach to regularities. The second is one between grammatical realism and an emphasis on
creativity and construction. My view highlights the ambiguities in each of these distinctions:
Wittgenstein refuses to take a clear position to either of them and acknowledges the descriptive
as well as prescriptive and creative aspects of language.
6.1 Space and Time
In light of the transition from spaces to calculi and finally to games, it seems that time plays
a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s later work. In this section I try to answer the question what
that role might be, albeit in a different way than one might expect. For the short answer
is that time is not as important as space as a methodical tool for Wittgenstein. Although it
does repeatedly occur as a problem in his writings, I cannot see the systematic unity in its
treatment that I suggest with regards to space. Before investigating how it does nevertheless
affect my reading of spaces as grammatical frameworks, I shall look at some examples in
which time and temporal issues are dealt with. In this excursus, I highlight the remarkable
absence of time in the Tractatus as well as some arguments about time which seem to be
relatively isolated in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre.
While these issues deal more or less directly with time, they touch my actual research
question only in an indirect way. After the excursus, I shall turn the focus back on space and
spatial frameworks, but under the aspect of their being implicitly affected by considerations
of time. My claim is that the disappearance of space as a central concept after the middle
period is motivated by the increasing acceptance of language as a temporal phenomenon. The
first step to substantiate this claim is to see what happens to the concept of spatial frameworks
as the terminology changes: I suggest that the emergence of new concepts, notably calculus
and language-game, is related to the disappearance of space and that they are, at least partly,
introduced in order to replace it. As we have seen, they share central features with spaces,
but differ by being essentially temporal frameworks, insofar as they treat of moves instead of
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static locations. Moreover, the frameworks themselves are considered changeable. Thus the
“objects” in space as well as the “geometry” itself become dynamic.
Calculi and games are rule-governed frameworks. The problem of rule-following can
be conceived in terms of the clash of the two images we have encountered: on the one
hand the static space-concept which assumes all of its possibilities to be simultaneously,
or rather timelessly, determined by geometrical rules; on the other hand the concept of
dynamic games in which we can never quite anticipate the application of the rule, at least
not all applications, as they depend on unforeseeable interpretations for future situations. As
language is increasingly conceived in terms of use, the static picture of space becomes less
attractive. The problems of generality and intentionality shall be readdressed in this section
as well as the shifting use of the term “rule”.
6.1.1 Excursus: Wittgenstein on Time
It is striking that of Kant’s two forms of intuition only space had this fertile career in
mathematics, philosophy, and the sciences, whereas time has often been treated as somewhat
mysterious or simply subsumed under spatial concepts. This is in fact what happened to time
in the Tractatus.168 Scholars have noticed that its system, and notably the notion of logical
space, is essentially a static affair, especially if considered in contrast to Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy (cf. Hyder 2002, 196; Pilch 2017, 23; Sluga 2017, 417). On the few occasions
where time is mentioned, it is treated in a spatialised way, as just one dimension of logical
space which itself is timeless, a “form of objects” (cf. TLP, 2.0121; 2.0251) where “form” is
closely related to the idea of a space of simultaneous possibilities as we have seen in chapter
3.169 Later in the Tractatus there is a brief hint to a vaguely Kantian understanding of time
as form which cannot itself be experienced and therefore cannot be compared to processes in
time (TLP, 6.3611). The distinction between eternity and temporal infinity as well as the
relegation of ethics and value to an unspatial and untemporal (and ineffable) realm seem to
be motivated by a Kantian reasoning, too (TLP, 6.431 ff.).
168. It is possible to highlight certain remarks in the Tractatus that stress the activity character of thinking
(TLP, 3.326; 3.5) and the operational account of logic. This would make language already dynamic in the
early philosophy. While there may indeed be such an intuition already contained in the Tractatus, I do not
think that Wittgenstein was aware of it because the overall impression, not least the space imagery, is decidedly
static. This static imagery may of course be one of the “steps of the ladder” which are, according to some
resolute readings, to be understood as transitory nonsense. But given Wittgenstein’s later use of spaces and his
self-criticism, I do not consider this a plausible reading. In any case, the temptation to conceive of possible
applications as predetermined and reified locations remains important for Wittgenstein in his later writings.
169. This tendency to conceive of time in spatial terms survives until Wittgenstein’s very last writings: “A
description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance)” (PPF, §70).
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In Wittgenstein’s middle period, problems with time occur in various contexts. One
rather puzzling strand of arguments comes up in September 1930. In these passages, a
series of oppositions is presented which are, as so often in Wittgenstein, understandable
enough in themselves, but it is not clear why these problems are raised in the first place. The
main contrast is between time and truth-functions and the criterion for their comparison is
their respective universality or generality: can both be applied to all kinds of proposition?
Wittgenstein expresses an intuition that they cannot, that time is, in some sense, less general
than negation or disjunction.170 What comes closest to a proof of this intuition is that
mathematical propositions and some immediate – to use a slightly inapt expression – protocol
sentences (“The sky is blue.”)171 are timeless, but the truth-functions can still be applied to
them; hence time would be less general than truth-functionality. But more often the difference
is presented as a kind of feeling: time “tastes” of content, truth-functions of form; the former
is “coloured”, the latter “dim”;172 time corresponds to what is pictured, truth-functions to
the frame of the picture; time is phenomenological, truth-functions are logical (cf. MS109,
120–133). These remarks are transferred to TSS211 and 212 and finally form a sub-chapter
of the Big Typescript with the title “Is time essential to propositions? Comparison between:
time and truth-functions” (TS213, 113–116). This seems to give them some relevance, as
170. These are apparently treated as truth-functions here, not as operations – thereby deviating from the
terminology of the Tractatus. Then again, this may be explained with Wittgenstein’s focus on the difference
between what he calls the “logic of content” and the “logic of form” (MS109, 130) instead of the difference
between functions and operations which both belong to the logic of form (It remains unclear what the “logic of
content” is and this may be the reason why Wittgenstein does not come back to this issue after 1932).
171. Obviously, the use of these sentences is less scientific than the Vienna Circle’s protocol sentences which
were meant to record a given observation at a certain time What they have in common is their supposed
certainty as opposed to constructed propositions according to hypothetical rules. Carnap developed his ideas
of a protocol language at about the same time. He published them in his essay Die physikalische Sprache als
Universalsprache der Wissenschaft’ (1931) in which Wittgenstein recognised his own “work in progress” which
he had shared with members of the Vienna Circle. He particularly insisted that the notion of hypotheses, which,
unlike protocol sentences, can never be verified completely, had been used by Carnap without referencing
its origin. As a consequence, Wittgenstein broke off his connection to Carnap and with the Vienna Circle
in general, only occasionally meeting with Schlick and Waismann in the years to come (cf. Stadler 1997,
475–480).
172. Mihai Ometiţă, who offers a good description of the disintegration of logical space and the role of colours,
misunderstands this distinction when he translates bunt and matt as “multicoloured” and “faint”: he interprets
faint as (intellectually, philosophically) weak and holds that this shows Wittgenstein’s crumbling account
of logical form which gives way to a “multicoloured – that is heterogeneous – logic” (Ometiţă 2017, 152).
However, “bunt” is not used as opposed to monochrome here, but to German “matt” in the sense of English
“dim” or “opaque”; far from being philosophically weak the temptation to conceive of logical form as a sort of
dim shadow of reality remains strong in Wittgenstein in these years (in fact, he never abandons it completely
despite recognising the problems of this imagery). See for instance this remark which also shows the connection
to geometry: “The so-called geometrical line stands to a colour boundary not like something fine to something
coarse, but like possibility to reality (think of the understanding of possibility as the shadow of reality)” (MS114,
15). Ometiţă is right in stressing the general opposition between universal logical form and local grammatical
spaces; but in this case he is right for the wrong reasons.
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the chapter headings provide a good overview over the topics that occupied the “middle
Wittgenstein”.173 But one must not forget that this typescript was mainly a collection of
material for further revision. The remarks about time and truth-functions undergo a first stage
of revisions with handwritten addenda, but are not used any further in later projects, in the
corpus of the Philosophical Grammar, MS116 or the various versions of the Investigations.
As a consequence they are ignored even by scholars who work on “Wittgenstein and Time”
(e.g. Hintikka 1996; Schulte 2006; Sluga 2017) – and this is understandable: those remarks
may be worth a detailed study as a local topic of the “middle Wittgenstein”, but it seems to
be not much more than that.
Apart from these arguments, which mention time explicitly as an object of interest,
temporal issues seem to have a largely illustrative purpose. Most occurrences are variations
of the general method to distinguish different grammatical spaces. Scholars have, for
example, noticed the contrast between physical time (“information time”) and experienced
time (“memory time”) which correspond to different ways of verification (cf. Schulte 2006;
Hintikka 1996). Different grammars constitute different conceptions of time: on the one
hand a measurable sequence of distinct states and on the other an indeterminate continuum of
past events leading to an ever moving end-point which is ontologically privileged and called
“present”. Like exactitude had different meanings in visual space and physical space, so time
is understood differently whether it is verified by introspection or physical measurement.
This was what should be exemplified by the analogy of the film-projector: the film-strip
and the screen are different grammatical systems with different possibilities, possibilities
of verification and possibilities of alternatives.174 Reflections on time that are based on
this train of thought also occur in the form of an argument on the seemingly fleeting reality
which cannot be captured in language (cf. VoW, 321) or in a reply to Russell’s idea that
the world could have been created five minutes ago.175 In both cases, Wittgenstein would
point out the impossibility to account for the absolute exactitude that seems to be required
for fixing a fleeting experience, or the absolute certainty that underlies Russell’s speculations:
173. As a synopsis of the years 1929–1932, the Big Typescript’s structure represents the “late middle Wittgen-
stein”, that is, the sections and sub-sections are titled according to topics which Wittgenstein considered
important in 1932. Therefore the headings can help to understand what problems shall be addressed with the
sometimes rather puzzling remarks. They are often literally identical or very similar to the manuscripts, but less
understandable than those because they appear out of their original context; however, the section in the Big
Typescript gives them a new context, not necessarily one of structured argument, but one of thematic belonging.
The order of the remarks in each section may not always form a coherent argument, but the order of the sections
is by no means arbitrary.
174. Jaakko Hintikka interprets this within a larger contrast between perspectival and ordinary identification,
memory and experience belonging to the former, physical time belonging to the latter (cf. Hintikka 1996).
175. Contrary to Sluga’s view, these questions are not only dealt with in Wittgenstein’s last years (cf. Sluga
2017, 437), but already in his lectures from 1933 which are clearly related to his ideas about verification, sense,
and grammar which he had developed in the preceding years (cf. MN 2016, 294).
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in the absence of a method of verification it has no sense to strive for such an unreachable
linguistic ideal. This warning against misleading ideals is a recurring theme in the writings
from the early 30s; at this time Wittgenstein also starts quoting St. Augustine who shall
become his most frequent reference to the philosophical tradition. A quote by Augustine
from 1930 (cf. MS108, 272) is reused in the Investigations where the interlocutor wonders
how a proposition can serve its “extraordinary” role in representing reality; to the typically
Wittgensteinian answer “nothing is concealed”, he would reply: “yes, but it all goes by so
quickly, and I should like to see it, as it were, more fully laid out.” (PI, §435). – And indeed
Wittgenstein warns at this point about the temptation of a phenomenological language which
is a philosophical “dead end” (cf. also MS113, 123v) and quotes Augustine’s dictum that the
words of time measurement are used frequently and without problems in ordinary language
and yet remain obscure and mysterious as if they had to be discovered anew (cf. PI, §436;
Confessions, book 11, ch. 22).
Book 11 of the Confessions differs from the preceding books by being less “confessional”,
less autobiographical, and more philosophical. Its topic is time. Wittgenstein takes another
example from this chapter in order to illustrate his method. He quotes Augustine’s question
“what is time?”, which is tied to the use of time expressions and methods of time measurement,
first in 1931 (MS111, 137) and later in the Investigations where it is cited as an example of a
“grammatical investigation” (§90).176
Similarly, Wittgenstein invokes Einstein as an ally in focusing on methods of measure-
ment:177 “what Einstein has taught the world: our method of time measurement belongs to
the grammar of our time expressions” (MS119, 116v). And like Einstein, Wittgenstein aims
to investigate “the clocks with which we measure the phenomena” (MS164, 82). In all these
cases, time seems to be no more than an example for the requirement to look at grammar
instead of searching for the essence of a concept, to think about ways of verification instead
of a seemingly straightforward quest for truth; comparisons to metrics occur in all kinds of
contexts of his philosophy and are not restricted to time measurement. Thus I shall in the
following focus more on structural ramifications of the general move from abstract and static
logical spaces to concrete and dynamic language-games (which should not be understood as
an alternative to logic, but as a new form of logic: as something temporal and changeable).
Therefore, I shall once again turn to calculi and games as the dynamic descendants of static
spaces.
176. It is perhaps significant that Augustine’s puzzle is based on a confusion of measurement of time with
measurement of space. However, one must be careful not to interpret too much into Wittgenstein quotes of
other thinkers. They often take a very specific role in the new context which can be quite remote from the
original one.
177. For a detailed study of Wittgenstein’s references to Einsteinian time metrics see Kusch 2011.
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6.1.2 Dynamic Frameworks: Calculi and Games Reconsidered
We have seen in the last chapter that “calculus” accounts for a number of the functions of
“space”. What are the differences? Why does it seem to replace “spaces” as the frequencies
of their occurrences suggest? Wittgenstein never makes them explicit, but there are some,
as it were, analytic differences, in the concepts themselves. One is that, unlike to “space”,
there is a verb to the noun “calculus”, namely “to calculate”, kalkulieren.178 So unlike space
a calculus is inherently connected to something that is done, not something that timelessly
stays in its place. Like spaces, calculi account for possibilities, but these possibilities are
possible “steps” or “moves”, in any case activities which are actually performed, not abstract
logical locations in a formalised space. To be sure, a calculus is still a very formal concept
and one can, in principle, abstract from concrete calculations; but the mere possibility of
conceiving in terms of activities what formerly was conceived in terms of static locations
moves the idea of grammar away from “space” and towards “language-games” in which we
have to do with activities without any doubt.
The notion of the proposition, hence of understanding and of the thought, must
certainly justify the possibility of the calculus. And the calculus takes place in
time, it is – so to speak – spread out. (MS109, 182)
Is it like this: Only language as a phenomenon that is extended in time has
grammar. (MS109, 288)
Mathematics is a calculus and the calculus does not say of any sign that it was
merely possible, but it deals only with those signs with which it actually operates.
(MS113, 98v)
The last remark takes up the Tractatus idea that nothing in logic, and this applies to language
as well as to mathematics, can be “merely possible”. However, it does not connect this notion
to a “modal realist” sphere of “all possibilities” (TLP, 2.0121), but ties this idea of actuality
to actual use, to the activity of calculation.
What makes calculi more dynamic than spaces is that, while both are frameworks of
possibilities, spaces constitute possible locations, whereas calculi constitute possible moves;
the former refer to knowledge of a grammatical place, the latter to a form of “know-how”, a
capability to perform certain moves. This slight shift of emphasis brings up new problems
178. The connection of verbs and time shows itself in the fact, that the German word for verb is Zeitwort, a
term Wittgenstein uses a lot in order to accentuate the – sometimes misleading – temporal character of verbs,
e.g.: “The Zeitwort “to want” makes us compare the activity of wanting with the activity of carrying out what is
wanted” (MS115, 106).
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which shall become more relevant in the context of rules: when do I know how to do
something? What does the “know-how” consist in? What is the grammar of “can”? And
how are the rules of the calculus to be interpreted in individual cases?179 In principle, these
questions could be asked about knowledge of a place as well, but they are far less obvious.
Knowing a place is much more conceived as a sort of permanent state of knowledge, while
knowing how to do something raises a lot of questions as to what it is to understand a rule
and to be able to follow it, which repeatedly come up in Wittgenstein’s later thinking.
What is at the basis of the word “can” in “I can now go on writing myself” is
only the idea of the variable expression (hence, the idea of a sign, again only a
tile in the calculus which itself only unfolds in time) and, say, the computations
of a few further numbers “in the head”. (MS110, 295)
Similarly, the rules of games are inherently connected to their applications, that is, to activities.
In the late 30s, the connection from language-games to human activity is expressed in a
number of remarks:
The basic form of a game must be one in which actions take place. (MS119,
77v)
To describe a language-game is to describe the actions of human beings [. . . ]
There is something in our language that we call the description of activities,
things etc. and also something that we call the description of images, impressions.
The ‘description of a language-game’ is of the first kind. (MS119, 147r–148r)
While the last remark mentions the ambiguity of “description” of which more shall be said in
section 6.2, here the emphasis on activity is more relevant; it returns in the later statement that
the word “language-game” indicates “that the speaking of language is part of an activity” (PI,
§23). That the language-games with which Wittgenstein describes philosophical problems
are dynamic is emphasised in other parts of the Investigations as well. We have seen that
parts of the discussions in the first 30 paragraphs can be conceived in terms of constitutive
frameworks whose internal oppositions are important criteria for their sense: the contextual
space in which one thing is marked as opposed to others is a requirement for the thing
(proposition, sign) to have sense. Different spaces with different oppositions are listed in §33
179. One way to put it is that up to this point “possibility” was the dominating problem, in the three senses of
possibility mentioned in chapter 3, but also in the sense of grammatical spaces in the middle period which allow
for different possibilities. In the course of the middle period, the interpretation of rules which seem to determine
the possible applications straightforwardly, becomes more problematic: “Everything is now contained in the
‘interpretation’. How the problem changes its house!” (MS109, 67).
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(all involve the colour blue: which shows that the meaning is not contained in the sign “blue”,
but in the circumstances that open up the grammatical space of a situation). Here we find
the first indication of a central problem in the relations of space, time, and grammar. One
is tempted to conceive of the meaning of a word or a sentence as an entity or event which
accompanies the utterance. We have seen Wittgenstein’s initial inclination to understand
meaning as something that depends on a system, as a place in a space, i.e. a place as opposed
to other places in this space. As soon as the places are no longer simultaneously existing
points, but temporally distinguished moves, these two conceptions – the timeless space and
the temporal game – become incompatible. “Directing one’s attention to something” does
not only consist in a mental event parallel to some physical activity such as turning one’s
head; “these and similar things happen while one ‘directs one’s attention to this or that”’.
But it also includes the circumstances of the utterance, what has happened before it and how
the respective addressee reacts to it – and also how the words were used in the past and how
people have reacted to it. These circumstances sum up to a pattern of normal usage which
constitutes the meaning of the phrase in a given situation, but not to a space whose points are
predetermined by a timeless geometry.180 What does a move in chess consist in? It “doesn’t
consist only in pushing a piece from here to there on the board – nor yet in the thoughts and
feelings that accompany the move: but in the circumstances that we call ‘playing a game of
chess’, ‘solving a chess problem’, and the like.”
While one may well call such an assembly of circumstances a “space”, one decisive
weakness of the space metaphor is its static nature. The notion of calculus already shifts
the emphasis from possible locations to possible activities, and this shift is continued in the
development of the game-metaphor. It further improves the idea of calculi by being more
open and flexible while still keeping the notion of context-relative exactitude and necessity.
The game metaphor is similar to space in that it illustrates the possibilities and the variety
of different forms of frameworks (it illustrates the openness perhaps even better, cf. PI
§§66–67); but it is more adequate with regards to practical questions insofar as the notion of
rules is more relaxed and does not include a fixed entity “geometry” which – once in place –
determines all steps rigorously and timelessly: “time” gets more important as the focus shifts
towards the application of language in the later philosophy.
180. There is a sense in which grammar is timeless: Hacker insists that mathematical propositions and
grammatical rules like “red is darker than pink” are not subject to temporal change (Baker and Hacker 2009,
279). Kuusela, with his focus on method, suggests that using a language-game as an object of comparison
is to “freeze” a situation so that it is perspicuous enough to be described. This illustrates his point of simple
language-games as tools for clarification, but it does not account for the inherently dynamic character of the
concept of “game” nor for the change of language-game in the more complicated sense: the use of a word in all
its variety (cf. Kuusela 2019b, 159).
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6.1.3 Rules and their Application in Time
As shown, an important sense in which the analogy between language and games is illuminat-
ing stems from the fundamental difference between calculi and games on the one hand and
static spaces on the other. Since the former treat of moves and actions, since language-games
are linked to activities (cf. PI, §§7, 23), the question arises what knowledge of grammar, of
the rules of a language-game, consists in.
The first assumption that leads to a static understanding of language is the idea of a
proposition as a picture.181 The second is the complementary metaphor of logical space
which treats of a proposition, its negation, its implications, and possible combinations as
locations none of which is preferred in a temporal or logical sense; all are equally present as
possibilities. What the space metaphor suggests is hence a sort of simultaneous presence of
the whole system. With the shift of emphasis from static pictures, which timelessly “exist”
as possibilities in logical space, to systems of possible operations, moves, and actions the
question of what it is to know the sense of a proposition becomes one of what it is to know
how to use a proposition, to know which moves may be performed in a certain game. “The
grammar of ‘to know’ is evidently closely related to the grammar of ‘can’, ‘is able to”’
(PI, §150a). Now, with the spatial metaphor in mind, it seems as if “to be able to” must
consist in the presence of the whole system in one’s mind. Admittedly, this is already hard
to imagine within the space-paradigm since logical space was conceived as infinite, as is
indeed Euclidean geometry; but the temptation is understandable with regards to limited
spaces such as the logical space for two elementary propositions as used in the Tractatus
(see section 3.2). These were supposed to be complete and each proposition, each location
in it, was internally connected to all others. Likewise, in the middle period, the emphasis
on the systematic character of conceptual frameworks seemed to imply, as Russell observed
with regards to colour space, that making a colour statement includes something about “all
the other colours” (Russell 1968, 168). As if a grammatical representation of colour space,
for example the “colour-octahedron” (MS107, 282), was present as a whole in the mind of
someone who speaks about colours.
Even though there were good reasons to introduce the metaphors of picture and space
and to emphasise the systematicity of language in general, there are many ways to challenge
this conception. One can, for example, point out the danger of reifying possibilities: if I
could have said something, this possibility does not imply an actual presence in the mind
– the method of the Tractatus was to treat all possibilities as if they were actual, but it did
not speak of logic being “in the mind”. However, this kind of psychologism appears as a
181. Consider for example Lessing’s essay Laocoon (1873) where he famously divides the arts into static
visual arts and the temporal arts of language which leads to different possibilities and limits.
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recurring enemy or temptation in Wittgenstein’s writings. The problem is addressed in the
treatment of infinity and generality (are all, potentially infinite, possibilities that fall under
a general statement real?) and exactitude (how can the inexactitude of the visual field be
present in one’s mind?). While these lines are discussed in some detail in the manuscripts
of the middle period, the late Wittgenstein conceives of this problem in terms of temporal
questions.
The game of chess has repeatedly been compared to a space or a calculus. There is,
however, another, a different, angle from which Wittgenstein approaches this analogy:
If I say, that knowing how to play chess consists in knowing the rules, is this
knowledge of the rules in some way contained in every move? In a certain
sense, it seems, yes! For otherwise a future experience was required to find out
whether he is really playing chess; that is, “he is playing chess” would then be
a hypothesis which could as such only be confirmed by experience, but never
proven. On the other hand it seems that there is, in a certain sense, no doubt
possible that I am playing chess and in this sense it has to be contained in what
is now going on in my move. (MS110, 53)
“When can you play chess?” (MS110, 235) – this question is repeated many times through-
out the Nachlass and also in the Investigations.182 At one point, it is even compared to
Augustine’s attempt to understand time by means of the question “when do I measure a
period of time?” (MS111, 137), but it is clear that we are speaking neither about chess
nor about time itself, but about the temporal nature of language in a fundamental sense.
While Augustine speaks about time, the question now is whether, in general, “meaning” or
“knowledge” are themselves to be understood temporally. Is the knowledge of the grammar
of a word a timeless state? A momentary state of mind? And how does this go together with
the conception of meaning as use which is clearly not reducible to a single state? Do you
know how to play chess “all the time? or just while making a move? And the whole of chess
during each move? – How queer that knowing how to play chess should take such a short
time, and a game so much longer!” (slip of paper, after §149).
The complete remark about the connection between knowing and being-able-to goes as
follows:
The grammar of the word ‘to know’ is evidently closely related to the grammar
of the word ‘can’, ‘is able to’. But also closely related to that of the word ‘to
understand’ (to ‘master’ a technique). (§150)
182. The question occurs on a slip of paper which is clipped to the typescript of the Investigations TS227 after
§149.
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The presentation of the problem is indeed based on the concept of “understanding” as this
word seems to mark the moment in which someone who is taught a game (a technique)
grasps the rules “all at once”. The remark on the slip of paper between §§149 and 150
contains more examples where one may wonder what the temporal status of knowledge and
understanding is, particularly in comparison to what is rightly called “mental state” according
to Wittgenstein: dejection, excitement, pain:
“He was dejected the whole day”
“He was in great excitement the whole day”
“He has been in pain uninterruptedly since yesterday”. –
We also say, “Since yesterday I understood the word”. ‘Uninterruptedly’, though?
– To be sure one can speak of an interruption of understanding. But in what
cases? Compare: “When did your pains get less?” and “When did you stop
understanding that word?”
The grammar of “to know” is related to the grammar of “to be able to” and “to understand”
and in all three cases the problems of time threaten the straightforward interpretation in terms
of a space whose locations one could all “know”, for example, by having a picture in one’s
head. “To understand” such a system would then seem to be an instantaneous grasping of the
whole grammar, “as if one could, as it were, swallow it all at once” (MS114, 44v).
Baker and Hacker, with whom I agree that the rule-following problems are based on this
picture of the static presence of a system (2009, 25), refer in their commentary mainly to
MS119 where rule-following is discussed in a way very similar to the Investigations; but the
underlying conflict is already present much earlier which is why I link it to the space and
calculus idea. Baker and Hacker admit that the complex of problems is already present in the
Big Typescript (2009, 8); this is, in turn, based on even earlier manuscripts, so the problem is
in fact present in most of the “middle Wittgenstein”. Even though they rightly point out that
the issue got enriched in the Investigations, my emphasis is different. Since I am interested
in the continuity of Wittgenstein’s thinking and in the development of space concepts, I focus
on the earlier sketches of the problem. The fact that the basic conflict of the rule-following
considerations is already present in 1930 motivates my approach to relate it to Wittgenstein’s
way of thinking at the time which is indeed dominated by spatial metaphors.
With these considerations in mind, it makes sense to look at the Big Typescript again, the
summary of the “middle period”. The section headings can again be a helpful guide through
the argument. The chapter “Instantaneous understanding and the application of a word in
time” is divided into five sub-chapters:
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1. To understand a word = To be able to use it. To understand a language: to have
command of a calculus.
2. How does understanding a sentence accompany uttering or hearing it?
3. Is the meaning of a word shown in time? Like the actual degree of freedom in a
mechanism? Is the meaning of a word only revealed in the course of time as its use
develops?
4. Does a knowledge of grammatical rules accompany the expression of a sentence when
we understand it – its words?
5. The rules of grammar – and the meaning of a word. Is meaning, when we understand
it, grasped “all at once”? And unfolded (laid out, spread out), as it were, in the rules of
grammar? (cf. MS213, 143–169; BT 2005, 110e-127e)
The tone of these headings is rather dubitative, no ultimate answers to the questions are
given in the sections. In the last one, it even seems as if the two conceptions might coexist
together so that meaning can be somehow compressed in the state of understanding and
then unfolded in the rules. The tempting conception is illustrated with powerful images
that suggest the static picture, the idea that the sign summed up the whole grammar as if
it was contained in the sign “like a string of pearls in a box and that we only had to pull it
out. (But this is precisely the image that leads us astray)” (MS112, 110v).183 While this
remark is set in the context of ostensive definitions of colour which seem to imply the whole
grammar of colours, the same analogy is repeated in the context of negation in 1932 where
Wittgenstein again points out that the sign of negation only has sense as a move in a game:
“Only dynamically the sign functions, not statically” he says, followed by the string-of-pearls
analogy, and he further comments:
As if the understanding was a momentary grasping of something of which I can
later draw the consequences; in a way, as if these consequences already existed,
in an ideal sense, before they are drawn. As if the cube already contained the
geometry of the cube and I only had to unfold it184 [. . . ] (MS114, 47v—48r)
183. Jane Heal sees the struggle against this image as central in Wittgenstein’s work: “the idea of concept
possession as the embodying of some psychic mechanism, in virtue of which a person is hooked up [. . . ] to
some predefined set of possibilities is exactly the tempting misconception from which the Wittgensteinian
reflections are designed to free us” (1989, 207).
184. Note how something like this idea was implied by the remarks about possibility and space in TLP
2.012–2.013.
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The problem can perhaps be summed up with this remark: “The most difficult problem
seems to be the contrast, the relation, between the operating with language in time and
the momentary grasping of a sentence” (MS111, 179). That Wittgenstein’s reflections on
rule-following are to a large extent motivated by these two contrasting conceptions is not
a new observation; as mentioned, Baker and Hacker already point out that the indisputable
fact that we sometimes do grasp something at a stroke, and call it understanding, clashes
with the idea of meaning as use.185 Beyond that, however, I want to point out that it is a
conception Wittgenstein was prone to due to his earlier conceptions of meaning as locations
in a conceptual space.
In the Tractatus, logical space was not dynamic. Time was simply a sub-form of logical
form, one dimension of logical space, in which all possible facts coexist simultaneously,
or rather timelessly. It is a variant of the block universe, in which every event has its fixed
place, or rather a multidimensional multiverse in which all possible worlds (totalities of facts)
are predetermined. Perhaps one should not reify this structure too much, but it is in any
case obvious that time plays a very subordinated role in it and that the general conception is
timeless.186 The smaller grammatical spaces of the middle period in principle inherit this
static nature, although the concept receives some first cracks. Especially the considerations
of generality and intentionality seem to involve temporal questions: the problem was that an
expectation is internally related to an event that has not yet happened (and might not happen
at all). Again, it has to be stressed that the internal relation is one between possibilities, not
actualities which could only be external. The similarity between a counterfactual proposition
and a capability that is not put to action becomes pressing in this context.
A clearly timeless geometry was, for example, the space of colors which could be
illustrated by the colour-octahedron, significantly a picture in which all colours can be
perceived simultaneously as well as their relations to one another. The grammar of visual
space, however, despite being frequently called a “geometry”, did account for certain temporal
phenomena which were related with their inherent inexactitude. Since the visual field is
ever changing, its grammar does not allow for an absolute exactitude as could perhaps be
achieved in a static, finite, and discrete geometry.
The problem becomes manifest in the context of understanding. Does he who understands
a colour statement have the whole system of colours present in his mind? One could think
185. By taking into account large parts of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, I am closer to the exegetical approaches to
rule-following like Baker and Hacker’s than to its interpretation as an argument on scepticism as presented by
Kripke (1982). Still, I go beyond them by showing where the idea of “understanding at a stroke” comes from.
The philosophical confusions that Wittgenstein wants to clarify in his writings are above all views he is himself
inclined to have, but fails to reconcile with other commonsensical views he accepts.
186. An attempt to understand time-relations in the Tractatus is given by Sluga, but he agrees that the book
itself largely neglects temporal questions (2017, 427–429).
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so because it is indeed a relatively perspicuous system and could exist as a schema on
a piece of paper (a method Wittgenstein often uses: mental maps can be replaced with
physical maps). But is having such a map the same as understanding colour concepts?
Does he who understands a proposition have all its combinatorial possibilities present in
his mind, the whole logical space through which it “reaches” (cf. TLP, 3.42)? Although a
certain uneasiness with the idea of grasping something at a stroke can be seen already in
remarks from 1930, Wittgenstein would at least consider that position which is probably
based on his reflections on the systematicity of language discussed above: “If ‘to understand’
does not mean ‘to translate’, then it means: to see the sign in the space of its grammatical
rules” (MS110, 51). Having said that each sign requires a grammatical space, Wittgenstein
continues: “Hence the sign cannot exist without grammar” and further: “The sign without
grammar would be the ‘static’ sign” (MS110, 126). I take it that at this time, which is, as it
were, the beginning of the calculus phase, it dawned on him that the two images clash: that
on the hand grammar is supposed to be a space of simultaneous possibilities and on the other
the possible applications of a word (its locations) should not be static.187
There is another way to put the problem that the sign only has sense as part of a system,
that this system is determined by the use of the signs, and that therefore it seems that the
whole, temporally extended system is somehow compressed in the sign. The above-quoted
remark on the illusion that a sign contains its grammar “like a string of pearls in a box” ends
as follows:
[. . . ] The geometrical rules constitute the cube (give it a constitution). What
I used to say about the ‘word-body’ is the clear expression of this illusion.
(MS114, 48r)
What did Wittgenstein say about the “word-body”? It is again a misleading picture, sometimes
also called “meaning-body”, which mixes two different kinds of sign. Its motivation was
the problem that two signs may have the same appearance and yet be used in very different
ways, and hence have different grammars. For example, the word “is” can be used to express
predication or equality (“the rose is red” or “two times two is four”). The two words may be
conceived as “bodies” that have one surface in common – hence their similar appearance
–, but behind that surface differ in their three-dimensional structure. Think of a triangular
prism and a tetrahedron (cf. MS110, 112 f.). The word “body” is here to be understood
geometrically. In German, Körper can mean a physical body, but also a geometrical concept
187. Like Engelmann, Uffelmann stresses that the later occurrences of “grammar” are interchangeable with
“use” (Uffelmann 2018, 41). While this is indeed a significant shift of emphasis, I do not think that grammar
has lost its formal role completely. Rather, it oscillates between the formal sense and the empirical (use) sense
as I shall show below in section 6.2.
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(e.g. Platonische Körper). This ambivalence is part of the source of confusion. For in its
physical sense it seems to suggest that there really is a difference to the words in any given
moment, namely that they do have these different possibilities of application, symbolised
by their different meaning bodies. Another illustration of this problem is the difference
of the musical tones #e and f which are identical tones, auditive “signs”, but belong to
different scales, different “grammars” as musicians indeed say. Wittgenstein acknowledges
the temptation to believe that the two tones do sound different, if one thinks about the
differing grammatical structures (cf. MS157b, 1v). But the grammar, the system to which
the sign belongs, is not contained in the sign; the sign is constituted by the system.
In the Investigations, there are more illustrative examples: does he who knows the
multiplication table for the numbers 1 to 10 (in German: das Einmaleins) think of the whole
table; or does he who knows the alphabet think of the whole series of letters in each moment
(cf. §148)? The “cube” from the middle-period returns at the beginning of the rule-following
considerations where the problem is framed in a very explicit way:
When someone says the word “cube” to me, for example, I know what it means.
But can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand it
in this way?
Yes; but on the other hand, isn’t the meaning of the word also determined by this
use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict? Can what we grasp
at a stroke agree with a use, fit or fail to fit it? And how can what is present to us
in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a use?
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? – Isn’t it
something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture? (§139)
The point of the argument is to show that there may well be a picture before one’s
mind, but it cannot serve as the justification of one’s actions. The picture of a cube may be
interpreted as a prism by using a different method of projection. And even if the method
of projection was somehow indicated in the mental picture, by adding beams of projection
to it, this could again be interpreted in different ways.188 The upshot of these remarks is
that there is something like “a normal case and abnormal cases” (§142), there are more or
less established frameworks in human societies and that something is “right” means just:
that someone acts in accordance with an established space. However, this normal usage,
too, does not determine all applications of a rule rigorously as the space metaphor suggests.
This misleading picture was present in the Tractatus where the “proposition reaches through
188. “If the method of projection is a bridge, it is one which is not build until the application has been made”
(MS116, 124).
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the whole logical space” and is discussed as a problem in the context of rule-following in a
manuscript from 1944. “The transitions are actually already made” means I no longer have a
choice.
Once the rule is stamped with a certain meaning it draws the line of how it is to
be followed through the whole space [. . . ] No, my description only had sense if
it was meant symbolically. – ‘So it seems to me’, I should have said. (MS128,
45)
Hypostatising this space in which all steps of the rule are already determined is, again, turning
a concept that was used as a tool – a tool to highlight the difference between causal and
logical dependency – into a “mythological description” (ibid. 46), in the same sense as a
notation can become a mythology when it is taken as the description of de re necessities (cf.
5.2.2).
In the Investigations, this problem leads, after a detour on the nature of understanding
and reading, to the much more intricate debates about the logic of rule-following which I
cannot go into here in more detail, and to the social aspects of conceptual frameworks to
the concept of normality (about which I will say a bit in 6.2). My aim here was to raise
awareness to the fact that this famous group of arguments, the build-up to, and part of, the
rule-following passages is in fact another way in which the space metaphor is challenged
and that it is related with the break-in of time into the spatial frameworks. It seems as if
the rule determines all its applications and implications like a geometry determines all its
possible locations and constructions. And these rules appear, like geometries, as expressions
of necessity, they are “a matter of course. As much as it is a matter of course for me to
call this colour blue”189 (PI, §238). However, when the perspective of time and actions is
considered, the intuitive assumption becomes problematic.
That the problem is not really settled with the end of the “rule-following chapter” – if it
can be isolated like this at all, which I think it cannot – may be seen by means of a remark
from 1949, published in the so-called part II of the Investigations, that formulates the basic
problem again:
If someone says, “When I heard this word, it meant ... to me”, he is referring to
a point in time and to a way of using the word. (Of course, it is this combination
that we fail to grasp.) (PPF, §7)
189. Compare this to the reference to relativity in which Wittgenstein says that the certainty to call something
red is “at the basis of my language-game” (MS164, 82) – here the emphasis is on the constitutive nature of
grammar (which is compared to Einstein’s move in relativity theory); in the Investigations the same certainty
explains the misleading assumption that a rule produces all its implications in advance (cf. section 4.5).
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6.2 Ambivalences: Logic and Experience
I have already indicated that Wittgenstein’s claim to be merely descriptive can be understood
in different ways. There is the basic opposition between description and explanation where a
clear preference for the former is recognisable. It is based on the rejection of causal theories
which is a constant in Wittgenstein’s thinking: in the Tractatus he said that “belief in the
causal nexus” is (the) “superstition”190 (TLP, 5.1361) and in the Investigations it is reaffirmed
that “it was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones [. . . ] all explanation
must disappear, and description alone must take its place” (PI, §109). While description
seems to be a rather straightforward activity as opposed to explanation, it itself can become
problematic in certain contexts. If it is used in contrast to other concepts than explanation, it
is no longer so clear whether Wittgenstein is always on the descriptive side; it seems that he
at least acknowledges other aspects of his philosophy which are not descriptive in a strictly
neutral way. In the first sub-section, I shall look at a framework’s different status whether it
is conceived in a prescriptive or in a descriptive way. In the second, I shall elaborate on an
ambiguity I have already mentioned several times: sometimes it seems that by describing
a framework an existing feature of reality is described, and sometimes that the framework
first needs to be constructed and that instead of “mere description” there is an element of
creativity in it.
6.2.1 Prescriptive vs. Descriptive Grammar
To distinguish the two aspects of Wittgenstein’s grammatical frameworks, one can use a
distinction that is known from the discipline of linguistics: that between prescriptive and
descriptive grammar. By prescriptive I mean that the framework of rules is conceived as the
range of possibilities in a binding sense. This means that we cannot speak of something that
does not fall within this range. To use a word in a way that deviates from common usage,
would be to transgress the “bounds of sense”, it would be nonsense. By contrast it would
be descriptive to simply state how a word is normally used. Since this use amounts to a
complicated language-game that is played with the word, it describes a range of possibilities
too, the word’s possible applications, but the emphasis in this case is on simply stating
these possibilities rather than on licensing them or legitimising them as opposed to other
illegitimate usages. Moreover, the claim of a framework described in this way is not absolute:
190. The contrast between superstition and mistake, which is highlighted in the Investigations (cf. §110),
corresponds to the distinction between space and place: while a mistake refers to a false location in a space,
superstition refers to a space as a whole – the whole way of looking at things is somehow “wrong”.
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if something unknown occurs, it would simply be recorded and added to the dynamic totality
of use instead of being sanctioned as nonsense.
It is not clear on which side Wittgenstein is in this opposition. The Tractatus with its
logical space for everything meaningful was quite clearly on the prescriptive side. Its purpose
was indeed to draw a boundary between sense and nonsense.191 Parts of this prescriptive
element remain vital in Wittgenstein’s later thinking. At least in the discussion of colours,
the purpose of grammar is clearly to exclude nonsense; likewise in the context of actual
games (e.g. castling in draughts). Importantly, it is not only nonsense to violate a rule of
grammar, but also to express it as if it were an empirical truth. Let us consider a remark from
the “private language argument”:
In what sense are my sensations private? – Well, only I can know whether I am
really in pain; another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is false, and
in another nonsense. [. . . ]
These two ways are the two senses of description we have distinguished: if the statement is a
grammatical proposition about a form of expression (knowing that I am in pain is not part of
its range of possibilities, not a move in the game) and in this sense prescriptive, then it is
nonsense to utter it in the form of a quasi-empirical claim:
[. . . ] It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in
pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps that I am in pain? [. . . ] This
much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I
am in pain; but not to say it about myself. (§246)192
However, in the other sense, as a neutral description of the use of pain expressions, the
statement is simply false, because we do say that other people know whether I am in pain
or not. If someone says about someone displaying pain behaviour “he is in pain” this is not
considered a piece of nonsense, but simply an empirical observation – in this case, however,
it does not have the metaphysical nimbus of a deep insight which it had when first uttered
by the interlocutor. More examples from the Investigations likewise imply this prescriptive
element of grammar. “When a sentence is called senseless, it is not, as it were, its sense that
is senseless. Rather, a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn
from circulation.” (PI, §500). If the framework is accepted, it is nonsense to state something
that is part of the geometry as if it were a fact. If it is merely a description of the use of a
word, then it can always be false as it is in the case of “only I can know my sensations”.
191. It was descriptive only insofar as the notation introduced therein was meant to be able to really describe
reality.
192. Cf. §401: “if you logically exclude other people’s having something, it loses its sense to say that you
have it.”
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That “every description can be conceived as a rule, every rule as description” was already
clear to Wittgenstein in 1930 (cf. MS107, 233).193 A sentence like “this is blue” can mean
“this shall be called blue” (in a game for example) in which case it would be a prescriptive and
grammatical proposition; or it can be a description in an already established space of things
and colours in which an object is said to have the “coordinate” blue – this truly descriptive
sentence can always be false, the prescriptive one cannot.
The ambivalence is so confusing because it is one and the same sign which has these
different roles. Qua grammatical rule a proposition may be timeless and fixed, qua description
it is valid only at a certain point of time. Conflating the two roles provokes the kinds of
statement Wittgenstein argues against constantly: statements taking a formal, prescriptive,
feature to be a quasi-empirical fact which has the strange property of being always true.
Therefore, his reminders are sometimes meant to highlight the logical, formal, role of such a
statement so as to emphasise that something which cannot possibly be false is part of the
framework, not a possibility within it; however, when this risks turning into a mythology of
metaphysical “super-concepts”, he insists that there is also a descriptive aspect to it which
makes it fallible just like any other empirical judgement and that, if the use of words and
human activities (forms of life) were different, even those seemingly necessary propositions
could be different. An awareness of this problem is present at all stages of Wittgenstein’s
writing of which I have given some evidence in my discussions of spaces and related concepts.
But there is a certain development from emphasising the prescriptive side to emphasising
the descriptive and changeable side (which has led Engelmann to believe that Wittgenstein
abandoned grammar in favour of an “anthropological view”). In the last manuscripts of On
Certainty, the importance of a statement’s role in a specific situation is spelled out most
explicitly: certainty is what is taken for granted, what first of all constitutes the possibility
of doubt for other things, but which cannot be doubted itself. However, Wittgenstein warns
against expecting more than this from our concept of certainty. He warns particularly against
the search for a kind of absolute foundation of knowledge, because even those constitutive
frameworks that are exempt from doubt can change over time or could be imagined differently,
that is, if they are not considered as prescriptive rules in a specific situation, but as historical
facts that I and other people take this set of propositions for granted at a certain time. This
193. It speaks also against the assumption of a strong break between “middle” and “late” Wittgenstein – for
example as “grammar” vs. “use” – that in the context of this remark the importance of use is already very
present: he already brings in the metaphor of words as money, not in the sense of reference, but of what one can
do with them (MS107, 233; cf. also PI, §120). And also the idea of “use in time” is already anticipated here
and brought in connection and contrast to that of “the proposition as part of a system of propositions” (MS107,
234).
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fluctuation between description and prescription is acknowledged in the Investigations,194
but finds its most illustrative expression in the river-bed metaphor in On Certainty:
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical proposi-
tions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions
as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that
fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts
may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed
and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from
the other.
But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be
wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as
something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.
And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration
or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in
another gets washed away, or deposited. (OC, §§96–99)
To overemphasise the prescriptive aspect of grammar runs the risk of turning into a
somewhat authoritarian demeanour. It may then appear as if language was in fact a system
(or many) of complicated rules which have to be revealed by the philosopher whose task it is
to point out transgressions of those rules: to warn people when they are talking nonsense.
Although they show awareness of this problem and occasionally qualify their claims with
a caveat, scholars like Hacker and Glock tend to highlight rather this side of grammar.
They tend to excessively highlight the similarity – which does indeed exist to an extent –
between the middle Wittgenstein and the later writings, that is, the sense-constitutive role
of grammar as a prescriptive framework (cf. Hacker 2012b) and neglect the shift towards
use as implying empirical aspects of logic (and the therapeutic function). Following this
prescriptive reading of grammar, they would hold that the “transgression” or “violation” of
its rules yields “nonsense” (Baker and Hacker 2009, 19 and 57; cf. Glock 1991, 84–85) and
that these rules are rules that everyone has to accept.
A sign becomes meaningful not through being associated with an object, but
through having a rule-governed use. Whether a sign is meaningful depends
194. E.g. “What today counts as an observed concomitant of phenomenon A will tomorrow be used to define
’A”’ (PI, §79); “what a proposition is, is in one sense determined by the rules of sentence formation (in English,
for example), and in another sense by the use of the sign in the language-game” (§136).
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on whether there is an established use, whether it can be employed to perform
meaningful linguistic acts; what meaning it has depends on how it can be used.
(Glock 1996, 376–368)
The special function of grammatical reminders is to draw attention to the vio-
lation of linguistic rules by philosophers, a violation that results in nonsense.
(Glock 1991, 78, quoted in Kuusela 2008, 242)
A certain tendency is visible in these statements and it has indeed provoked a reaction in
Wittgenstein scholarship. Critics of this view have highlighted that this prescriptivism about
grammar amounts to a theory about language despite the well-known fact that Wittgenstein
rejected the view that philosophy should put forward a theory of language (cf. Kuusela 2008;
Engelmann 2013b). Engelmann argues that the idea of rule-governed frameworks is more or
less replaced by what he calls the “genetic method” and the “anthropological view” which
has a focus on facts of language acquisition and use, on the genesis of forms of expression
and on their actual application by human beings in an anthropological sense (cf. Engelmann
2013b). Hence, unlike Hacker, he stresses the differences between the middle and the late
Wittgenstein and even speaks of different philosophies.
While the criticism of the one-sided view of prescriptivism is justified, this view can be
blind to the other side and hence miss the ambiguity in Wittgenstein’s thinking: it can make
it appear as if the prescriptive aspects of grammar have disappeared completely and been
replaced by a mere description of human practices for “therapeutic” purposes, to clarify how
a certain misleading analogy has arisen without, however, giving a positive account of how
things should be looked at.195
“The fluctuation of grammar between criteria and symptoms makes it appear as if there
were nothing but symptoms” (PI, §354).196 Beyond the philological evidence that there are
indeed passages in the Investigations and later that indicate an at least locally prescriptive
reading of grammar, there is also a philosophical uneasiness about this purely descriptive
view. It threatens to eliminate the difference between empirical and grammatical propositions
which is never neglected in Wittgenstein, even when the empirical side of the latter is
acknowledged as in On Certainty (“But I distinguish between the movement of the water and
the river-bed itself”). To say that there is no grammar, that there are no prescriptive rules at
195. Kuusela, who agrees with Engelmann on the rejection of the authoritarian and “theoretical” accounts of
Hacker and Glock, recognises this shortcoming of a purely therapeutic approach (cf. Kuusela 2019a).
196. For a detailed discussion of criteria and symptoms see Cavell (1979). It is clear why this remark belongs
to the context: criteria are on the level of geometry, they prescriptively say that, if A is a criterion of B, and A
is given, then B is true. By contrast, symptoms are “softer” insofar as they only say (descriptively), if A is a
symptom of B, and A is given, then B might be true, but needn’t be necessarily true.
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all, because they can change and can be described in a quasi-empirical manner, is like saying
that there is no river since its water is in constant flux and even the river-bed may change. It
is the Heraclitean fallacy that something dynamic cannot be talked about as a stable entity at
all which Wittgenstein explicitly addresses in the context of time questions quoted above:
“The man who said that one couldn’t step twice in the same river, said something false. One
can step twice into the same river” (MS110, 34). To see that reality is ever changing and
fleeting is not to say that we can never speak about reality; we can and do speak about it and
if actual language is the reference point then we see that the word “fleeting” itself only makes
sense as a concept that is opposed to something stable. Likewise, to see that a grammatical
framework can never a priori capture the totality of empirical possibilities, is not to say that
we can never construct any framework that determines things a priori or that we are not in
fact guided by such implicit structures when we use language. These are the formal structures
whose role in Wittgenstein’s considerations I have tried to extract from his writings in the
preceding chapters.
6.2.2 Grammatical Realism vs. Constructivism
As I said, Kuusela agrees with the criticism of too much prescriptivism, but warns against a
merely descriptive and therapeutic view. He suggests understanding rule-governed frame-
works such as calculi and games as constructed models, as objects of comparison, with
the aim of clarification. Thereby they are dependent not only on the context, but also on
the person who stands in need of clarification. Describing these models is one method of
philosophical clarification among others.197
Here we encounter another problem for the purely descriptive account of philosophy. A
purely descriptive account of constitutive frameworks would be to assume that there really
is something like a grammatical space which can be described; it is a question of realism
about these geometrical structures which Wittgenstein himself seems to be rather sceptical of.
However, it remains a recurrent temptation for him to reify expressions of potentiality like
“form”, “space”, “location”, or also “moves in a game”, “applications of a rule” as if they
were something like real objects. To treat the constitutive frameworks as constructed models
counters this realism, but in that case they cannot be accounted for with mere descriptions.198
This ambivalence is related to the distinction of prescriptive and descriptive grammar: the
problem of philosophical authoritarianism becomes pressing if one combines a realist view
197. Another method would, again, be “anthropological”: remarks about the natural history of humans (cf.
Kuusela 2019b, 182).
198. One could perhaps characterise these positions as idealism and realism which Wittgenstein both rejects:
“The one party attacks the normal form of expressions as if they were attacking a statement; the others defend it,
as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being” (PI, §402).
160 Limitations of Spatial Frameworks
about frameworks with the claim that their objectively existing rules really and bindingly
determine what makes sense, what is rational and so on.199 It is somewhat less threatening
if one considers the frameworks as man-made systems which can be altered if required.
The non-prescriptive descriptivism is compatible with grammatical realism, but seems to
be philosophically empty: since the frameworks are not granted any prescriptive power, to
merely describe them, even if they are real, is no more than an anthropological observation –
it can have a philosophical function in a negative sense, insofar as it offers an explanation
of how certain misleading expressions have come about. To merely describe constructed
frameworks is, of course, also possible, but if one does not ascribe any influence to them on
questions of sense and nonsense, then the idea of constructing new frameworks seems to lose
its point.
I do not want to straightforwardly identify with one of these approaches; naturally, the
ambiguity of each distinction is reflected in the ambiguity of their combinations. Neither
in the distinction descriptive-constructivist nor in the distinction descriptive-prescriptive
is there a clear preference for one side. Hence, I would again subscribe to a polyphonic
reading of Wittgenstein in which various voices are presented none of which is declared the
correct one in an absolute sense. What I find most interesting among the combinations of the
distinctions presented is the idea that frameworks are constructed and prescriptive where the
non-realism somewhat extenuates the authoritative claim. However, this would completely
neglect the descriptive side of both distinctions: that there is also a certain factive element
in these frameworks which restricts our freedom to construct them. So in the end one has
to accept the ambiguities and highlight one side or the other according to the context of the
philosophical problem at hand.
If language-games are only taken as constructed models to illuminate certain points of
reality then our freedom is almost unrestricted, but this clashes with Wittgenstein’s claim
for being purely descriptive which requires something like a factive element. As we have
seen, he insists that language need not conform to a calculus or a game, that these are only
objects of comparison (cf. PI, §81) – and this seems to imply that they can be constructed.
The paragraph opens with a reference to Ramsey who called logic “a normative science”.
Now one could say that if the propositions of logic (or grammar) are norms, then they must
have some prescriptive power: unlike factive statements, norms speak about what ought to be
done, not about what is the case (Glock, for example, who tends to a prescriptive reading of
rules, insists on their normative nature). But Wittgenstein does not seem to use “normative”
199. There would then be something like absolute nonsense which completely fails to accord with the form of
reality which is reflected in grammar. Hacker’s reading of the late Wittgenstein is anti-realist (cf. Hacker 2017)
insofar his philosophy is only about forms of language, not about de re facts and necessities. However, Hacker
is a realist about these grammatical forms: they exist and determine sense and nonsense.
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in this sense. That logic is not factive has been his basic conviction since the Tractatus which
he has never doubted anyway. So why should he make that distinction? One could read the
remark making almost the opposite claim: if logic is normative, then it is not the reflection of
metaphysical necessity, but has contingent, factive, aspects to it. For unlike metaphysical
entities, norms can be described, they can change and so on. In a notebook with drafts for
the Investigations, Wittgenstein seems to refer to Ramsey’s view precisely in this vein: “I
always wanted to say (against Ramsey): Surely, logic cannot become an empirical science.
But how we use the language/words, this is, of course, experience” (MS152, 93–94).
The question returns in the idea of forms of life, the cultural background which functions
as a constitutive framework. The emphasis of these latter frameworks is clearly on the
empirical, on the factive side of our dichotomy. By taking up a foundational role in language,
they are on the one hand constitutive of meaning, a characteristic of the form we have
established: human agreement, agreement in form of life, is not agreement in opinions (cf.
PI, §241); it determines what can be true, not what is true in a specific situation. On the
other hand, we cannot influence or construct forms of life; in this sense they are a foundation,
a number of empirical facts about the way human beings behave. Lebensform is more on
the use side of our frameworks. A form of life is, as it were, the totality of uses; these, in
turn, determine which language-games can be played, what counts as having sense in which
situations and so on. In this sense they could be the object of an anthropological study indeed.
The difficulty to balance between the factive and the logical side of such systems is expressed
in the remark following that on “agreement in forms of life”:
It is not only agreement in definitions, but also (odd as it may sound) agreement
in judgements that is required for communication by means of language. This
seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. – It is one thing to describe methods
of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But
what we call “measuring” is in part determined by a certain constancy in results
of measurement. (PI, §242)
What you say seems to amount to this, that logic belongs to the natural history
of man. And that is not compatible with he hardness of the logical “must”.
But the logical “must” is a component part of the propositions of logic, and these
are not propositions of human natural history. If what a proposition of logic said
was: Human beings agree with one another in such and such ways (and that
would be the form of the natural-historical proposition), then its contradictory
would say that there is here a lack of agreement. Not, that there is an agreement
of another kind.
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The agreement of humans that is a proposition of logic is not an agreement in
opinions, much less in opinions of logic. (MS164, 149–150; cf. RFM, 352–353)
What seems central to me, is not to absolutise either horn of the dilemma: After acknowl-
edging that forms of life are more on the factive side, admitting that even the river-bed
may change, Wittgenstein immediately qualifies this insight. The changeability does not
amount to equalising the river-bed with the river. Apparently reconsidering Ramsey’s idea he
writes: “But if someone were to say ‘So logic too is an empirical science’ he would be wrong.
Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by
experience, at another as a rule of testing” (OC, §98). In the first sense it is a description of
something “real” which can be tested, in the second sense it is constructed. Simply describing
human practices in the first sense obviously borders to the discipline of anthropology.200
However Wittgenstein is aware of the risk of turning philosophy into an empirical science.
His “ethnological view”, he writes in 1940, “means that we take a point of view far afield
so as to see things more objectively” (MS162b, 67v). – What was considered impossible
in the Tractatus, to be outside of logical space, becomes possible in the later philosophy
thanks to, first, the plurality of spaces and, second, to the ambiguity of grammar between
the logical and the empirical: now there is the possibility to treat one’s own constitutive
framework like the culture of a foreign people, that is, to simply describe the use of words
and the activities with which it is interwoven as if they were not treated as given certainties
in one’s own culture. However, this objective view will reveal that some propositions are
used as certainties and do have a foundational function, but this we know not through insight
into the necessary form of the world, but by describing it as one form out of many possible.
Besides Engelmann and Kuusela, other scholars have noticed this turn towards anthro-
pology. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2003) focuses on the foundationalist function of what
Wittgenstein calls “hinges” in On Certainty.201 However, the foundational role of a frame-
work – I would subsume “hinges” under my “geometrical” propositions since they are exempt
from doubt202 – is not the absolute one which the foundationalist strives for. “The difficulty
200. For Kuusela, it is an extension of logic as the method of philosophy. I agree by understanding anthropo-
logical frameworks, forms of life, as extensions and modifications of spatial frameworks.
201. Besides, she highlights the universal nature of some anthropological facts, but given the preceding
discussion of Wittgenstein’s anthropological methods, I do not think he would be interested in such a contingent
universality. The point of seeing something sub specie anthropology is precisely to imagine that seemingly
necessary things could be different.
202. It is debatable whether they are “grammatical”: for Hacker, only propositions governing the use of
language are grammatical, hence hinge propositions are not, because they are of the form of empirical
propositions (cf. Baker and Hacker 2009, 258; cf. Bassols 2010). However, Moyal-Sharrock rightly highlights
that they seem to be empirical, but function like logical statements to which a certain necessity is ascribed. I
would agree with her and say that they belong to the framework of fixed certainties which first of all constitute
the possibility of empirical truth and falsity.
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to do without any theory is this: to take what is incomplete as something complete” (MS133,
73v–74r). Instead of treating something as necessary because it is subjectively necessary for
our activities, the ethnological viewpoint is to see these things as something a certain people
holds necessary at a certain time. This “anthropological, or even anthropomorphic, view of
necessity [. . . ] may be disappointing”, as Stanley Cavell has pointed out. It seems to be not
the kind of thing we had in mind when we talked about logic (it seems to “abolish logic”):
“as if it is not really necessity which he has given an anthropological view of. As though if the
a priori has a history it cannot really be the a priori in question” (Cavell 1979, 118–119). But
the point is, despite all these historical and factive elements, to still recognise its grammatical
or logical role in a specific situation – its role as an a priori framework which determines
what counts as possible.
In my view, the role of anthropology or “natural history” is as related with the idea of
frameworks as are the spaces, calculi and language-games of the middle and late period; only
they stress the empirical side of these frameworks, the one which is real and can be described,
not the constructivist side which they also have. Based on my study of spaces so far, I would
say that the former aims at the clarification of the space we are placed in, it may be an
inherited framework or conventions, and that the latter aims at inventing new spaces – and
that both aspects are valid and can help to avoid confusion in our attempts to capture reality
with our systematic frameworks. Indeed a description of reality without any framework
is not possible because the space first of all establishes the means to describe anything, it
determines sense, and we cannot do without sense, even if none of these sense-constitutive
frameworks is the real one. “There is no outside; outside we cannot breathe” (PI, §103).
An indication of the creative aspect of framework construction is visible in Wittgenstein’s
views on mathematics which is often conceived in terms of spaces (see section 4.3), nota-
tions and calculi. On the one hand their seemingly metaphysical and eternal truth can be
demystified by pointing out that it depends on actual practices and can be observed as part of
our natural history, as a cultural practice
[. . . ] I go through a proof and then accept its result. – I mean: this is simply
what we do. This is use and custom among us, or a fact of our natural history.
(RFM, 61; cf. MS117, 84–85)
But isn‘t it correct to say: The essential thing about mathematics is that it forms
concepts? – For mathematics is after all an anthropological phenomenon. Thus
we can recognize it as the essential thing about a great part of mathematics (of
what is called “mathematics”) and yet say that it plays no part in other regions.
(RFM, 399; cf. MS124, 115)
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However, this anthropological perspective also reveals that mathematical truths have a
different role than empirical truths, are treated as a priori, eternal, necessary and so on. The
two senses of description are to be considered here: any proposition could be considered a
mere description of a state of affairs; but given the use of a mathematical, or any prescriptive,
proposition, it turns out that they are rather to be understood in the sense of the description
of grammar, of a rule, not of a thing.
Are the propositions of mathematics anthropological propositions saying how
we men infer and calculate? – Is a statute book a work of anthropology telling
how the people of this nation deal with a thief etc.? – Could it be said: „The
judge looks up a book about anthropology and thereupon sentences the thief to
a term of imprisonment“? Well, the judge does not USE the statute book as a
manual of anthropology. (RFM, 192; cf. MS117, 172)
We shall see contradiction in a quite different light if we look at its occurrence
and its consequences as it were anthropologically – and when we look at it with
a mathematician‘s exasperation. That is to say, we shall look at it differently,
if we try merely to describe how the contradiction influences language-games,
and if we look at it from the point of view of the mathematical law-giver. (RFM,
220; cf. MS117, 256)
The development of these a priori frameworks is for Wittgenstein a creative task as we have
seen: the mathematician is a law-giver, “not a discoverer, but an inventor”. In a manuscript
from 1942 in which the mathematical is particularly intimately intertwined with philosophical
questions, he alludes to this kind of spontaneity in inventing new frameworks by using the
Kantian terminology of synthetic a priori (and: “form”) which has already been used in 1931.
“What makes one speak of a synthetic proposition is the new form” (MS125, 79r).
With regards to the two senses of style that I have distinguished (section 5.4.2), one can
say that Wittgenstein’s effort to find the right mode of expression for his thoughts – style
in the individual sense – is an effort to change other people’s style of thinking, now in the
more general sense of a cultural style as an a priori framework. It is often quoted that, for
Wittgenstein, philosophical problems, philosophical diseases, result from a “one-sided diet”
of examples (PI, §593). Elsewhere he says that this “disease of the philosophical problems
can only be cured through a changed mode of thinking and mode of life” (MS121, 27r).
And in his space phase he had already articulated the essential idea in similar imagery: “He
who teaches philosophy today gives dishes to the other, not because he likes them, but in
order to change his taste” (MS112, 223). In this sense, I also read the well-known statement
that “philosophy ought actually only to be written like poetry” – “Philosophie dürfte man
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eigentlich nur dichten” (MS146, 25v). His stylistic efforts are attempts to achieve something
which poetry occasionally achieves, namely to invent new forms of expression, to see things
in a new space and to look at the world differently.
However, the ambivalence discussed in this chapter must not be forgotten. Wittgenstein
seems to have seen this as a central problem of his whole philosophy. Now, I think, the
remark from 1946, which I have quoted in the introduction, has become more understandable:
If the mode of representation is arbitrary (willkürlich), why do not all humans
learn the same language – which would surely be so much more practical?
The forces that determine how something is represented are as great as those that
insist on the truth of the representation.
How small a thought it takes to fill a whole life! (MS131, 180)
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, I investigated the relation of space and time by means of a comparison of
the spatial frameworks in the early and middle Wittgenstein and of geometrical propositions,
which were thought to feature a timeless necessity, with the more dynamic frameworks of
calculi and games in the late middle and late periods. These do not treat of static locations,
but of possible moves and actions. There are not only many grammatical frameworks which
constitute sense, as shown in chapters 4 and 5, but these may also change over time, as they
themselves are partly constituted by the use of language which is extended in time.
The basic opposition that has taken shape is one between timeless and a priori spaces
on the one hand and a temporal and empirical reality on the other. Between these two
there is a dialectical relationship in which no side makes really sense without the other.
Speaking of a continuous readjustment of grammatical spaces stretches the concept of logic,
but Wittgenstein acknowledges the logical role of certain propositions that have a certain
necessity in a particular situation. Much of his work is concerned with the ambivalences
of these propositions: that they can be regarded as prescriptive rules or merely as empirical
regularities; as features of reality, insofar as they merely describe the practices of human





Aus mehr als einem Grunde wird, was
ich hier veröffentliche, sich mit dem
berühren, was Andre heute schreiben.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Philosophische Untersuchungen
We are now in a position to specify the claim that there is a certain unity in Wittgenstein’s
work and that it can be seen under the perspective of space. Space is just one name for
a number of connected concepts that play a central role in his philosophy. They stand
for formal systems by means of which philosophical problems are conceived. “Space” is
particularly suited to reveal the function of these systems for two reasons. First, because its
history provides a conceptual basis Wittgenstein could build on. The historical development
of space concepts in the 19th century prepared the ground for his use of logical space
in the Tractatus. In the gradual abstraction and formalisation of geometry since Kant,
which I have reconstructed, space was linked to concepts such as “form” and “a priori”
which remain important throughout Wittgenstein’s work and which are connected to all
concepts investigated in this thesis. Second, space is particularly suited to represent these
systems because of its enormous importance in large parts of Wittgenstein’s work. In my
reconstruction of the Tractarian system I have shown how it draws together key ideas of the
book such as the modal ontology, the picture theory, and the rejection of logical constants;
it also embodies one of the work’s major mistakes, namely its claim for absoluteness and
universality. Spaces remain, or become even more, central in the middle period. With
numerous examples, contextualisations, and interpretations, I have shown the variety of their
occurrences which correspond to so many forms and methods.
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Unlike scholars who draw sharp distinctions between middle and late Wittgenstein, I
have argued that essential ideas of the Investigations are already in place in the 1930s and
are accounted for with the spatial concepts I have presented; – that the problems of this
imagery are already recognised in these early writings, supports my claim and allows me to
provide an account of the changes from middle to late Wittgenstein without losing sight of
the similarities. Having carved out the functions of spaces allowed me to recognise other
concepts as related. These other concepts still share with spaces the function to distinguish
between a level of necessity – the level of the framework – and a level of contingency,
the possibilities inside the framework, one “location” as opposed to others which are a
priori equally possible. As the language of space and geometry, and eventually also of
calculus, becomes less important in Wittgenstein’s thinking, the systems lose their technical-
mathematical roots and increasingly become general metaphors for various ways to look
at things. Sure enough, this was already implied by the former concepts: it is a shift of
emphasis which does not alter everything that has been valid about constitutive frameworks.
That the systems, especially if conceived as static spaces, bring problems with them, does
not weaken, but confirm my claim for their importance. Much of Wittgenstein’s thinking
after 1929 is concerned with the articulation of these problems which, however, never lead
to a complete abandonment of the idea that formal systems constitute the way we look at
things and determine the range of possibilities. The task of the philosopher, according to my
reading of Wittgenstein, is to think precisely on this level of spaces.
In this thesis, I have interpreted a number of Wittgenstein’s self-reflective remarks about
his own method by means of my reading of spaces. The most famous one has not been
among them and it seems at first sight to be unrelated to my approach: “What is your aim
in philosophy? – To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (PI, §309). And yet in the
first version of that remark, Wittgenstein does place it in the context of spaces. In 1937, he
is discussing a situation in which someone tries to solve a geometrical puzzle, namely to
“match” a triangle and a hexagon, and is later surprised that they can be matched by placing
the hexagon inside the triangle. It is not that there is some sort of resistance against bringing
them in this position, but one simply tries everything to match them except this.
This position is, as it were, excluded from the geometry/space. As if there was a
“blind spot” in our mind. – And is it not really like that, when I believe to have
tried all possible positions, but have always, as if bewitched, missed this one.
Can one not say: the representation that shows you the solution removes a
blindness; or also, it changes your geometry. It shows you, as it were, a new
dimension of space. (as if one showed a fly the way out of the fly-bottle) (MS118,
44v)
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Not much has been said about aspect change in this thesis. In the context of the fly-bottle,
it becomes clear how my reading allows for an interpretation of it that does not treat it as a
completely new topic in a relatively late manuscript, the so-called part II of the Investigations
with the famous duck-rabbit head, but as connected and indeed central to Wittgenstein’s
philosophising. Conceiving of aspect change as a change of space, in the wide sense I
have elaborated, allows for a solution of the “paradox” that in aspect change everything
stays the same and yet changes in a significant sense. Arif Ahmed distinguishes between
the “optic” features of an image, which stay the same, and the “synoptic content”, which
changes. By stressing the synoptic side of aspect change, he highlights the organic nature
of the experience of an object which includes relations to other objects, actions, reactions,
and context. (cf. Ahmed 2017). As we have seen, it is problematic to conceive of an object
in complete isolation, outside of any conceptual framework, but I sympathise with the idea
that it is a synoptic, a holistic structure which determines the aspect change. Wittgenstein
is not merely interested in the psychological phenomenon, but in the logical issue, in the
change of spaces to which a philosopher can contribute by clarifying concepts or inventing
new spaces that constitute new possibilities (note the emphasis on “possible” in the quote
about the fly-bottle).
This is the creative task of the philosopher that I have pointed out in the last chapter:
to give dishes to the other “in order to change his taste”, to change his “way of looking at
things” (cf. PI, §144). That the other also has to accept the “picture” that is thus proposed
to him, calls indeed for some skill on the side of the philosopher: the result of clarification
or the suggested new framework should be perspicuous – to use another key word from
Wittgenstein scholarship that has been somewhat neglected in this thesis. This presentational
skill as well as the creativity in inventing new spaces is what I take to be at the basis of
Wittgenstein’s dictum that “philosophy ought actually only to be written like poetry”. It
aims for a change of perspective in the reader or listener that can be described as a change
of space, opening up new possibilities, in the strong sense of possibilities that have not
been conceivable before. If this change is a change of the rather large frameworks I have
discussed, it amounts to the kind of “conversion” that Stanley Cavell regards as an important
and decidedly ethical aim of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (cf. 1979, 125).
The results of my work reveal many intersections of Wittgenstein’s thinking with his
contemporaries. Not only does he stand in the tradition of an increasingly abstract and formal
account of space and geometry, which enabled his creative use of that imagery for new
purposes, but he also has connections to other thinkers who reacted to similar developments
at the same time. Michael Friedman has shown how Logical Positivism was influenced
by Kant, Poincaré, and Einstein at least as strongly as by Comte and Mach (cf. Friedman
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1999). The works of those three thinkers were milestones in the development of space
conceptions that Wittgenstein took up and modified in the Tractatus. According to Friedman,
philosophers such as Reichenbach and Carnap developed an account of a priori principles
that can be called “relativized a priori”: it assumes constitutive frameworks without the claim
for apodicticity that characterised the Kantian a priori. Wittgenstein’s grammatical spaces
and related concepts can be conceived as versions of this idea, insofar as they constitute a
certain domain without claiming absolute and timeless validity.203 However, his thinking is
more pluralist – “There are many more language-games than Carnap and others can dream of”
(MS134, 120) – and more open than Friedman’s rather unifying and reductionist account of a
priori frameworks which may be “relativized”, but whose succession is assumed to converge
to an ideal of rationality as conceived by mathematical physics.204
As we have seen, references to science and measurement as well as to particular scientists
abound in Wittgenstein’s work. My approach can help appreciating it as a contribution to
(among other things) the philosophy of science –and surprisingly for a reason for which he is
often considered an enemy of science in general: he insisted on the difference of philosophy
and science, of conceptual questions on the level of spaces and empirical questions inside a
given space. Another thinker who, according to Friedman, uses a form of the “relativized a
priori” is Thomas Kuhn. The relation between his theory of paradigms and Wittgenstein’s
grammatical frameworks may be even closer than is generally assumed. Kuhn was influenced
by Ludwik Fleck, a contemporary of Wittgenstein who had a conception of “styles” that
is strikingly similar to what I have discussed in section 5.4.2, even though they probably
did not know each other. While there are studies about Wittgenstein’s relation to these
thinkers (for Fleck see Griesecke 2008; Kogge 2008; for Kuhn see Kindi 2017), my approach
allows for a more systematic comparison on the basis of frameworks that constitute what
counts as possible in the first place. Fleck argues that styles of thinking determine what is
considered meaningful by a group of thinkers. When Wittgenstein made his claim that he
had developed a new philosophical method in 1933, he said that “the style of thinking has
changed” (MN, 67), referring to the German tradition which understands style in the sense of
an a priori framework (cf. Plaud 2011, 76). I argue that this method is not replaced later by a
plurality of methods, but that it is an essentially open method which acknowledges the need
to treat different forms differently. The method to conceive of logic in terms of systematic
frameworks, is not abandoned, but transformed and put into dialogue with ever new claims
of an unsystematic reality.
203. In the debate on Friedman’s ideas, Wittgenstein is mostly considered a “logical absolutist” because only
the Tractatus is considered. See my paper Beyond logical absolutism. Wittgenstein and the relativized a priori
(forthcoming).
204. For criticisms of Friedman’s view in this vein see Chang 2008; Mormann 2012; Stump 2015.
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Finally, I want to come back to the idea of philosophy as poetry. The epigraphs that
I used for the individual chapters in this thesis are taken from texts that were written at
Wittgenstein’s time. While Spengler’s book was published in 1918 and Adorno’s late work
sums up thoughts from the 30s to the 60s, Robert Musil and Hermann Broch coincide with
the middle Wittgenstein not only temporally – their great novels were published from 1930 to
1933 – but also locally as they were based in Vienna for much of that period. Their thinking
in this period is primarily concerned with the question of formal systems that determine
how a given situation is conceived and how such a space affects our actions. Based on my
understanding of constitutive frameworks, it would be possible to investigate from a fresh
angle these similarities between Wittgenstein and writers who worked, as it were, at the edge
of the Vienna Circle and added an aesthetical dimension to its formalist methods.
In light of all these connections, which come into light through a focus on frameworks,
one may revise a common cliché about Wittgenstein. Even though I consider thinking in
“spaces” as a recognisable characteristic, “Wittgensteinian” philosophy may after all not be
as idiosyncratic as it is often presented.
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